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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past half century, courts and legal scholars have written
innumerable opinions and articles that mention, discuss, praise, and
criticize antipsychotic medications,1 the class of psychoactive medications
that physicians began prescribing in the 1950s2 to treat psychoses.3 In
1. The earliest case in the LEXIS database of combined federal and state case law
that mentions an antipsychotic medication is Williams v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 319
(E.D. Va. 1955). Williams concerns a non compos mentis seaman who underwent
treatment at “Central State Hospital . . . the only public or private institution available to
Negro mental patients in Virginia.” Id. at 321. The decision describes the overcrowding
at this “public institution,” where, in early 1955, “there were 4578 patients on hand, or
an excess of 1180 over the rated capacity. . . . To care for the 4578 patients there are two
psychiatrists . . . .” Id. at 323. After discussing the limitations of then available
psychiatric therapies, “the Court . . . noted an interesting article appearing in Time
magazine (March 7, 1955) involving the use of new drugs referred to as chlorpromazine
and reserpine which have been very effective in certain types of schizophrenia cases.”
Id. at 322.
For a review of earlier criticisms of antipsychotic medications, see generally Thomas
G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, “Mind Control,” “Synthetic Sanity,” “Artificial
Competence,” and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic
Medications, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1983). For a recent critical discussion of these
medications, see generally BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH
TREATMENT 61–86 (1997). A highly critical view of antipsychotic medication appears in
the majority opinion in State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 758–60 (La. 1992) (describing
involuntary psychopharmacological treatment of a condemned inmate—who would
receive a lethal injection if competent for execution—as “the physical intrusion of
powerful, dangerous and unpredictable drugs into his body and brain”).
2. Chlorpromazine, more commonly known by its proprietary name Thorazine® ,
was the first of these drugs. See discussion infra Part III.A. (discussing its discovery and
initial use in the 1950s). Throughout this Article’s main text, medications are referred to
primarily using their nonproprietary names, in accordance with the usual policies of
scientific publications. Medications’ better known trade names, which often appear in
legal publications, are mentioned in these footnotes.
3. In current medical usage, “psychosis” is “a mental disorder characterized by
gross impairment in reality testing as evidenced by delusions, hallucinations, markedly
incoherent speech, or disorganized and agitated behavior, usually without apparent
awareness on the part of the patient of the incomprehensibility of his behavior.”
DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1489 (29th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
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the rapidly growing field of mental disability law,4 antipsychotic
medications figure prominently in cases and legislation involving
hospitalized patients’ right to refuse treatment,5 involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization,6 outpatient civil commitment,7 the Americans with
Disabilities Act,8 malpractice litigation,9 Medicaid entitlements,10 rights
DORLAND’S]. The various syndromes classified as psychotic disorders “emphasize
different aspects of the various definitions of psychotic.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR MENTAL DISORDERS 827 (4th ed. text rev.
2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. Psychotic symptoms occur in several types of mental
disorders. Id. at 750–51. See infra note 136 (listing several currently recognized
varieties of psychotic disorders).
4. See 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
1–6 (2d ed. 1998) (summarizing “the astonishing development” and “recent explosion of
mental disability legislation and litigation”).
5. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 153–385 (1999). The seminal cases in
this area are Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modified, 634 F.2d 650
(1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), suppl., 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d
836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); and Rivers v. Katz,
495 N.E.2d 337, 504 (N.Y. 1986). The Rogers and Rennie decisions limited themselves
to antipsychotic medications. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 653 n.1; Rennie, 653 F.2d at 839 n.2.
Rivers also mentions the use of lithium, a mood stabilizing medication used for many
psychiatric conditions, including manic depressive illness. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 340.
6. In Vitek v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court found that notwithstanding a
prisoner’s conviction for robbery and incarceration in state prison, he retained “a
residuum of liberty that would be infringed by a transfer to a mental hospital without
complying with minimum requirements of due process.” 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). One
reason for this was that at the hospital, the convict might receive “[c]ompelled treatment
in the form of mandatory behavior modification programs.” Id. at 492. The “compelled
treatment” was antipsychotic medication. Brief of Appellee Larry D. Jones at 16, Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (No. 78–1155).
7. State statutes and case law concerning outpatient commitment (OPC)
frequently mention compliance with medication as a criterion for allowing this procedure
instead of inpatient commitment. 1 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 493 n.1384 (citing statutes
and cases). Civil libertarian commentators have criticized OPC as a tool for forcing
patients to take medication. Steven Schwartz & Cathy Costanzo, Compelling Treatment
in the Community: Distorted Doctrine and Violated Values, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1329,
1368 (1987) (stating that OPC is “synonymous with forced medication”); Susan Stefan,
Preventive Commitment: The Concept and Its Pitfalls, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 288, 294 (1987) (stating that forced medication is the “core” of
OPC). Psychiatrists endorse using OPC to force medication compliance as a means of
keeping patients from becoming violent. See generally Jeffrey Geller, Rights, Wrongs,
and the Dilemma of Coerced Community Treatment, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1259
(1986). Perlin recognized that OPC can both extend state “control over those not subject
to inpatient commitment” and permit persons to remain free in the community rather
than being hospitalized. 1 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 499. See discussion infra Part V.B.3
(discussing the relationshp between OPC and medication).
8. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C.); see also
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (requiring community placement of
mentally disabled persons when treating professionals recommend such placement, the
patients agree to placement, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated
considering the state’s resources and treatment needs of other patients). In his Olmstead
concurrence, Justice Kennedy worried that release of psychiatric patients from
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of incarcerated felons,11 competence to stand trial,12 the insanity
defense,13 and administration of the death penalty.14
institutions might result in their becoming homeless, in part because of the “common
phenomenon” in which “a patient . . . because of the mental illness itself, lacks the
discipline or capacity to follow the regime the medication requires.” Id. at 610
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
9. E.g., Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917, 923 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (affirming the
jury’s negligence award for tardive dyskinesia caused by improperly administered
antipsychotic medications).
Tardive dyskinesia is a syndrome of long-standing or permanent abnormal
involuntary movements that is most commonly caused by long-term use of
typical antipsychotic (neuroleptic) drugs. . . . Tardive dyskinesia presents
clinically as involuntary movements of the tongue, facial, and neck muscles,
upper and lower extremities, truncal musculature, or occasionally muscle
groups that subserve breathing and swallowing. . . . [Examples of these
movements include] tongue protrusions, lip smacking, puckering of the lips,
chewing movements, . . . cheek puffing[,] . . . grimacing, blinking, . . . and
rapid ticlike movements of the face . . . .
STEVEN E. HYMAN ET AL., HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRIC DRUG THERAPY 35 (3d ed. 1995).
For a recent discussion of malpractice aspects of tardive dyskinesia, see generally John
Baker, Tardive Dyskinesia: Reducing Medical Malpractice Exposure Through a RiskBenefit Analysis, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 799 (1997).
10. Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that state
Medicaid programs were obligated to make clozapine, a then new and expensive
antipsychotic drug, available to beneficiaries when doctors felt that the drug was
medically necessary); Alexander L. v. Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1992)
(holding that state Medicaid programs were obligated to make clozapine, a then new and
expensive antipsychotic drug, available to beneficiaries when doctors felt that the drug
was medically necessary); see discussion infra Part III.D.1 (discussing clozaine).
11. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990) (holding that involuntary
medication is permissible to prevent harm to an inmate or others, when shown to be
medically necessary, and that the prison’s procedure for overriding an inmate’s refusal
met the requirements of the Due Process Clause); Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463, 472 (9th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that not providing clozapine to inmates was not a violation of the
court order); Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 409 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that state
constitutional protection against arbitrary government action gives a prisoner a qualified
right to refuse psychotropic drugs).
12. E.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) (reversing the conviction
because the defendant’s right to a fair trial was compromised by his involuntary
treatment with antipsychotic medication); United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 305–
13 (4th Cir. 1988) (limiting the right of an incompetent defendant to stand trial and to
refuse antipsychotic medication); United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 138
(D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (authorizing the involuntary
medication of a pretrial detainee).
13. Concerning a defendant’s right to stop taking antipsychotic medication during
a trial at which he raises the insanity defense so as to present himself to jurors in an
unmedicated state, see generally 4 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 9A-4.6g, at 206–07 (2002).
Compare People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that
the court was “declin[ing] to adopt a per se rule that a drug-normalized accused must be
allowed to discontinue medicinal treatment so that the jury may observe his demeanor in
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The pharmacotherapeutic properties of antipsychotic medications—
their actions, therapeutic uses, benefits, adverse effects, contraindications,
and risks—are quintessentially medical topics, even when the situations
and contexts in which doctors prescribe or recommend their use raise
legal questions. Frequently, however, the legal database (that is,
published opinions, legislation, regulation, and law review articles) is the
principal or sole information source cited and consulted by lawyers,
judges, and scholars who write about these drugs and make decisions
concerning the persons that may have to take them.15 What often results
is the perpetuation of mistaken, outdated, distorted, biased, contradictory,16
a drug-free state”), appeal dismissed, 477 U.S. 902 (1986), with State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d
1379, 1381 (N.H. 1978) (stating that a “defendant has no absolute right to be tried free
from the influence of the drugs administered to him”). One would expect that it would
take far longer than three days for the defendant to return to the same “unmedicated
state” in which he might have been before being arrested. For most antipsychotic drugs,
when an individual has received the medication for several weeks, detectible, clinically
significant amounts of the medication or its active metabolites may remain in the body
long after the individual has stopped taking the medication. Also, the antipsychotic
effects of these drugs may persist long after patients stop taking them. HYMAN ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 14 (“[B]ehavioral effects in patients can last long after serum levels are
no longer detectable.”).
14. In at least two cases, state supreme courts have held that involuntarily
medicating condemned inmates to make them competent for execution would violate
state constitutional provisions. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747–48 (La. 1992);
Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 60–62 (S.C. 1993), rev’d in part, State v. Torrence,
406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991). See generally 4 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 12-4.3, at 550–53
(2002) (listing cases and scholarly articles).
15. See, e.g., Hightower by Dehler v. Olmstead, 959 F. Supp. 1549, 1552 (N.D.
Ga. 1996) (citing cases and law review articles concerning actions and side effects of
antipsychotic drugs); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 53–54 (Mass. 1981)
(utilizing a 1973 law review article as the principal source for a description of adverse
effects); Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 15–17
(Ohio 2000) (citing only cases and law review articles); 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at
161–64 (1999) (law review articles are the principal sources for the text’s description of
side effects, though dozens of medical articles are listed in footnotes).
16. For example, Justice Kennedy’s views regarding mental illness and the role of
pharmacotherapy in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), conflict with the views he
expressed in Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138. In Riggins, Kennedy acknowledged the value of
antipsychotic medication in treating psychosis, but would forbid involuntary
pharmacological treatment of mentally ill pretrial defendants to restore their competence.
He stated that the side effects of antipsychotic drugs seemed so inevitably severe and
disabling that they “can compromise the right of a medicated criminal defendant to
receive a fair trial” by altering his demeanor and ability to confer with counsel. Id. at
142–44 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Seven years later, by contrast, Kennedy noted that
“medical science” had made “remarkable advances and achievements” and that mental
illnesses were “treatable.” Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 608 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He
stated “that for the person with severe mental illness who has no treatment[,] the most
dreaded of confinements can be the imprisonment inflicted by his own mind, which shuts
reality out and subjects him to the torment of voices and images beyond our own powers
to describe.” Id. at 609–10. Many patients, “because of the mental illness itself, lack[]
the discipline or capacity to follow the regime the medication requires.” Id. Medical
science had indeed advanced in the seven year period between these opinions, and
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or just plain foolish ideas about psychotic disorders, the actions and
adverse effects of antipsychotic drugs, and physicians’ goals in treating
patients with psychoses.17 At the same time, the emerging scientific
understanding of psychotic disorders and the role drugs play in their
treatment remains misunderstood and underappreciated.18
Courts’ and legal scholars’ potential for misunderstanding antipsychotic
treatment has recently acquired a new dimension. In the 1990s, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration approved four new antipsychotic drugs19
for the treatment of patients with psychotic disorders. These medications
are not always effective and, like the older drugs, do not cure psychotic
disorders. However, these new medications are at least as effective as,
and possibly more effective than, previously available compounds.20
Moreover, the new antipsychotic drugs are “novel” or “atypical” in that
several of these advances are discussed in subsequent sections of this Article. However,
severe mental illnesses were quite treatable in 1992, and the consequences of leaving
them untreated were no different seven years later. For pre-1992 discussions by
psychiatrists concerned about this problem, see generally E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHERE
TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (1988), and H. Richard
Lamb, Will We Save the Homeless Mentally Ill?, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 649 (1990).
17. Indeed, Drs. Gutheil and Appelbaum published their 1983 Hofstra Law Review
article to counter just these problems. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 1, at 79; see
also infra Part VI.B.1.
18. See, e.g., Perry, 610 So. 2d at 758 (likening treatment with antipsychotic
medications to government restrictions on individuals’ access to pornography); Sheldon
Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism, and the Constitution, 72 GEO. L.J.
1725, 1747–48 (1984) (“The physiological causes and concomitants of mental illness
remain matters for speculation. Physiologically, antipsychotic effects cannot be
confidently distinguished from crude measures—such as bleeding, purging, and, in all
probability, lobotomy—which render individuals too weak or preoccupied to attend to
their psychotic urgings.” (footnote omitted)); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse
Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 28–
29 (1996) (endorsing the same view).
19. The medications were clozapine, risperidone, olanzapine, and quetiapine. A
fifth new antipsychotic agent, ziprasidone, became available in early 2001 and a sixth
agent, aripiprazole, may be released before the end of 2002. Melody Petersen & Andrew
Pollack, Problems at Bristol Are Clear; Solution Isn’t, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2002, at C1.
See infra Part III.D (describing these medications further).
20. Michael D. Jibson & Rajiv Tandon, New Atypical Antipsychotic Medications,
32 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 215, 220–21 (1998). The degree to which the new
antipsychotics are better is a matter of ongoing debate. See, e.g., John Geddes et al.,
Atypical Antipsychotics in the Treatment of Schizophrenia: Systematic Overview and
Meta-Regression Analysis, 321 BRIT. MED. J., 1371–76 (2000) (noting that meta-analysis
of fifty-two randomized trials suggests that the newer drugs are only slightly more
effective than the older drugs at high doses; compared to moderately dosed older drugs,
newer “antipsychotics had no benefits in terms of efficacy or overall tolerability,” but
caused fewer side effects).
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they alleviate psychotic symptoms with a much reduced risk of the side
effects that were a nearly inevitable consequence of treatment with the
older, “conventional” medications.21
This last point has special legal, as well as therapeutic, significance
because the drawbacks of the older antipsychotic agents generated much
of the concern about, and litigation related to, the use of these drugs.
The side effects of antipsychotic drugs have been a specific element in
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis of a pretrial
detainee’s right to refuse treatment22 and of the right of prisoners not to
receive involuntarily administered antipsychotic drugs absent certain
procedural safeguards.23 Side effects also have figured prominently in
state court decisions concerning administration of antipsychotic drugs to
civilly committed inpatients,24 to incompetent individuals with guardians,25
and to condemned inmates that have been found incompetent to be
executed.26 A few malpractice cases have made psychiatrists subject to
potentially massive judgments for failing to properly use and monitor
these medications.27
The potential advantages of the new antipsychotic agents are now
beginning to influence courts’ opinions. A July 1, 2002 search of the
LEXIS database of federal and state cases after 1944 showed that at least

21. Jibson & Tandon, supra note 20, at 215. For more on the problems caused by
older antipsychotic drugs, see infra Part III.C.
22. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137–38 (stating that the involuntary
administration of thioridazine, and resulting side effects, could infringe on fair trial rights
by compromising testimony, communication with counsel, and ability to follow trial).
23. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (recognizing an inmate’s
“significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs” and stating that although an inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
medication was not insubstantial, prison regulation concerning the procedure for
overriding an inmate’s refusal met the requirements of the Due Process Clause).
24. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[O]ne of the
factors to be considered in the exercise of professional judgment . . . is whether and to
what extent the patient will suffer harmful side effects.”); Rogers v. Comm’r of Dep’t of
Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 319 (Mass. 1983) (finding “adverse side effects” to be a
factor in the judge’s decision concerning the involuntary administration of medication);
Rivers v. Katz, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986) (stating that the court is to consider, among
other factors, “the adverse side effects” before ordering medication for an incompetent
psychiatric inpatient).
25. In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 53–54 (Mass. 1981) (stating that
the possibility of adverse effects requires that decision for administration be made by a
judge, not by the guardian).
26. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 760 (La. 1992) (characterizing antipsychotic
medications as “powerful, dangerous and unpredictable”).
27. Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917, 917, 922–23 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (affirming
a $760,000 damage award and describing side effects); Accardo v. Cenac, 722 So. 2d
302, 313 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (revising a tardive dyskinesia award upward to $1.2
million).
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171 cases had mentioned or discussed these new drugs;28 these cases
address a variety of issues, including informed consent,29 the right to
refuse treatment,30 and the rights of Medicaid patients31 and prisoners32
to have these drugs available. A search that same date of the LEXIS law
review database revealed sixty-six articles that mention these medications.
Legal scholars have considered the cost issues and the antitrust
implications of the method by which the first of these new drugs was
introduced,33 and the new medications have begun to receive attention
from law review authors writing about malpractice,34 the right to refuse
treatment,35 managed psychiatric care,36 outpatient commitment,37 research
28. The search strategy, “((new or newer or novel or atypical) w/3 ((anti-psychotic
or antipsychotic) pre/1 (medication or medicine or drug))) or cloza! or risperidone or
resperidone or respiridone or risperdal or olanzap! or zyprexa or quetiapine or seroquel
or geodon or ziprasidone,” was designed to include cases that referred to the new
antipsychotic drugs without mentioning one of them specifically by name. See State v.
Jung, 724 N.E.2d 1262, 1263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (citing Dr. Douglas Songer’s
discussion of “several newer medications which have fewer side effects”), and cases in
which the names of these medications were misspelled. The strategy may not have
found cases with unanticipated misspellings. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, No.
96–11156(001–004), 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 664, at *2–3 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Dec. 18,
1998) (referring to “Resperidol” and “Zypreza” but containing the proper spelling of
olanzapine). All cases found are listed in this Article’s Appendix.
29. See infra Part V.B.2.
30. See infra Part VI.C.
31. See infra Parts IV.A and V.C.1.
32. See infra Part V.C.1.
33. Michael A. Sanzo, Antitrust Law and Patent Misconduct in the Proprietary
Drug Industry, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1209, 1224–25 (1994) (arguing that a court would have
found that bundling clozapine to a patient monitoring system violated the Jefferson
Parish test); Robert N. Swidler, Medical Innovations and Ethics: A State Government
Perspective, 57 ALB. L. REV. 655, 666–72 (1994) (commenting on ethical issues
surrounding the State of New York’s concerns about the cost of clozapine); Mark A.
Hurwitz, Note, Bundling Patented Drugs and Medical Services: An Antitrust Analysis,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1188, 1215–20 (reasoning that the tying of clozapine to lab tests does
not violate Justice O’Connor’s “rule of reason” test articulated in Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)).
34. See generally Baker, supra note 9.
35. See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No”: A History and Analysis of
the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 299 & nn. 88–89 (1992)
(discussing the risks of clozapine); Dora W. Klein, Trial Rights and Psychotropic Drugs:
The Case Against Administering Involuntary Medications to a Defendant During Trial,
55 VAND. L. REV. 165 (2002) (opposing the use of medications to restore a criminal
defendant’s competence to stand trial); David M. Siegel et al., Old Law Meets New
Medicine: Revisiting Involuntary Psychotropic Medication of the Criminal Defendant,
2001 WIS. L. REV. 307 (2001) (discussing, inter alia, the implications of new treatments
for restoring competence to stand trial); Daniel Abraham, Note, Riggins Protects the
Insanity Defendant, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 131 (2000) (urging courts to be wary of

1041

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

on persons with mental impairments,38 the Americans with Disabilities
Act,39 professional rivalries,40 and assessing the professional judgment of
psychiatrists.41
That legal thinkers sometimes regard antipsychotic medication as a
“chemical straitjacket”42 reflects both a flawed understanding of what
medication side effects in insanity defendants, notwithstanding the availability of new
antipsychotic agents); Recent Case, United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir.
2001), D.C. Circuit Holds that the Government May Forcibly Treat Incompetent
Criminal Defendants with Antipsychotic Medication to Render Them Competent to Stand
Trial, 115 HARV. L. REV. 737 (2001) (discussing the implications of medicating
defendant to restore trial competence). In the author’s opinion, David Siegel’s article
contains what is, to date, the best summary in law review articles concerning the
properties of the new antipsychotics. Siegel et al., supra at 346–51.
36. See Mary R. Anderlik & Wendy J. Wilkinson, The Americans with Disabilities
Act and Managed Care, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1163, 1179 (2000) (discussing the failure of
health plans to cover novel antipsychotics); Emile L. Loza, Access to Pharmaceuticals
Under Medicaid Managed Care: Federal Law Compiled and State Contracts Compared,
55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 449, 469–70 (2000) (describing the restrictions on clozapine in
managed state Medicaid programs).
37. Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with
Serious Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85
IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1319–1320 (2000) (discussing the relationship between the severity
of side effects and the justification for outpatient commitment).
38. Laurie M. Flynn & Ronald S. Honberg, Achieving Proper Balance in Research
with Decisionally-Incapacitated Subjects: NAMI’s Perspectives on the Working Group’s
Proposal, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 174, 176 (1998) (explaining the benefits and
potential risks of participating in research involving antipsychotic drugs).
39. Kathleen D. Zylan, Comment, Legislation That Drives Us Crazy: An Overview
of “Mental Disability” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 79,
119 (2000–2001) (discussing the interplay among clozapine therapy, the ADA, and
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999)).
40. See Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional Conflict: Law
Reform, Mental Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Self-Governance, 5 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 25, 28–29 (1992) (using clozapine to illustrate interprofessional conflicts).
41. Marc J. Posner, The Estelle Medical Professional Judgment Standard: The
Right of Those in State Custody to Receive High-Cost Medical Treatments, 18 AM. J.L.
& MED. 347, 348 (1992) (discussing clozapine treatment of detainees or committed
patients); Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the “Experts”: From Deference to
Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 691 (1992)
(discussing cost factors as nonclinical influences on medical decisions).
42. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 18, at 72 (stating that patients experience these
drugs as a “chemical straight-jacket”); Gelman, supra note 18, at 1737, 1783 (advocating
use of the phrase “chemical restraint” in judicial opinions on antipsychotic drugs because
of the phrase’s political connotations); Elizabeth Dickinson Furlong, Note, Coercion in
the Community: The Application of Rogers Guardianship to Outpatient Commitment, 21
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 485 (1995) (containing several references to
antipsychotic drugs as “chemical restraints”); see also Cochran v. Dysart, 965 F.2d 649,
650 (8th Cir. 1992) (describing psychotropic medication as an “alternative” to
“straightjackets” and “frontal lobotomies”); United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 978
(8th Cir. 1990) (describing psychotropic medication as an “alternative” to
“straightjackets” and “frontal lobotomies”), vacated by United States v. Holmes, 900
F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 60 (Mass. 1981)
(stating that when the safety of others is part of the justification for involuntary
medication, “antipsychotic drugs function as chemical restraints”).
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these drugs do43 and the genuine limitations44 of all the antipsychotic
medications that were available in the United States until just a few
years ago. The arrival of novel agents, however, has allowed patients to
receive antipsychotic medication with fewer side effects, a lower risk of
neurological damage,45 and possibly better outcomes46 than the older
drugs permitted. Thus, most patients who take antipsychotic drugs need
no longer endure chemical straitjacketing to get relief from their delusions,
hallucinations, and disordered thinking. Judges, legal scholars, and
lawyers who deal with persons who take antipsychotic drugs now should
experience an analogous process, one that unbuckles the conceptual
straitjacket that frequently has prevented recognition of the need for and
value of antipsychotic medications. Courts and legal scholars must
evaluate antipsychotic drugs without being misled by distorted and
increasingly outdated views found in existing case law and secondary
legal sources.
The goal of this Article is to encourage legal scholars and decisionmakers
to reconsider the legal significance of antipsychotic medication. To do
this, the Article presents the legal literature’s first systematic review of
the emerging legal significance of, and unresolved issues related to, the
recent advances in the psychopharmacology of psychoses. The next two
Parts offer summaries of psychiatry’s current views on the nature of
schizophrenia47 and its pharmacotherapy.48 Schizophrenia is just one of
the psychiatric disorders for which novel antipsychotic drugs are
officially indicated49 and prescribed.50 This Article focuses its discussion
43. See infra Parts III.A–B (reviewing the actions of antipsychotic drugs).
44. See infra Part III.C (discussing the side effects of older drugs).
45. See infra Parts III.C, IV.B.1 (discussing the risks associated with the newer
drugs).
46. See infra Part III.D.2.
47. See infra Part II.
48. See infra Part III.
49. See PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2319 (56th ed. 2002) [hereinafter PDR]
(stating that clozapine “is indicated for the management of severely ill schizophrenic
patients”); id. at 1797 (stating that risperidone “is indicated for the management of the
manifestations of psychotic disorders”); id. at 1974 (stating that olanzapine “is indicated
for the treatment of schizophrenia” and “acute manic episodes”); id. at 685 (stating that
quetiapine “is indicated for the treatment of schizophrenia”); id. at 2689 (same for
ziprasidone).
50. “Once a product has been approved for marketing [for any disorder], a
physician may choose to prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient
populations that are not included in approved labeling. . . . [A]ccepted medical practice
includes drug use that is not reflected in approved drug labeling.” Id. at foreword.
Numerous articles discuss the use of novel antipsychotic drugs for conditions other than
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on schizophrenia both to simplify exposition and because recent advances
in understanding this disorder typify psychiatrists’ current thinking
about severe mental illnesses generally, as well as the role that
antipsychotic drugs play in treating those illnesses.
Subsequent Parts discuss legal issues and policy problems in which
the newer antipsychotic agents are already or may soon be figuring
importantly. Part IV examines the relationship between the high cost of
novel antipsychotics compared to older, generic antipsychotic medications
and the implications this cost differential may have for policymakers and
third party payment decisions. Part V reviews potential sources of
physician and institutional liability that might arise from financially
motivated decisions to restrict or limit use of novel antipsychotics. Part
VI reviews litigation on the right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic
medication, focusing on how the benefit and side effect profiles of novel
agents have influenced courts’ perceptions of and decisions about
involuntary administration of these drugs. Part VII presents a short
quantitative summary of cases that mention novel antipsychotic agents,
and Part VIII summarizes this Article’s major points.
II. THE CURRENT CONCEPTION OF SCHIZOPHRENIA
Recent studies estimate that about two million adults in the U.S.,
schizophrenia. Joseph R. Calabrese et al., Clozapine for Treatment-Refractory Mania,
153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 759, 762 (1996) (stating that clozapine is often effective in
manic patients that have not responded to treatment with mood stabilizers); Robert M. A.
Hirschfeld et al., Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with Bipolar Disorder
(Revision), 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 4, 9 (Supp. Apr. 2002) (recommending novel agents
for treatment of acute mania in bipolar disorder); Susan L. McElroy et al., An Overview
of the Treatment of Schizoaffective Disorder, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 16, 20 (1999)
(reviewing novel antipsychotic agents useful in treating schizoaffective disorder); Rajesh
Narendran et al., Olanzapine Therapy in Treatment-Resistant Psychotic Mood
Disorders: A Long-Term Follow-Up Study, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 509, 515 (2001)
(concluding that the use of olanzapine is more successful in patients with mood
symptoms); S. Nassir Ghaemi, New Treatments for Bipolar Disorder: The Role of
Atypical Neuroleptic Agents, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 33, 33 (2000) (discussing the
role of atypicals in treating persons with bipolar disorder); Paola Rocca et al., Treatment
of Borderline Personality Disorder with Risperidone, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 241,
241 (2002) (concluding that risperidone can help some patients with borderline
personality disorder); Martha Sajatovic et al., Quetiapine Alone and Added to a Mood
Stabilizer for Serious Mood Disorders, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 62, 62 (2001)
(stating that quetiapine may help persons “with serious mood disorders who are
suboptimally responsive to mood stabilizers alone”); Trisha Suppes et al., Report of the
Texas Consensus Conference Panel on Medication Treatment of Bipolar Disorder 2000,
63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 288, 292 (2002) (stating that all atypicals have a potential
role in treating bipolar disorder’s manic phase and that olanzapine is an appropriate first
choice); Mauricio Tohen et al., Olanzapine Versus Placebo in the Treatment of Acute
Mania, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 702, 708 (1999) (concluding that olanzapine is effective
in reducing manic symptoms).
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approximately one percent of the U.S. adult population, suffer from the
disorder that psychiatrists diagnose as schizophrenia.51 Psychiatrists’
current goals in the pharmacological treatment of schizophrenia reflect
the capabilities of the antipsychotic drugs now available, medical
science’s developing conceptualization of the disorder itself, and
physicians’ beliefs about how antipsychotic medications correct or
modify the pathological processes that manifest themselves in symptoms
and psychological dysfunction.52 Although antipsychotic drugs are still
termed “major tranquilizers” in case law,53 legal publications,54 physicians’
testimony,55 and even the Physicians’ Desk Reference,56 this designation
ignores the specific actions of these drugs and misleadingly suggests that
their main role is to reduce agitation. This Part presents a summary of
modern psychiatry’s understanding of schizophrenia as it has emerged in
51. William E. Narrow et al., Revised Prevalence Estimates of Mental Disorders in
the United States: Using a Clinical Significance Criterion to Reconcile 2 Surveys’
Estimates, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 115, 121 (2002). See infra Part II.B.
(describing the clinical criteria that psychiatrists use to diagnose schizophrenia).
52. For a recent and well-organized summary of theories concerning the etiology
of schizophrenia, see generally Debra A. Pinals & Alan Breier, Schizophrenia, in 2
PSYCHIATRY 936 (Allan Tasman et al. ed., 1997).
53. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 28 P.3d 34, 47, 49, 55 (Cal. 2001) (making three
references to major tranquilizers); People v. Kinkead, 695 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ill. 1998)
(referring to Thorazine as a potential “major tranquilizer” or “an antipsychotic”); In re
Conservatorship of Foster, 547 N.W.2d 81, 83 n.1 (Minn. 1996) (stating incorrectly that
medical literature uses the terms “neuroleptic,” “antipsychotic,” and “major tranquilizer”
interchangeably); Irick v. State, 973 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (calling
Thorazine a “major tranquilizer”). Currently, psychiatrists frequently use the terms
“neuroleptic” or “conventional agent” to refer to older antipsychotic medications, and the
terms “novel” or “atypical” to refer to the antipsychotic medications introduced since
1989. See infra in Parts III.C, D.1 (discussing these terms).
54. Baker, supra note 9, at 824; Sharon L. Flower, Comment, Resolving Voluntary
Mental Health Treatment Disputes in the Community Setting: Benefits of and Barriers to
Effective Mediation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 881, 881 n.2 (1999) (stating that
“Thorazine is a major tranquilizer”); M. Catherine Healy, Comment, Riggins v. Nevada:
Are “Synthetically Sane” Criminal Defendants Competent to Stand Trial?, 20 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 385, 385 (1995) (stating that patients treated with
“major tranquilizers” are “zombified”); Avital Stadler, Comment, California Injects New
Life Into an Old Idea: Taking a Shot at Recidivism, Chemical Castration, and the
Constitution, 46 EMORY L.J. 1285, 1306 (1997). But see Lester J. Perling, Health Care
Advance Directives: Implications for Florida Mental Health Patients, 48 U. Miami L.
Rev. 193, 201 (1993) (stating that the term “major tranquilizer” is used “incorrectly”).
55. Williamson v. Haynes Best Western of Alexandria, 688 So. 2d 1201, 1214 (La.
Ct. App. 1997) (physician uses term); People v. Posby, 574 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997) (physician uses term), vacated, 583 N.W.2d 458 (Mich. 1998).
56. PDR, supra note 49, at 2533 (“Haloperidol is the first of the butyrophenone
series of major tranquilizers.”).

1045

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

the last quarter century, with the aim of helping readers appreciate how
leading psychiatric researchers conceptualize the role of antipsychotic
therapy.
A. Twentieth Century Developments in Understanding the Disorder
1. Bleuler’s Conception
The contemporary view of schizophrenia has its roots in the work of
Eugen Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist who coined the word “schizophrenia”
early in the twentieth century.57 Although the term “schizophrenic” is
often used colloquially to describe the holding of dual, conflicting
attitudes, as though the term referred to a multiple or split personality,58
the word’s Greek roots, σχίζειν and Φρήγ actually connote a mind that is
divided or torn apart.59 According to psychiatrist Nancy Andreasen,
Bleuler’s use of the term schizophrenia emphasizes that the disorder
should be “defined by an underlying cognitive process” rather than by its
often-variable outward appearance,60 or, as Bleuler himself put it, as a
“splitting of the psychic functions.”61 Throughout the twentieth century,
57. EUGEN BLEULER, DEMENTIA PRAECOX OR THE GROUP OF SCHIZOPHRENIAS
(Joseph Zinkin trans., 1950).
58. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 928.
59. 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2159, 2664
(1971).
60. Nancy C. Andreasen, A Unitary Model of Schizophrenia: Bleuler’s
“Fragmented Phrene” as Schizoencephaly, 56 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 781, 782
(1999). For a slightly different interpretation, see Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 928.
However, the latter authors agree with Andreasen that “Bleuler used the word
[schizophrenia] to capture his belief that this mental illness was one in which different
aspects of the psyche were split.” Id.
61. BLEULER, supra note 57, at 9. His description continued:
In every case we are confronted with a more or less clear-cut splitting of
the psychic functions. . . . The psychic complexes do not combine in a
conglomeration of strivings with a unified resultant as they do in a healthy
person . . . . Often ideas are only partially worked out, and fragments of ideas
are connected in an illogical way to constitute a new idea. Concepts lose their
completeness, seem to dispense with one or more of their essential
components; indeed, in many cases they are only represented by a few
truncated notions.
Thus, the process of association often works with mere fragments of ideas
and concepts. This results in associations which normal individuals will regard
as incorrect, bizarre, and utterly unpredictable. Often thinking stops in the
middle of a thought; or in the attempt to pass to another idea, it may suddenly
cease altogether, at least as far as it is a conscious process (blocking). Instead
of continuing the thought, new ideas crop up which neither the patient nor the
observer can bring into any connection with the previous stream of thought.
. . . In the severest cases emotional and affective expressions seem to be
completely lacking.
Id. at 9–10.
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the term schizophrenia, when used by psychiatrists, denoted a severe and
debilitating disorder characterized by a pervasive impairment in thinking,
behavior, and interpersonal relationships.62
Bleuler’s approach to schizophrenia assumed that this condition, like
any medical disorder, should be described and understood by cataloging
constellations of signs and symptoms and by paying careful attention to
the disorder’s clinical course and patients’ ultimate outcomes.63 Under
this “medical model” of illness, schizophrenia was a condition equivalent to
pneumonia or diabetes, that is, a specific, diagnosable, organically based
disorder with well-defined manifestations, a typical course, and a
characteristic prognosis. The disorder’s treatment, which consisted of
hospitalization, physician administered and directed therapy, as well as
the supportive efforts of medical personnel (for example, nursing staff),
followed logically from this medical diagnosis and was directed toward
alleviating symptoms and restoring functioning, to the extent possible.64
2.

Mid-Century Views

By the 1960s, schizophrenia had become disputed territory. Though
the Bleulerian medical paradigm retained its adherents, several other
schools of thought within and without psychiatry offered alternative,
competing explanatory models for the disorder.65 Under the behaviorist
or “moral model” of illness, a patient’s unacceptable behavior, rather
than his underlying sickness or diagnosed condition, was the nexus of
clinical concern. Treatment, administered by psychologists and other
behavioral experts rather than physicians, was designed to alter that
In the
behavior via a set of contingencies or reinforcements.66
62. Susan K. Schultz & Nancy C. Andreasen, Schizophrenia, 353 LANCET 1425,
1425 (1999).
63. For a short description of Bleuler’s contributions to the modern conception of
schizophrenia, and for a discussion of other disease-model-oriented twentieth century
approaches to the description of schizophrenia, see Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at
928–29, and J. Hoenig, The Concept of Schizophrenia: Kraepelin-Bleuler-Schneider,
142 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 547, 549–52 (1983).
64. Miriam Siegler & Humphry Osmond, Models of Madness, 112 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1193, 1194–95 (1966).
65. Id. at 1193.
66. See id. at 1195–97. “[B]y and large the view of operant behavior therapists is
that maladaptive behavior is no different than any other behavior . . . . The problem
facing the therapist is therefore to identify maladaptive behaviors in an individual’s
repertoire and remove them through operant techniques.” JOSEPH F. RYCHLAK, INTRODUCTION
TO PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: A THEORY-CONSTRUCTION APPROACH 335
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“psychoanalytic model,” schizophrenia was part of a continuum of
emotional difficulties that arose either from traumatic experiences or
from failures to negotiate an earlier phase of psychological development.
Psychoanalytic treatment of schizophrenia consisted in talking therapy
that aimed to interpret pathological thinking, help the patient achieve
insight, and thereby permit the patient to overcome the early childhood
conflict from which the symptoms arose.67 The “family interaction
model” placed the locus of sickness in the family, rather than within an
individual. Under this view, the schizophrenic patient reflected and
acted out the disturbed functioning of his family, and treatment was
focused on getting the family to interact in a healthier way.68 The
Szaszian “conspiratorial model” held that neither schizophrenia nor any
other mental illness existed. What was called schizophrenia was merely
deviant behavior, and calling someone crazy was a political act that
served to justify interference with his civil liberties through forced
therapy and hospitalization. According to Szasz and his adherents,
psychiatrists were agents of social control.69
3.

Medical Science’s Current View: A Brain-Based Disorder

By the end of the twentieth century, scientific evidence had shown
overwhelmingly that schizophrenia was a brain-based illness that could
be addressed effectively, though not cured, with pharmacological agents
that altered neuronal70 functioning.71 Several other studies had shown
(1973). For a description of the in-hospital behavioral treatment of a person with
schizophrenia, in which desired (rational) behaviors are rewarded and bizarre behaviors
are ignored (extinguished), see id. at 337–38. The classic exposition of the behaviorist’s
world view is Beyond Freedom and Dignity. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND
DIGNITY (1971).
67. Siegler & Osmond, supra note 64, at 1197–98. For a summary of
psychodynamic contributions to the treatment of schizophrenia, see Pinals & Breier,
supra note 52, at 958. There are two classic works in this area. SILVANO ARIETI,
INTERPRETATION OF SCHIZOPHRENIA (1955); HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A
HUMAN PROCESS (1962).
68. Siegler & Osmond, supra note 64, at 1198–1200. There are also two classic
works in this area. Gregory Bateson et al., Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia, 1
BEHAVIORAL SCI. 251 (1956) (describing the “double bind” as a causative factor);
GREGORY BATESON, STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND (1972).
69. THOMAS S. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES (1963); THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF
MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CONDUCT (1974); Siegler &
Osmond, supra note 64, at 1200.
70. The word “neuronal” means “pertaining to a neuron or neurons.” DORLAND’S,
supra note 3, at 1212. Neurons are “the conducting cells of the nervous system.” Id. at
1211.
71. Innumerable studies have reported the effectiveness of antipsychotic drugs in
quelling the symptoms of schizophrenia. For a summary of early research, see Jonathan
O. Cole et al., Phenothiazine Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia, 10 ARCHIVES GEN.
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that by continuing to take antipsychotic medication after they recover,
patients can greatly reduce their risk of suffering a relapse.72 This was
not to say that individual psychotherapy, behavioral treatments, or
family therapy had no role in treating schizophrenia. Research had
clearly shown that these treatments could be very useful.73 However,
nonpharmacological interventions were now regarded as helping patients
and their families cope with the consequences of a biologically-based
disorder and as addressing symptoms that medication alone could not
completely correct.74 Several independent lines of evidence support the
contention that “[s]chizophrenia is a biological brain disease.”75
a. Genetic Evidence
First, individuals vary greatly in their genetic susceptibility to
schizophrenia, just as is the case with other common medical disorders.
The probability that a first-degree relative of someone with schizophrenia
will himself contract the disorder is ten times greater than the probability
of someone who has no first-degree relatives with schizophrenia. The
concordance rate of schizophrenia in monozygotic (identical) twins, who
share the same genetic makeup, is higher than the concordance rate for
dizygotic (fraternal) twins.76
PSYCHIATRY 246 (1964). More recent summaries also concern older antipsychotic
medications. See John M. Davis et al., Important Issues in the Drug Treatment of
Schizophrenia, 6 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 70 (1980); John M. Kane, Treatment of
Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 133 (1987) (noting both pooling and
summarizing studies showing that antipsychotic drugs are effective for approximately
seventy percent of patients in acute episodes of schizophrenia).
72. See, e.g., Patricia L. Gilbert et al., Neuroleptic Withdrawal in Schizophrenic
Patients: A Review of the Literature, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 173 (1995)
(presenting a meta-analysis showing that after 9.7 months, patients maintained on
antipsychotic drugs experienced a sixteen percent relapse rate and fifty-three percent of
patients not taking medication relapsed).
73. See, e.g., Sukhwinder S. Shergill et al., Auditory Hallucinations: A Review of
Psychological Treatments, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 137 (1998); Dennis G. Dyck et al.,
Management of Negative Symptoms Among Patients with Schizophrenia Attending
Multiple-Family Groups, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 513 (2000) (stating that multifamily
educational groups are effective in reducing negative symptoms).
74. See Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 958–960. Substantial evidence suggests
that nondrug therapies can work in concert with antipsychotic medication to improve
outcomes in patients with schizophrenia. Id.
75. Paula C. Ashe et al., Schizophrenia, a Neurodegenerative Disorder with
Neurodevelopmental Antecedents, 25 PROGRESS NEURO-PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY &
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 691, 692 (2001).
76. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at 309; see also, e.g., Preben Bo Mortensen et al.,
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b. Viral Etiologies
Second, studies have revealed an association between prenatal
exposure to viral infections and schizophrenia. A study of persons born
after the 1957 influenza epidemic in Helsinki suggested that individuals
whose mothers were exposed to the virus while pregnant, especially
those whose mothers were exposed during the second trimester, a critical
period for brain development, were at increased risk of developing
schizophrenia.77 Several studies have demonstrated an increased rate of
winter births among persons with schizophrenia, suggesting that
susceptibility to the disorder may be linked to the higher rates of viral
infections during those months.78
c. Evidence from Brain Scans and Autopsy Studies
Third, a host of computerized tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) studies have demonstrated that persons with schizophrenia
have enlarged brain ventricles,79 which implies a decrease in brain
matter itself.80 Radiological studies have demonstrated size decrements
in portions of the brain that are responsible for memory, attention,
emotional expression, social affiliation, and information integration.81
Effects of Family History and Place and Season of Birth on the Risk of Schizophrenia,
340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 603, 603 (1999) (finding that having a parent or sibling with
schizophrenia increased the relative risk of developing schizophrenia by factor of seven
to nine).
77. See generally Sarnoff A. Mednick et al., Adult Schizophrenia Following
Prenatal Exposure to an Influenza Epidemic, 45 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 189 (1988)
(finding that second trimester exposure to an influenza epidemic increased the risk of
psychiatric hospitalization with diagnosis of schizophrenia); E. O’Callaghan et al.,
Schizophrenia After Prenatal Exposure to 1957 A2 Influenza Epidemic, 337 LANCET
1248 (1991) (finding that a study of England and Wales births yields similar finding and
provides “clinical and neuropathological evidence of aberrant fetal brain development in
the pathogenesis of schizophrenia”).
78. See generally Richard L. O’Reilly, Viruses and Schizophrenia, 28
AUSTRALIAN & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 222 (1994).
79. The four brain ventricles are “the cavities within the brain which are filled with
cerebrospinal fluid.” DORLAND’S, supra note 3, at 1955. Their structure is illustrated,
id., and their function is described in many texts on nervous system anatomy. See, e.g.,
MALCOLM B. CARPENTER, CORE TEXT OF NEUROANATOMY 25–28 (1972).
80. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 938–39. A recent meta-analysis of fiftyeight previously published studies concludes that “cerebral volume was lower . . . and
total ventricular volume was higher . . . in patients with schizophrenia than in
comparison subjects.” Ian C. Wright et al., Meta-Analysis of Regional Brain Volumes in
Schizophrenia, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 16, 22 (2000). For a highly technical but
authoritative summary of brain abnormalities ascertained in “neuroimaging studies,” that
is, radiologic studies of brain structure, such as CT and MRI scans, see Jeffrey A.
Lieberman, Is Schizophrenia a Neurodegenerative Disorder? A Clinical and
Neurobiological Perspective, 46 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 729, 733–34 (1999).
81. Nancy Andreasen et al., Structural Abnormalities in the Frontal System in

1050

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

[VOL. 39: 1033, 2002]

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

Unbuckling the Straitjacket
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Several postmortem studies have demonstrated localized, microscopic
abnormalities in the shape and organization of neurons from brains of
individuals that had schizophrenia.82
d. Birth Complications
Fourth, schizophrenia is associated with birth complications. One
recent study found that birth complications that were associated with
lowered brain oxygen levels strikingly elevated the subsequent risk of
developing schizophrenia,83 a finding that supports an earlier report that
oxygen deprivation doubled the risk of developing schizophrenia.84
Certain areas of the brain are very sensitive to lowered blood oxygen
levels, and these areas may be especially susceptible to hypoxia related
damage around the time of birth.85 In a recent MRI study of
monozygotic twins who had a history of birth complications but who
were discordant for schizophrenia,86 the ill twins had smaller
hippocampi and enlarged ventricles, findings frequently found in

Schizophrenia: A Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 43 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
136, 136 (1986) (finding that “schizophrenics had significantly smaller frontal lobes, as
well as smaller cerebrums and craniums”); Alan Breier et al., Brain Morphology and
Schizophrenia: A Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study of Limbic, Prefrontal Cortex and
Caudate Structures, 49 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 921, 921 (1992); Hilleke E.
Hulshoff Pol et al., Volume Changes in Gray Matter in Patients with Schizophrenia, 159
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 244, 244 (2002) (concluding that “smaller brains of the patients with
schizophrenia can be explained by decreases in gray matter volume,” especially prefrontal gray matter); Philip R. Szeszko et al., Neuropsychological Correlates of
Hippocampal Volumes in Patients Experiencing a First Episode of Schizophrenia, 159
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 217, 221–23 (2002) (noting the relationship between loss of tissue in
a portion of the brain usually associated with memory functioning and executive
functioning suggests defect in linkage of brain regions); Wright et al., supra note 80, at
23 (“Regional volume reductions . . . were particularly marked in the bilateral medial
temporal lobe regions.”).
82. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 939. See generally Thomas F. McNeil et al.,
Relationship of Obstetric Complications and Differences in Size of Brain Structures in
Monozygotic Twin Pairs Discordant for Schizophrenia, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 203
(2000) (citing studies).
83. Gwen L. Zornberg et al., Hypoxic-Ischemia-Related Fetal/Neonatal Complications
and Risk of Schizophrenia and Other Nonaffective Psychoses: A 19-Year Longitudinal
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 196, 196–97 (2000).
84. Stephen L. Buka et al., Pregnancy/Delivery Complications and Psychiatric
Diagnosis: A Prospective Study, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 151, 156 (1993).
85. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 938 (mentioning the hippocampus and
neocortex as especially vulnerable areas).
86. That is, only one twin had the disorder.
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schizophrenia,87 and a pattern of complications implying that labor or
delivery trauma was importantly associated with the development,
decades later, of schizophrenia.88 A recent study of minor physical
anomalies (slight deviations in a person’s physical characteristics that
reflect disruptions in fetal development)89 showed that in a group of
children at risk for developing mental illness, those who had a higher
number of such anomalies “developed schizophrenia spectrum disorders
significantly more often than they developed a no mental illness
outcome.”90
e. Characteristic Cognitive Impairment
Fifth, schizophrenia is associated with a variety of impairments in
cognitive functioning that are predictive of poor outcome and long-term
disability.91 The most commonly investigated impairments are deficits
in information processing that, in some cases, have been localized to
dysfunction in particular areas of the cortex.92 As psychiatrist Jeffrey
87. See supra Part II.A.3.c (citing studies).
88. McNeil et al., supra note 82, at 203.
89. See Baher Ismail et al., Minor Physical Anomalies in Schizophrenia:
Cognitive, Neurological and Other Clinical Correlates, 34 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 45
(2000).
90. Jason Schiffman et al., Minor Physical Anomalies and Schizophrenia Spectrum
Disorders: A Prospective Investigation, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 238, 238 (2002); see
also John McGrath et al., Minor Physical Anomalies and Quantitative Measures of the
Head and Face in Patients with Psychosis, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 458 (2002)
(having head abnormalities increased odds of having a nonaffective psychotic disorder,
that is, schizophrenia).
91. Philip D. Harvey & Richard S.E. Keefe, Studies of Cognitive Change in
Patients with Schizophrenia Following Novel Antipsychotic Treatment, 158 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 176, 176 (2001).
Cognitive functioning is a correlate of global and specific functional outcome
in schizophrenia. Cognitive impairments consistently account for significant
variance in measures of functional status, such as social and occupational
disability, and are more strongly related to functional outcome than other
aspects of the illness such as positive symptom severity.
Id.; see also Stanley R. Kay & Lisa M. Murrill, Predicting Outcome of Schizophrenia:
Significance of Symptom Profiles and Outcome Dimensions, 31 COMPREHENSIVE
PSYCHIATRY 91, 97 (1990) (finding that thought disturbance predicts poor functional
outcome).
92. See, e.g., Esther F. Rabinowicz et al., Auditory Sensory Dysfunction in
Schizophrenia: Imprecision or Distractibility?, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1149,
1153 (2000) (finding that tone matching deficits appear to be caused by dysfunction at
the level of the auditory sensory cortex); Daniel R. Weinberger et al., Physiologic
Dysfunction of Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex in Schizophrenia: I. Regional Cerebral
Blood Flow Evidence, 43 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 114, 114 (1986) (finding that
persons with schizophrenia fail to activate the prefrontal cortex during a Wisconsin Card
Sort procedure). In recent years, most issues of the American Journal of Psychiatry have
contained at least one illustration that depicts a connection between localized brain
activity and some feature of schizophrenic psychopathology. See, e.g., Tamara A.
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Lieberman explained: “The average schizophrenic patient in the first
episode of psychosis performs a full standard deviation below the
normal mean. This translates to a reduction in cognitive performance to
the seventeenth percentile or an IQ score-equivalent of 85.”93 The onset
of this reduction appears to begin before persons develop full-blown
symptoms of schizophrenia.94
f. Mechanism of Antipsychotic Drug Action
Sixth, all antipsychotic medications have a consistent property; they
block the dopamine-D2 receptor.95 Dopamine is one of many brain
chemicals dubbed “neurotransmitters” because of its role in transmitting
signals between nerve cells.96 At least five major types of dopamine
receptors97 can be found in various locations in the brain,98 and all
Russell et al., Exploring the Social Brain in Schizophrenia: Left Prefrontal
Underactivation During Mental State Attribution, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2040, 2041
(2000) (comparing activation of brain areas in healthy persons and patients with
schizophrenia that were asked to describe the mental state reflected in photographs of
persons’ eyes).
93. Lieberman, supra note 80, at 733.
94. Rebecca Fuller et al., Longitudinal Assessment of Premorbid Cognitive
Functioning in Patients with Schizophrenia Through Examination of Standardized
Scholastic Test Performance, 159 Am. J. Psychiatry 1183, 1186 (2002) (stating that
lower grade 11 Iowa Test scores support “previous findings that children who later
develop schizophrenia manifest intellectual differences from peers before illness onset”).
In addition, teenagers who do not yet show characteristic signs and symptoms of
schizophrenia, but who later go on to develop that disorder, have more signs of impaired
functioning and higher rates of psychiatric disorders. Mark Weiser et al., Association
Between Nonpsychotic Psychiatric Diagnoses in Adolescent Males and Subsequent
Onset of Schizophrenia, 58 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 959, 959 (2001).
95. Philip Seeman, Atypical Antipsychotics: Mechanism of Action, 47 CANADIAN J.
PSYCHIATRY 27, 27 (2002).
96. “Neurotransmitters, the key information molecules of the brain, mediate the
actions of all known psychoactive drugs.” Solomon H. Snyder & Christopher D. Ferris,
Novel Neurotransmitters and Their Neuropsychiatric Relevance, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1738, 1738 (2000). Snyder and Ferris provide an excellent (though highly technical)
review of how current knowledge of neurotransmitters developed in the last half of the
twentieth century. Concerning the role of dopamine in the brain and the impact of D2
blockers on dopamine transmission, see HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 12–14.
97. A receptor is “a molecular structure within a cell or on the surface
characterized by (1) selective binding of a specific substance and (2) a specific
physiologic effect that accompanies the binding.” DORLAND’S, supra note 3, at 1539.
98. Anibal Cravchik & David Goldman, Neurochemical Individuality: Genetic
Diversity Among Human Dopamine and Serotonin Receptors and Transporters, 57
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1105, 1105–08 (2000). Dopamine receptors transduce
signals within cells by coupling with specialized proteins on nerve cell membranes. Id.
at 1106–07.
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currently available antipsychotic medications prevent or alter the way
that dopamine binds to a specific type of site, the dopamine-D2 receptor,
on neurons.99 The D2 receptor blockade is directly correlated with the
potency of conventional antipsychotic drugs.100 The ability of
psychoactive drugs to quell some symptoms of psychosis is another
powerful argument in favor of regarding schizophrenia as a disorder of
brain dysfunction.
g. Drugs Can Induce Psychoses
Seventh, drugs can induce behavior and symptoms similar to those
experienced by persons with schizophrenia. Although the brain’s responses
to particular pharmacological agents have sometimes led to simplistic
hypotheses about the nature of spontaneously occurring psychoses,101
recent studies have shown that, for example, specific neurocognitive
deficits in schizophrenia can be replicated in healthy persons by administering
medications that block specific brain receptors.102 Moreover, these
medications produce abnormal brain activation patterns that resemble the
brain activity abnormalities exhibited by persons with schizophrenia.103
99. Shitij Kapur et al., A Positron Emission Tomography Study of Quetiapine in
Schizophrenia: A Preliminary Finding of an Antipsychotic Effect with Only Transiently
High Dopamine D2 Receptor Occupancy, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 553, 553
(2000); Shitij Kapur et al., Clinical and Theoretical Implications of 5–HT2 and D2
Receptor Occupancy of Clozapine, Risperidone, and Olanzapine in Schizophrenia, 156
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 286, 286 (1999).
100. Ian Creese et al., Dopamine Receptor Binding Predicts Clinical and
Pharmacological Potencies of Antischizophrenic Drugs, 192 SCIENCE 481, 481–483
(1976); P. Seeman et al., Antipsychotic Drug Doses and Neuroleptic/Dopamine
Receptors, 261 NATURE 717, 717–719 (1976); P. Seeman & T. Lee, Antipsychotic
Drugs: Direct Correlation Between Clinical Potency and Presynaptic Action on
Dopamine Neurons, 188 SCIENCE 1217, 1218 (1975). For a recent discussion on how
assay methods may be responsible for what appear to be exceptions to this rule of
proportionality, see Philip Seeman & Teresa Tallerico, Rapid Release of Antipsychotic
Drugs from Dopamine D2 Receptors: An Explanation for Low Receptor Occupancy and
Early Clinical Relapse upon Withdrawal of Clozapine or Quetiapine, 156 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 876, 876 (1999) (stating that the “rapid release of clozapine and quetiapine
from D2 receptors by endogenous dopamine may contribute to [apparent] low D2
receptor occupancy” in binding studies).
101. See also infra Part III.B.
102. For example, the drug ketamine, see discussion infra Part III.B, blocks the Nmethyl-D-aspartate receptor (NMDAR). Daniel Umbricht et al., Ketamine-Induced
Deficits in Auditory and Visual Context-Dependent Processing in Healthy Volunteers, 57
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1139, 1142 (2000). Recently, Umbricht and colleagues
showed that ketamine, administered to healthy volunteers, could produce deficits in tone
matching ability, electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings, and attention that
mimicked the deficits in persons with schizophrenia. Id. at 1142–44. “The similarity of
ketamine-induced deficits thus suggests that NMDAR-related dysfunction may
contribute to the observed deficits in schizophrenia.” Id. at 1146.
103. Alan Breier et al., Association of Ketamine-Induced Psychosis with Focal

1054

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

[VOL. 39: 1033, 2002]

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

Unbuckling the Straitjacket
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The ability to chemically induce the specific neurocognitive deficits
characteristic of schizophrenia suggests that the neurons affected by
those chemicals have abnormalities that produce the manifold problems
exhibited by persons with the disorder.
h. Functional Brain Imaging
Finally, currently available imaging techniques allow neuroscientists
to watch the brain as it functions and to observe activation patterns that
are distinctive to schizophrenia. For several years, psychiatrists have
used information from functional imaging studies to document decreased
metabolism and blood flow in the prefrontal regions of persons with
schizophrenia.104 Recently, scientists have used these methods to find
correlations between specific psychotic symptoms and patterns of brain
activity. For example, Shergill and colleagues recently used a radiographic
technique called functional magnetic resonance imaging105 to look at
what regions of the brain are activated during periods when persons with
schizophrenia hear voices, that is, experience verbal speech in the
absence of external sensory input. They found that activation in an extensive
network of brain areas was “associated with auditory hallucinations.”106
This activation pattern was, in some respects, “remarkably similar to that
seen when healthy volunteers imagine another person talking to
them,”107 but differed in two important respects: (1) an area of the brain
associated with self-awareness was not activated, and (2) an area of the

Activation of the Prefrontal Cortex in Healthy Volunteers, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 805,
805 (1997).
104. Daniel R. Weinberger & Karen Faith Berman, Speculation on the Meaning of
Cerebral Metabolic Hypofrontality in Schizophrenia, 14 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 157, 157
(1988). For a recent study and discussion, see Steven G. Potkin et al., A PET Study of
the Pathophysiology of Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
227, 227 (2002) (finding a lower prefrontal metabolic rate in patients with predominantly
negative symptoms and stating: “A consistent finding . . . is a lower level of prefrontal
cortical metabolism in schizophrenic subjects . . . .”).
105. A full discussion of this technique lies far beyond the scope of this Article, but
it involves the use of very powerful magnets to detect changes in localized blood
oxygenation, which is an index of neural activity. See generally S. Ogawa et al., Brain
Magnetic Resonance Imaging with Contrast Dependent on Blood Oxygenation, 87 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 9868 (1990).
106. Sukhwinder S. Shergill et al., Mapping Auditory Hallucinations in
Schizophrenia Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 57 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1033, 1034 (2000).
107. Id. at 1035.
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brain associated with unexpected stimuli was activated.108 This pattern
of activation provides confirmation for the idea that auditory verbal
hallucinations “arise through the disruption of normal cognitive
processes, such as monitoring of self-generated verbal material,” and it
also “makes it easier to appreciate why patients often describe the
experiences as indistinguishable from ‘real’ auditory perceptions.”109
The authors also note that their findings elucidate the biological
underpinnings for what patients experience and explain why certain
psychological and biological treatments may be helpful.110 In another
recent study correlating symptoms with specialized areas of brain
activity, Kircher and colleagues found that the severity of disordered
thinking111 induced when schizophrenic patients commented on
Rohrschach inkblots “was inversely correlated with the level of activity
in the Wernicke area, a region implicated in the production of coherent
speech.”112
4. Conceptualizing Schizophrenia
The foregoing discussion is not intended to suggest that physicians
and scientists know what the cause of schizophrenia is in the way that
doctors know that a specific type of bacterium is the pathogen involved
in pneumococcal pneumonia. Nor are they sure why observed disturbances
in brain function or morphology lead to the problems exhibited by
persons with schizophrenia. However, an emerging consensus about the
disorder holds that the clinical signs and symptoms of schizophrenia,
whether they be florid, “positive” symptoms,113 such as crazy beliefs
(delusions114) and hearing voices (auditory hallucinations115), or “negative”
108. These areas are the supplementary motor area and the left parahippocampal
region, respectively. Id. at 1036.
109. Id. at 1037.
110. Id.
111. The authors looked specifically at manifestations of positive formal thought
disorder, or the “incoherence, use of peculiar words, and distractibility” that is “one of
the core features of schizophrenia.” Tilo T. J. Kircher et al., Neural Correlates of
Formal Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia: Preliminary Findings From a Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 58 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 769, 769 (2001).
112. Id.
113. Positive symptoms involve the presence of abnormal clinical findings or
“distortions of normal functioning.” Samuel J. Keith, Pharmacologic Advances in the
Treatment of Schizophrenia, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 851, 851 (1997).
114. A delusion is:
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is
firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what
constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The
belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture
or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith).
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at 821.
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symptoms,116 such as social withdrawal and apathy, reflect an
“underlying disruption in functional neural circuitry.”117 Symptoms of
schizophrenia occur in persons who have hereditary and congenital
vulnerabilities to the disorder and who may also be exposed to
environmental stressors ranging from drugs of abuse to social
disappointments. While these symptoms vary enormously both among
persons diagnosed with the disorder and within such persons over the
course of their illness, persons with schizophrenia typically display
distinctive abnormalities in visual tracking of moving objects, ability to
filter out interfering stimuli, information processing and attention, and
working memory.118
Recently, Dr. Andreasen and colleagues have suggested that these
difficulties reflect disruptions in neuronal circuits that are responsible for
coordinating sequences of motor activity and thought “that are the
hallmark[s] of normal cognition.”119 Persons with schizophrenia suffer
from misconnected brain circuitry, because of which they cannot make
normal associations among mental ideas and cannot distinguish between
their own thoughts and those of others. They cannot suppress “[t]he
multiple stimuli that bombard our consciousness” and have trouble
ignoring trivial matters and paying attention to what is important.120
When they experience hallucinations, it is because they interpret
“internal representations,” which are their own thoughts, as coming from
outside themselves. When they experience delusions, it is because their
misfunctioning circuitry has made erroneous or inappropriate connections

115. A hallucination is “[a] sensory perception that has the compelling sense of
reality of a true perception but that occurs without external stimulation of the relevant
sensory organ.” Id. at 823.
116. Negative symptoms involve the absence of normal findings or “the loss of
normal functioning.” Keith, supra note 113, at 851.
117. Andreasen, supra note 60, at 782.
118. Id. at 783–84.
Working memory is a multicomponent cognitive system that serves to
hold briefly a limited amount of information ‘online’ and to manipulate that
information so that it is available for further cognitive processing or to guide
response selection. . . . [T]his elementary capacity is generally thought to be
necessary for a wide range of complex cognitive functions such as language
comprehension, learning, reasoning, and planning.
Cenk Tek et al., Visual Perceptual and Working Memory Impairments in Schizophrenia,
59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 146, 146 (2002) (footnote omitted).
119. Andreasen, supra note 60, at 783–84.
120. Id. at 785.

1057

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

between mental phenomena.121 Disorganized thinking and speech is a
reflection of faulty “[o]n-line monitoring,” poorly coordinated and
mistimed brain activity being a few examples. Similarly, social ineptitude,
aggression, inactivity, and even catatonia may represent results of what
happens when neurons improperly match each others’ signals, mistime
messages, or send transmissions to the wrong locations.122
This description of Andreasen and colleagues’ interpretation of
schizophrenia is not an endorsement of all aspects of its specific
content.123 It is valuable to a legal audience because it typifies
psychiatrists’ and neuroscientists’ current theories about the nature of
schizophrenia. The theory is an exemplar of the explanatory paradigms
used in most current theories about schizophrenia. These theories all
share the view that schizophrenia is not fundamentally a syndrome of
irrational perceptions, beliefs, or actions.124 A person with schizophrenia
does not act irrationally or behave oddly because he believes things that
are bizarre, impossible, maladaptive, unusual, socially inappropriate,
politically unpopular, or in some other way “sick.” Schizophrenia is
manifested in disturbances of what, in ordinary language, we call
thinking and behavior. Yet, the core pathological processes that are the
current focus of scientific investigation are not impairments in thinking,
behavior, or some other aspect of the individual’s psychology, but are
instead malfunctioning brain circuitry.125
This type of explanation differs from how, using ordinary language
explanations, we describe the utterances and actions of persons. Our
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. For another, equally elegant conceptualization of neuropathology in
schizophrenia, see generally Thomas H. McGlashan & Ralph E. Hoffman, Schizophrenia
as a Disorder of Developmentally Reduced Synaptic Connectivity, 57 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 637 (2000) (describing computer simulations of elimination of connections
between neurons, and explaining how this process accounts for the unique symptoms,
course, age of onset, neurodevelopmental deficits, limited neurodegenerative
progression, and sex differences in schizophrenia).
124. “Psychotic symptoms are probably the least specific aspects of the
schizophrenia syndrome, and [yet] traditionally, . . . they have been the symptoms that
we emphasize. I think neuroimaging and genetics will eventually lead us to subtype
patients into categories that are more biologically valid.” Donald C. Goff, A 23-YearOld Man With Schizophrenia, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3249, 3256 (2002).
125. The symptoms and signs of schizophrenia are very diverse, and they
encompass the entire range of human mental activity. . . . These symptoms
and signs occur in patterns that may not overlap; one patient may have
hallucinations and affective flattening, whereas another has disorganized
speech and avolition [lack of motivation]. The diversity and nonoverlapping
pattern of symptoms and signs suggest a more basic and unifying problem:
abnormalities in neural circuits and fundamental cognitive mechanisms.
Nancy C. Andreasen, Understanding the Causes of Schizophrenia, 340 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 645, 646 (1999).
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ordinary language explanations of behavior are grounded in the
assumption that persons are practical reasoners whose beliefs and desires
account for what they do.126 By contrast, current theories that attempt to
account for the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia, as well as for
many other biologically conceptualized psychiatric disorders, are
materialist127 and are structurally similar to how we explain the output of
a malfunctioning computer. We do not explain a computer’s misfunction by
referring, for example, to a scramble of lines or symbols on a monitor,
although these might provide evidence that something is wrong with the
computer. Instead, we interpret a scrambled screen as an indication of
malfunctioning at a more fundamental level, such as a problem with the
computer’s microcircuitry or with how its software was controlling that
microcircuitry. Similarly, proposed explanations of schizophrenia no
longer attribute patients’ disorganized thinking and delusional statements to
erroneous beliefs, reactions to others, or emotional conflicts. Instead,
neuroscientists’ explanations are efforts to describe how disruptions in
the brain’s computational processes may produce failures in basic
cognitive functions that in turn lead to the observed craziness and
irrationality of persons that suffer from the illness.128
126. For a superb explanation of the explanatory paradigm that underlies most
everyday discussions of behavior and the paradigm that the law uses to describe actions,
see MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP, 67–90
(1984).
The connection between this paradigm, our conception of criminal
responsibility, and the insanity defense is cogently summarized in Stephen J. Morse,
Craziness and Criminal Responsibility, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 147 (1999).
127. To give even a short description of the philosophical issues raised by this
explanation approach would be far beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent
explanation of the kind of philosophical eliminative materialism to which neuroscientists
may be implicitly committed, see generally PAUL S. CHURCHLAND, A
NEUROCOMPUTATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1989). A recent, clever, and accessible discussion
of dualist, materialist, and functionalist explanatory perspectives is found in Kenneth S.
Kendler, A Psychiatric Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
989 (2001).
128. “Schizophrenia is a disease of the brain that is expressed clinically as a disease
of the mind. . . . The working hypothesis shared by most investigators is that
schizophrenia is a disease of neural connectivity caused by multiple factors that affect
brain development.” Andreasen, supra note 125, at 646. For a description of the
neuropathological processes that might generate the disturbance of neural connectivity,
see Bryan T. Woods, Is Schizophrenia a Progressive Neurodevelopmental Disorder?
Toward a Unitary Pathogenetic Mechanism, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1661, 1666 (1998)
(stating that the underlying disease process begins before birth and leads to progressive
loss of brain volume). For the classic exposition of how gross mental functioning is
comprised of many smaller functions, see MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND
(1985).
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B. The Diagnosis of Schizophrenia
Notwithstanding the last quarter century’s neuroscientific advances,
the diagnosis of schizophrenia remains a “low tech,” clinical process.
That is, the major activities in the diagnostic process involve interviewing the
patient concerning his problems, symptoms, and history. Interview
findings are often supplemented with information from medical records
and from other persons, including family members, that know about the
patient’s situation, recent behavior, and background.129 The most recent
edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic manual130
states that a diagnosis of schizophrenia may be rendered when the
following clinically ascertained criteria are met:
(A) For a significant portion of time during a one month
period, the individual has had two or more of the
characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia. These include
positive symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations,
disorganized speech, and grossly disorganized or
catatonic behavior.131 Also factored in are the presence of
abnormal clinical findings or negative symptoms, such as
lack of emotional expression,132 speech that is a
diminished amount or that conveys little information,133 or
an inability to initiate and sustain important activities such
as work or self-care.134
(B) The individual has experienced marked deterioration in
ability to work, interpersonal relations, or ability to take
care of himself.
(C) The disturbance has lasted at least six months, during
which the (A) criteria have lasted at least one month
(unless successfully treated).
(D) The (A) criteria symptoms are not accompanied by severe
mood disturbances.135
129. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 929–31, 945–48.
130. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at 312.
131. Id. at 820–21 (listing “[m]arked motor abnormalities including . . . immobility[,]
. . . certain types of excessive motor activity[,] . . . apparent motiveless resistance to instructions
or attempts to be moved,” and other movement and speech disturbances).
132. Psychiatrists term this “blunted affect.” Id. at 819.
133. Psychiatrists term this diminished production of speech “alogia.” See id. at
820.
134. The psychiatric term for this deficit is “avolition.” Id.
135. Were severe mood symptoms present, the individual’s mental disturbance
might be better diagnosed as an instance of schizoaffective disorder, see id. at 319–23, or
as an episode of mood disorder with psychotic features, see id. at 411–17. Psychotic
symptoms may form part of major depressive episodes, manic episodes, and “mixed”
episodes, in which manic and depressive symptoms appear together. Id. at 411–17.

1060

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

[VOL. 39: 1033, 2002]

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

Unbuckling the Straitjacket
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

(E) The (A) criteria symptoms are not due to a medication,
drug of abuse, or a general medical condition.136
The next step in diagnostic classification is to categorize an
individual’s syndrome as falling into one of the following subtypes of
schizophrenia:
Paranoid Type: The individual is preoccupied with one or more
delusions or frequent auditory hallucinations but does not display other
prominent active phase symptoms (catatonia, disorganized behavior or
speech, flat or inappropriate affect).137
Disorganized Type: The individual displays disorganized speech,
disorganized behavior, and flattened or inappropriate affect, but no
catatonia.138
Catatonic Type: The individual is immobile or displays excessive,
purposeless motor activity. The individual resists all instructions; maintains a
rigid or bizarre posture; and will not speak, holds himself bizarrely, makes
repetitive movements, or repeats the words or movements of others.139
Undifferentiated Type: The individual’s problems do not fit the
paranoid, disorganized, or catatonic subtypes.140
Residual Type: Although the individual does not exhibit prominent
delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, disorganized behavior, or
catatonic behavior, either (1) negative symptoms are present, or (2) at
least two of the symptoms listed above in paragraph (A) appear in
attenuated form.141
Finally, when the illness has been present for at least a year after the
onset of active phase symptoms, the diagnostician may summarize the
disorder’s “longitudinal course” using a variety of “specifiers.” The specifiers
briefly characterize the illness, stating whether the individual has
136. For a summary of the decision process for differentiating schizophrenia from
other disorders that may cause psychotic symptoms, see id. at 750–51. For a decision
tree that outlines how schizophrenia can be distinguished from the many other
psychiatric conditions that present with psychotic symptoms, see id. A partial list of
these conditions includes: psychotic disorders caused by general medical conditions, id.
at 334–38, psychotic disorders induced by medications or intoxicants, id. at 338–43,
schizophreniform disorder, id. at 317–19, schizoaffective disorder, id. at 319–23, mood
disorders with psychotic features, id. at 411–17, delusional disorder, id. at 323–29, and
brief psychotic disorder, id. at 329–32.
137. Id. at 313–14.
138. Id. at 314–15.
139. Id. at 315–16.
140. Id. at 316.
141. Id. at 316–17.
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suffered one or more episodes of the (A) criteria symptoms, and whether
he recovered partially or fully after or between episodes of (A) criteria
symptoms.142
Having completed a short summary of modern psychiatry’s current
understanding and diagnosis of schizophrenia, this Article now turns to
psychiatrists’ principal means for helping patients cope with the
disorder—antipsychotic medication.
III. ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION
A. The Benefits and Impact of Antipsychotic Drugs
Antipsychotic drugs are the mainstay of modern medical treatment for
schizophrenia143 and are frequently used to treat persons that suffer from
several other mental disorders144 that include psychotic symptoms.145
Although the symptoms of psychotic disorders have been recognized
since antiquity,146 effective and specific pharmacological treatments for
142. Examples of longitudinal course specifiers are “episodic with interepisode
residual symptoms,” “continuous . . . with prominent negative symptoms,” and “single
episode in partial remission.” Id. at 312–13.
143. “Antipsychotic medications are indicated for nearly all acute psychotic
episodes in patients with schizophrenia . . . . [P]sychiatrists should avoid withholding
medications for [more than a period of several days] . . . as this may delay the patient’s
recovery and place the patient at risk of suicide and other dangerous behaviors . . . .”
Marvin I. Herz et al., Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with
Schizophrenia, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2 (Supp. Apr. 1997). The coding of the guideline
indicates that this recommendation is made “with substantial clinical confidence.” Id.
The guideline expresses the same level of confidence concerning continuation of
antipsychotic medication during the first six months after recovery from acute psychosis,
and for longer periods to reduce the risk of relapse. Id. at 4.
144. Other psychotic disorders for which antipsychotic drugs are indicated include
acute manic episodes, depression with psychotic features, delusional disorders, and some
instances of delirium. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 14–22.
145. For several years, courts have recognized the central importance of
antipsychotic medication in treating schizophrenia. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. 1131, 1137–38 (D.N.J. 1978) (“[N]o other treatment modality has achieved equal
success in the treatment of schizophrenics. . . . [P]sychotropic drugs are widely accepted
in present psychiatric practice. . . . They are the treatment of choice for schizophrenics
today.”), suppl., 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981),
vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
146. For example, the Bible describes a successful effort to feign a severe mental
disorder. After David learned that King Saul wanted him killed, he fled to the court of
King Achish of Gath. The courtiers recognized him, however. I Samuel 21:11–22:1.
So he [David] concealed his good sense from them; he feigned madness for
their benefit. He scratched marks on the doors of the gate and let his saliva run
down his beard. And Achish said to his courtiers, “You see the man is raving;
why bring him to me? Do I lack madmen that you have brought this fellow to
rave for me? Should this fellow enter my house?”
TANAKH–THE HOLY SCRIPTURES: THE NEW JPS TRANSLATION ACCORDING TO THE
TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT 453–54 (1985) (footnotes omitted). David’s ruse worked,
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these conditions only became available in the 1950s, following the
discovery that chlorpromazine147 could reduce or eliminate hallucinations
and delusions in many individuals with schizophrenia.148 The success of
chlorpromazine led, within a few years, to the development of several
other phenothiazine derivatives149 including fluphenazine,150 perphenazine,151
thioridazine,152 and trifluoperazine,153 as well as other compounds that
had different chemical structures but very similar abilities to quell
psychotic symptoms.154
Because appellate court decisions and other legal publications often
emphasize the adverse effects of older antipsychotic drugs, it is worth
pausing to consider what life for psychotic patients was like before the
advent of chlorpromazine and other antipsychotic drugs. “Before the
introduction of chlorpromazine in 1953, most individuals with
and he escaped to the cave of Adullam. Id. at 454. The story implies that madness (not
to mention malingering) was recognized during the time of Saul, or at the latest by the
time that the books of Samuel were set down. Current biblical scholarship places Saul’s
reign in the latter half of the 11th century B.C.E., 10 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 475 (15th ed. 1998), and places the writing of I Samuel in the 6th century
B.C.E., id. at 381–82.
147. Chlorpromazine is the nonproprietary name for the antipsychotic compound
that probably is best known by the trade name Thorazine®, under which it is marketed
by GlaxoSmithKline. PDR, supra note 49, at 1656. At least three other pharmaceutical
firms (Elkins-Sinn, Geneva Pharmaceuticals, and Roxane Laboratories) also market
chlorpromazine in the United States. Id. at 107.
148. For a fascinating account of the success, impact, and marketing of
chlorpromazine in the 1950s, see ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH
ABOUT DEINSITUTIONALIZATION 40–52 (1990).
149. Phenothiazine antipsychotic drugs all share a basic three-ring structure; their
primary chemical differences arise from various moiety substitutions at the nitrogen
atom in the middle ring. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 5–7.
150. Fluphenazine is best known by the trade name Prolixin®, id. at 6, and
currently is marketed in the U.S. as a generic drug by at least five firms, PDR, supra note
49, at 112.
151. Perphenazine is marketed in the U.S. under the brand names Trilafon® and
Etrafon®, PDR, supra note 49, at 123.
152. Thioridazine is best known by the trade name Mellaril®, HYMAN ET AL., supra
note 9, at 6, and currently is marketed in the U.S. as the generic drug by four firms, PDR,
supra note 49, at 129.
153. Trifluoperazine is marketed as Stelazine® by GlaxoSmithKline, and generically by
two other firms, PDR, supra note 49, at 130.
154. In the mid-1990s, commonly prescribed nonphenothiazine antipsychotic
compounds included haloperidol (Haldol®), loxapine (Loxitane®), molindone
(Moban®), and thiothixene (Navane®). HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 6–8. The older
antipsychotic drugs differ at least fifty-fold in their potency, and therefore the dosages of
these drugs differ greatly. However, “each of these agents has been found to be equally
effective in treating psychotic disorders.” Id. at 7.
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schizophrenia were destined to spend their entire adult lives within large,
often remote psychiatric hospitals.”155 By 1955, U.S. state mental
hospitals housed more than one-half million persons,156 many of whom
suffered from psychotic disorders; patients often spent years and decades
living in horrifying, wretched conditions. Writes Ann Braden Johnson:
If you have ever spent time with a floridly psychotic person who is expressing
himself in behavior that was supposed to have been extinguished in childhood,
you will never forget how terrifying it is to see someone so utterly out of
control. But now imagine yourself in a huge, old building that is visibly falling
apart, in charge of sixty to eighty adults, all acting like one-, two-, and threeyear-olds in mid-tantrum—such were the patients that the state hospitals, alone
and unaided, kept in their wards for over a hundred years [from the mid-19th to
the mid-20th centuries]. A doctor from that era described a women’s ward at
New York’s Pilgrim State Hospital before the introduction of phenothiazines:
[They were] so wild I couldn’t keep them decent. They’d soil themselves,
tear their clothes off, smash the windows, and gouge the plaster out of the
walls. One of them would even rip radiators right off he wall. We’d
sometimes have to surround them with mattresses in order to give them
sedative injections, and these would help for a while, but then they’d get
addicted to the sedative and we’d have to take them off it.
....
. . . [T]he new drugs made the wholesale removal of patients from hospitals
imaginable and then possible, which in the end became one of the most
effective selling points of the new medications.157

The long-term course for persons with schizophrenia is not necessarily
one of inevitable deterioration, even when those with the disorder do not
155. Goff, supra note 124, at 3253–54.
156. H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons With Severe Mental Illness
in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483, 486 (1998) (stating that
559,000 patients were in state psychiatric hospitals in 1955). By contrast, in 1998, there
were just 63,525 hospital beds in the nation’s state and county psychiatric hospitals. Liz
Lipton, Few Safeguards Govern Elimination of Psychiatric Beds, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS,
Aug. 3, 2001, at 9, http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/36/15/9. Many
psychiatrists attribute the decline in state hospital beds solely to antipsychotic
medication. See JOHNSON, supra note 148, at 38–39. But according to Ronald
Manderscheid, Chief of the Survey and Analysis Branch, Division of State and
Community Systems Development, for the federal Center for Mental Health Services:
One key reason for this decline is that, because of the federal Institution
for Mental Diseases . . . exclusion [in Medicaid law], Medicaid does not pay
for the hospitalization of persons between the ages of 21 and 64 in state and
county facilities. Thus, these patients were sent to community and general
hospitals, which could be reimbursed. . . .
. . . [Other reasons are] the development of new treatment approaches and
new psychiatric medications including the introduction of the antipsychotic
thorazine in 1954, the effort by states to save money by moving patients out of
state hospitals to other forms of care, and the effort to move people into the
community . . . .
Lipton, supra, at 9 (quoting Dr. Manderscheid) (alteration in original).
157. JOHNSON, supra note 148, at 45–46 (alteration in original) (quoting Morton M.
Hunt, Pilgrim’s Progress, NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 1961, at 71).
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take antipsychotic drugs or take them erratically.158 Yet, the value and
importance of antipsychotic medication is unmistakable. By virtue of
their ability to control psychotic symptoms, chlorpromazine and subsequently
developed drugs contributed importantly to the deinstitutionalization of
mental illness, and a ninety percent decrease in the number of patients
held in state hospitals.159 To anyone familiar with the conditions under
which hospitalized patients existed before effective antipsychotic
medication became available, it is hard to disagree with the 1961 report
of the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health: “Unquestionably,
the drugs have delivered the greatest blow for patient freedom, in terms
of nonrestraint, since Pinel struck off the chains of the lunatics in the
Paris asylum 168 years ago.”160

158. Wayne S. Fenton & Thomas H. McGlashan, Sustained Remission in DrugFree Schizophrenic Patients, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1306, 1306 (1987); Thomas H.
McGlashan, A Selective Review of Recent North American Long-Term Followup Studies
of Schizophrenia, 14 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 515, 515 (1988). However, many
psychiatrists are convinced that early pharmacological intervention in schizophrenia can
improve the long-term course of the disorder, and some psychiatrists even propose
treating persons who merely have prodromal symptoms of schizophrenia. For a
discussion of this idea, see Thomas H. McGlashan, Psychosis Treatment Prior to
Psychosis Onset: Ethical Issues, 51 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 47, 47 (2001) (“Compelling but
tentative evidence suggests that early treatment may improve course and prognosis, and
this has initiated a paradigm shift in thinking about the risks and benefits of early
intervention.”). Also, some psychiatrists have used novel agents to reverse cognitive
deficits in nonpsychotic relatives of persons with schizophrenia. See Ming T. Tsuang et
al., Treatment of Nonpsychotic Relatives of Patients with Schizophrenia: Four Case
Studies, 45 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1412, 1412 (1999) (finding that risperidone
produced “reductions in negative symptoms, and . . . substantial improvements on some
tests of attention and working memory”); see also infra notes 206–07 and accompanying
text.
159. See Timothy A. Kelly, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1522: A
Policymaker’s Guide to Mental Illness, Heritage Foundation, at http://www.heritage.
org/Research/HealthCare/BG1522.cfm (Mar. 7, 2002):
In the early 20th century, asylums became “mental hospitals,” and the numbers
of Americans committed within their walls grew substantially, reaching a high
of nearly 560,000 in 1955. . . .
In the mid-1950s, the discovery of antipsychotic medications such as
chlorpromazine sparked a revolution in mental hospitals. These new
medications controlled psychotic symptoms, and for the first time, people with
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders could be discharged and returned
to their home communities. The census of mental hospitals began a dramatic
drop in their rolls, which now stand at just over 55,000.
160. JOHNSON, supra note 148, at 46 (quoting JOINT COMM’N ON MENTAL ILLNESS
AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 39 (1961)).
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B. How Antipsychotic Drugs Work: A Puzzle
Although medical scientists had no trouble recognizing and demonstrating
that these first antipsychotic drugs were useful, it took several years
before they could be sure what these compounds did. In 1963, Carlsson
and Lindqvist161 offered what came to be termed the “dopamine
hypothesis” of schizophrenia, which in its most simplistic form
suggested that schizophrenia resulted from an excess of dopamine.162
The dopamine hypothesis drew support from observations that hallucinations
and delusions could be induced by high doses of amphetamines and
other drugs that increase brain levels of dopamine163 and from the
finding that the potency of all then available antipsychotic drugs was
directly proportional to their ability to block the dopamine-D2 receptor.164
By the 1980s, many lines of evidence had made it clear that the
simplistic excess dopamine hypothesis was inadequate to explain the
causes and phenomena of schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders.
For example, compounds such as phencyclidine (PCP) and the anesthetic
ketamine can cause florid psychoses even though they have little direct
effect on brain dopamine activity.165 Also, it was recognized that in
161. See Arvid Carlsson & Margit Lindqvist, Effect of Chlorpromazine and
Haloperidol on Formation of 3-Methoxytyramine and Normetanephrine in Mouse Brain,
20 ACTA PHARMACOLOGICA ET TOXICOLOGICA 140 (1963) (finding that after
administration of antipsychotic drugs, extracellular dopamine was not increased, but its
metabolites were, which suggested that the drugs blocked dopamine receptors and
activated feedback pathways).
162. GOODMAN AND GILMAN’S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS
389 (7th ed. 1985).
163. Id. at 168, 553–54; see Yoshimoto Sekine et al., Methamphetamine-Related
Psychiatric Symptoms and Reduced Brain Dopamine Transporters Studied With PET,
158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1206 (2001) (discussing the long-term impact of
methamphetamine on dopamine transporter density, and its relationship to psychotic
symptoms).
164. See supra Part II.A.3.f. For a recent description of still valid aspects of the
dopamine hypothesis and confirmatory findings from brain imaging studies, see Anissa
Abi-Dargham et al., Increased Baseline Occupancy of D2 Receptors by Dopamine in
Schizophrenia, 97 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 8104, 8104, 8109 (2000) (also showing
“direct in vivo evidence that schizophrenia is associated with excessive stimulation of D2
receptors by dopamine [as opposed to excess dopamine simpliciter], and that this
dysregulation is predictive of good treatment response to antipsychotic drugs”).
165. In 1979 the ability of ketamine and phencyclidine to mimic psychoses was
found to be related to interaction by the drugs with a unique receptor; once bound to this
receptor, phencyclidine is not displaced by dopamine or other chemically similar
neurotransmitters. J.P. Vincent et al., Interaction of Phencyclidine (“Angel Dust”) with
a Specific Receptor in Rat Brain Membranes, 76 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 4678,
4678 (1979); S.R. Zukin & R.S. Zukin, Specific [3H]Phencyclidine Binding in Rat
Central Nervous System, 76 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5372, 5372 (1979). For this
reason, the psychotic symptoms induced by phencyclidine are not reversed by
antipsychotic drugs. For a recent explanation of the effects of ketamine and
phencyclidine, see generally Ilana Zylberman et al., Phencyclidine Use Disorders, in 1
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many cases, the hallmark symptoms of schizophrenia that are mimicked by
overdoses of dopaminergic166 drugs, including hallucinations and
delusional thinking, often could be alleviated without having much
impact on a patient’s functioning. Increasingly, psychiatrists recognized
that the positive symptoms could be less devastating to a person’s
functioning and long-term outcome than the negative symptoms that
afflict many persons with schizophrenia.167 Some evidence suggested
that negative symptoms such as deficits in a patient’s interest in
surroundings, volume of communication, and social relationships, might,
in fact, be related to a dearth of dopaminergic activity in certain areas of
the brain.168
PSYCHIATRY 827 (Allan Tasman et al. ed., 1997).
166. That is, “activated or transmitted by dopamine . . . pertaining to tissues or
organs affected by dopamine.” DORLAND’S, supra note 3, at 540.
167. See Nancy C. Andreasen et al., Positive and Negative Symptoms in
Schizophrenia: A Critical Reappraisal, 47 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 615, 615 (1990)
(affirming the validity of the negative subtype of schizophrenia, which “may be
characterized by a variety of hypothesized correlates of structural brain abnormality,
including . . . poor response to treatment”); Wayne S. Fenton & Thomas H. McGlashan,
Antecedents, Symptom Progression, and Long-Term Outcome of the Deficit Syndrome in
Schizophrenia, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 351, 351 (1994) (“[D]eficit syndrome was
associated with a very high risk of poor outcome and long-term disability.”); Wayne S.
Fenton & Thomas H. McGlashan, Natural History of Schizophrenia Subtype: II. Positive
and Negative Symptoms and Long-Term Course, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 978,
978 (1991) (having “many negative symptoms was associated with poor premorbid
functioning, insidious onset, partial or no remissions during the first several years of
illness, and in most cases a progressive course leading to permanent disability”).
“Positive schizophrenia is characterized by prominent delusions, hallucinations, positive
formal thought disorder, and persistently bizarre behavior; negative schizophrenia, by
affective flattening, alogia, avolition, anhedonia, and attentional impairment.” Nancy C.
Andreasen & Scott Olsen, Negative v. Positive Schizophrenia, 39 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 789, 789 (1982).
168. See David Pickar et al., Neurochemical and Neural Mechanisms of Positive
and Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia, in 24 MODERN PROBLEMS OF
PHARMACOPSYCHIATRY 124–51 (Nancy C. Andreasen ed., 1990) (linking deficit
symptoms to functional frontal dopamine dysfunction); Terry E. Goldberg et al.,
Cognitive and Behavioral Effects of the Coadministration of Dextroamphetamine and
Haloperidol in Schizophrenia, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 78, 78 (1991) (finding that the
addition of amphetamine, a dopaminergic drug, to schizophrenic patients’ medication
regimen improved some aspects of cognition, motivation, and affect); Jonathan D. Cohen
& David Servan-Schreiber, A Theory of Dopamine Function and Its Role in Cognitive
Deficits in Schizophrenia, 19 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 85, 85 (1993) (noting that a
computer model suggested that dopamine deficiency is responsible for cognitive deficits
observed in persons with schizophrenia); Kenneth L. Davis et al., Dopamine in
Schizophrenia: A Review and Reconceptualization, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1474, 1474
(1991) (suggesting “that schizophrenia is characterized by abnormally low prefrontal
dopamine activity (causing deficit symptoms) leading to excessive dopamine activity in
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C. Problems Associated with Older Drugs
Although the D2 blockers that were available before 1990 were clearly
beneficial, they had serious limitations and drawbacks. They reduced
many patients’ psychotic symptoms but they did not help all patients that
suffered from schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders. Studies
reviewing the effectiveness of older antipsychotic drugs in schizophrenia
typically reported that fifty to seventy-five percent of patients have “a
moderate to excellent response and up to ninety percent of patients
show[] some response,”169 which implies that ten to fifty percent of
patients show no response or only a partial one. Many patients who do
respond to older antipsychotic agents experience noticeable, but only
partial, reduction in their positive symptoms170 and little improvement in
their cognitive impairments and negative symptoms.171
Pre-1990s antipsychotic drugs also consistently cause a constellation
of side effects known as “extrapyramidal symptoms,”172 including
stiffness, diminished facial expression, tremors, and restlessness.173
Indeed, the pronounced effects of these drugs on many aspects of the
nervous system led to their being termed “neuroleptics,” a combination
of the Greek words νεύρου (nerve) and ληψις (to take hold).174 Patients
often will quit taking their medication because these side effects are
esthetically unappealing and intensely unpleasant to experience.175 As
Dr. Samuel Keith noted, “[e]stimates of 40 percent rates of noncompliance
mesolimbic dopamine neurons (causing positive symptoms)”).
169. Daniel P. Van Kammen & Stephen R. Marder, Dopamine Receptor
Antagonists, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY/VI, at 1987 (Harold I.
Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 6th ed. 1995).
170. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 16.
171. Lisa B. Dixon et al., Conventional Antipsychotic Medications for
Schizophrenia, 21 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 567, 572 (1995); Herbert Y. Meltzer & Susan
R. McGurk, The Effects of Clozapine, Risperidone, and Olanzapine on Cognitive
Function in Schizophrenia, 25 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 233, 235 (1999) (seeing “some
evidence” that neuroleptics “cause selective impairment of some cognitive functions”).
172. The term “extrapyramidal” refers to those neurons involved in controlling
movements that lie outside the “pyramidal tracts.” DORLAND’S, supra note 3, at 638.
The pyramidal tract “provides for direct cortical control and initiation of skilled
movements, especially those related to speech and involving the hand and fingers.” Id.
at 1861. “Extrapyramidal system” is “an imprecise term referring to a functional rather
than an anatomical part of the central nervous system[;] . . . it includes . . . [brain
structures that] control and coordinate especially the postural, static, supporting, and
locomotor mechanisms.” Id. at 1776.
173. Keith, supra note 113, at 851.
174. DORLAND’S, supra note 3, at 1210. The French psychiatrists Delay and
Deniker coined the term “neuroleptic” in 1955. JOHNSON, supra note 148, at 40.
175. The classic study on this topic is Theodore Van Putten, Why Do Schizophrenic
Patients Refuse to Take Their Drugs?, 31 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 67, 70 (1974)
(stating that antipsychotic noncompliance is strongly associated with extrapyramidal
involvement, especially akathisia, the subjective experience of restlessness).
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among patients treated with [older] antipsychotic agents were not
unusual; when noncompliance was combined with the therapeutic
limitations of the drugs, rates of relapse were quite high.”176 In addition,
many patients who take neuroleptics develop permanent and sometimes
disabling neuromotor syndromes such as tardive dyskinesia (TD),177 and
a small fraction of patients develop a severe and sometimes fatal
reaction to these drugs called “neuroleptic malignant syndrome.”178
D. “Novel” Agents: A New View of Treatment
1. Clozapine
Although U.S. psychiatrists did not begin prescribing atypical antipsychotic
agents extensively until the mid-1990s, the FDA’s approval of clozapine
in late 1989179 paved the way for this change in psychiatrists’ practices.
176. Keith, supra note 113, at 851; see also Van Putten, supra note 175, at 67
(commenting that forty-six percent of patients took less medication than was prescribed,
probably to avoid distress related to extrapyramidal side effects); Joyce A. Cramer &
Robert Rosenheck, Compliance with Medication Regimens for Mental and Physical
Disorders, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 196, 196 (1998) (analysis of twenty-four reports on
antipsychotic drug compliance yielded an average rate of fifty-eight percent, with a
range of twenty-four to ninety percent).
177. See supra note 9 (describing TD). TD rarely occurs in young individuals who
have been exposed to neuroleptics for fewer than three months. HYMAN ET AL., supra
note 9, at 35. Approximately one-fifth of patients undergoing long-term treatment
develop TD; current estimates place the risk of developing TD at approximately five
percent per year of neuroleptic exposure. Dilip V. Jeste and Michael J. Caligiuri,
Tardive Dyskinesia, 19 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 303 (1993) (“The overall mean prevalence
of TD among chronically neuroleptic-treated patients is approximately 24 percent. The
annual incidence in younger adults is 4 to 5 percent.”). The risk for elderly patients in
much higher in their initial year of treatment. See, e.g., Robert A. Sweet et al., Duration
of Neuroleptic Treatment and Prevalence of Tardive Dyskinesia in Late Life, 52
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 478, 478 (1995) (noting a twenty-nine percent risk with
three to twelve months of drug exposure).
178. This syndrome occurs in one-tenth to one percent of persons receiving
neuroleptics, and “is characterized by the development of fever, rigidity, autonomic
instability, altered consciousness, . . . [elevated cardiac enzymes,] and raised WBC
[white blood cell] count.” Herbert Y. Meltzer & S. Hossein Fatemi, Treatment of
Schizophrenia, in THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PRESS TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
760–61 (Alan F. Schatzberg & Charles B. Nemeroff eds., 2d ed. 1998); see also HYMAN
ET AL., supra note 9, at 34.
179. FDA Approves Clozapine for Treatment of Schizophrenia; Careful Monitoring
Required, 40 HOSP. COMTY. PSYCHIATRY 1310, 1310 (1989) (requiring FDA approval);
Stuart L. Nightingale, Approval of Clozapine for Refractory Schizophrenia, 263 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 202, 202 (1990) (requiring FDA approval); F.D.A. Approves a Backup
Therapy for Severe Schizophrenia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at A24 (reporting FDA
approval).
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Clozapine was the first truly novel antipsychotic medication to become
available in thirty-five years, and was dubbed “atypical” because it could
alleviate psychotic symptoms without inducing the extrapyramidal side
effects that were the typical, expected accompaniments to therapy with
conventional D2 blockers.180 Moreover, clozapine works better than
conventional neuroleptics. Thirty to sixty percent of schizophrenic
patients who do not respond to the older drugs improve when they take
clozapine,181 and clozapine may also be better at reducing negative
symptoms than the conventional antipsychotic drugs.182 Clozapine
achieves these superior therapeutic results with a much lower likelihood
of extrapyramidal symptoms and the damaging neuromotor syndromes
that are associated with neuroleptic drugs.183
Patients who take clozapine for extended periods incur a small risk of
developing agranulocytosis,184 a potentially fatal side effect in which the
180. Michael J. Owens & S. Craig Risch, Atypical Antipsychotics, in THE
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PRESS TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY, supra note 178, at
323, 333. In 1993, psychiatrist Jeffrey Lieberman proposed what many clinicians now
regard as the defining characteristics of an atypical antipsychotic drug. These include
“pre-clinical” (that is, laboratory findings often worked out in animals) evidence of
efficacy and nontoxicity, and the following three “clinical” criteria: (1) effectiveness in
reducing psychotic symptoms, (2) little or no induction of extrapyramidal symptoms and
tardive dyskinesia, and (3) no elevation of prolactin (a hormone involved in breast milk
production, secretion of which is increased in men and women who take typical
antipsychotics). Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Understanding the Mechanism of Action of
Atypical Antipsychotic Drugs: A Review of Compounds in Use and Development, 163
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 7, 7–18 (Supp. 22, 1993).
181. For the landmark study reporting clozapine’s efficacy in patients who had
failed to benefit from neuroleptics, see John Kane et al., Clozapine for the TreatmentResistant Schizophrenic: A Double-Blind Comparison with Chlorpromazine, 45
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 789, 789–96 (1988) (demonstrating improvement in thirty
percent of previously refractory patients over a six-week period, compared with just four
percent of patients who received chlorpromazine). Subsequent studies looking at treatment
refractory patients treated with clozapine for longer periods have yielded higher
estimated rates of improvement. See, e.g., John M. Kane et al., Clozapine and
Haloperidol in Moderately Refractory Schizophrenia: A 6-Month Randomized and
Double-Blind Comparison, 58 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 965, 965 (2001) (showing a
fifty-seven percent response rate); Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Clinical Effects of
Clozapine in Chronic Schizophrenia: Response to Treatment and Predictors of Outcome,
151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1744, 1744 (1994) (showing a fifty percent response rate in
treatment-refractory patients).
182. David Pickar et al., Clinical and Biologic Response to Clozapine in Patients
with Schizophrenia: Crossover Comparison with Fluphenazine, 49 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 345, 348 (1992).
183. Daniel E. Casey, Effects of Clozapine Therapy in Schizophrenic Individuals at
Risk for Tardive Dyskinesia, 59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 31, 31–37 (Supp. 3, 1998);
Herz, supra note 143, at 17, 19.
184. “Clozapine was first tested in the 1960s but was withdrawn from general use”
because of this problem. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 29. Initial estimates placed the
risk of agranulocytosis at one percent. Id. A more recent estimate sets the risk at only
thirty-eight hundredths of a percent. Gilbert Honigfeld, Effects of the Clozapine
National Registry System on Incidence of Deaths Related to Agranulocytosis, 47
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bone marrow stops making the white blood cells responsible for fighting
bacterial infections.185 Due to this risk, patients who take clozapine must
be monitored with frequent blood tests. When clozapine was initially
released, it was “bundled”186 by its manufacturer, Sandoz Pharmaceuticals,
with a mandatory “Clozaril Patient Management System” (CPMS) that
required weekly blood tests to be performed by Caremark, a home health
care division of Baxter International Inc.187 The cost of the monitoring
was built into the cost of drug and was estimated to run around $9,000 a
year.188 Even after clozapine therapy was “unbundled”189 to allow
testing by a broader variety of agencies, psychiatrists recommended that
the blood tests should be performed weekly for as long as a patient took
clozapine and more frequently if tests suggested an abnormality might
be developing. By the mid-1990s, it was recognized that if a patient
taking clozapine was going to develop agranulocytosis at all, this
complication usually would occur during the first six months of
exposure to the drug. Currently, therefore, blood tests are performed
each week for the first six months of therapy and every two weeks
thereafter. Clozapine remains available only through monitoring
protocols under which pharmacists do not dispense the medication until
they have determined that a patient’s blood has been tested and that the
laboratory values are satisfactory.190
Factors such as inconvenience to patients, medical risks,191 the costs of
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 52, 56 (1996).
185. DORLAND’S, supra note 3, at 40, 984; Philip A. Pizzo, The Compromized Host,
in 2 CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1571 (Lee Goldman & J. Claude Bennet eds., 21st
ed. 2000).
186. The initial bundling of clozapine raised antitrust issues. See Sanzo, supra note 33,
at 1224–25; Swidler, supra note 33, at 666–72; and Hurwitz, supra note 33, at 1215–20.
187. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 29; Carl Salzman, Mandatory Monitoring for
Side Effects: The “Bundling” of Clozapine, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 827, 827 (1990);
Hurwitz, supra note 33, at 1190.
188. Hurwitz, supra note 33, at 1190; Daniel Goleman, Outcry Grows Over Method
of Selling New Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1990, at B9 (annual cost of bundled
treatment was $8944).
189. Because Sandoz’s bundling made the drug very expensive in the United States,
the program was assailed by physicians, patient advocacy groups, and Congress. Milt
Freudenheim, Maker of Schizophrenia Drug Bows to Pressure to Cut Cost, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1990, at A1.
190. PDR, supra note 49, at 2320.
191. Several other serious medical problems may be associated with clozapine
therapy. The potential to develop seizures was well recognized when the drug was
released in the U.S., as were other less serious but potentially troublesome problems (for
example, sedation and drooling). The Medical Letter, Inc., Clozapine for Schizophrenia,
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blood testing, the high price of the drug itself,192 FDA restrictions on
approved indications for clozapine’s use,193 and the initial reluctance of
third party payers to support such expensive therapy194 led psychiatrists
32 MED. LETTER DRUGS & THERAPEUTICS 3, 3–4 (1990). Potential for weight gain and
associated medical problems (for example, diabetes mellitus, and hyperlipidemia) were
better appreciated after several years of the drugs’ use. Michael Davidson, Risk of
Cardiovascular Disease and Sudden Death in Schizophrenia, 63 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 5, 6–8 (Supp. 9, 2002) (summarizing the results of studies); Bruce D.
Gaulin et al., Clozapine-Associated Elevation in Serum Triglycerides, 156 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1270 (1999) (reporting that men treated with clozapine have higher followup serum triglyceride concentrations in blood); David C. Henderson et al., Clozapine,
Diabetes Mellitus, Weight Gain, and Lipid Abnormalities: A Five-year Naturalistic
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 975, 979 (2000) (reporting high rates of weight gain,
diabetes, and hyperlipidemia in patients who took clozapine for extended periods); Brian
C. Lund et al., Clozapine Use in Patients with Schizophrenia and the Risk of Diabetes,
Hyperlipidemia, and Hypertension: A Claims-Based Approach, 58 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1172, 1174 (2001) (reporting that clozapine appears not to directly cause
diabetes or hyperlipidemia, but may make people more susceptible to these disorders by
inducing weight gain); Prakash Masand & Sanjay Gupta, Long-Term Adverse Effects of
Novel Antipsychotics, 6 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 299, 301–04 (2000).
192. In 1997, Keith estimated the cost of clozapine to be “about $6,000 a year at
[his] institution—and the additional cost of the weekly blood monitoring [was] about
$1,000 a year.” Keith, supra note 113, at 852. In a study conducted at VA facilities, per
capita pharmacy costs in clozapine-treated patients were $3199 a year. Robert
Rosenheck et al., A Comparison of Clozapine and Haloperidol in Hospitalized Patients
with Refractory Schizophrenia, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 809, 812 (1997).
193. Clozapine had been available in some European countries for many years,
during which its potentially fatal association with agranulocytosis had become apparent.
Thus, the FDA’s requirements for approving clozapine were quite stringent. The FDA
“required a demonstration of efficacy in patients whose disease was refractory to
treatment with standard antipsychotic drugs. No other antipsychotic drug had ever been
required to meet such a standard.” Keith, supra note 113, at 852.
The Physicians’ Desk Reference still contains a warning, in boldfaced capital letters, to
reserve clozapine therapy for “severely ill schizophrenic patients who fail to show an
acceptable response to adequate courses of standard antipsychotic drug treatment.”
PDR, supra note 49, at 2319. “However, ongoing clinical research investigations
suggest the clinical utility of clozapine, alone or in combination with other
psychotropics, in patients with schizoaffective disorder and refractory bipolar disorder
(manic or depressed), as well as during the early stages . . . of schizophrenia.” Owens &
Risch, supra note 180, at 333; see also Susan L. McElroy et al., Clozapine in the
Treatment of Psychotic Mood Disorders, Schizoaffective Disorder and Schizophrenia, 52
J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 411, 411 (1991). Successful, safe use of clozapine has also
been reported in self-mutilating, but not psychotic, patients with borderline personality
disorder. See Frances R. Frankenburg & Mary C. Zanarini, Clozapine Treatment of
Borderline Patients: A Preliminary Study, 34 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 402 (1993);
K. N. Roy Chengappa et al., Clozapine Reduces Severe Self-Mutilation and Aggression
in Psychotic Patients with Borderline Personality Disorder, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
477, 483 (1999).
194. The expense of this new treatment caused some state Medicaid programs to be
reluctant to financially support clozapine therapy. In two of the first published cases
involving clozapine, courts ruled that Medicaid programs were obligated to make
clozapine available to beneficiaries when doctors felt that the drug was medically
necessary. Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990); Alexander L. v.
Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
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to prescribe clozapine only to patients who clearly could not benefit
from, or who could not tolerate, other available antipsychotic drugs. In
the early 1990s, these drugs included only conventional neuroleptics, so
psychiatrists continued to view the older D2 blockers as the “first-line”
therapy for their psychotic patients. Nonetheless, clozapine signified
both to psychiatrists and to patients that the potential benefits from
antipsychotic drugs might be far greater than had been the case during
the preceding decades.
2. Novel Agents for “First-Line” Use
The January 1994195 entrance of risperidone196 into the U.S.
pharmacopeia dramatically altered treatment prospects for patients with
psychotic disorders and initiated a change in the drugs that U.S.
psychiatrists selected to treat psychoses. After the release of risperidone,
U.S. psychiatrists could offer a novel antipsychotic agent as initial
therapy for schizophrenia. Risperidone, and the more recently released
olanzapine,197 quetiapine,198 and ziprasidone199 are not associated with a
substantial risk of agranulocytosis, and the recipients of these drugs do
not require any special medical monitoring.200 Olanzapine, quetiapine,
risperidone, and ziprasidone all appear to have several advantages over
older neuroleptics: (1) The novel agents all treat positive symptoms at
least as effectively as conventional neuroleptics, but they accomplish
this with a much lower frequency and intensity of the noxious
neuromotor side effects caused by the older D2 blockers. 201 It appears
195. Reuters, Johnson & Johnson Drug for Schizophrenia Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1994, at D5.
196. Risperidone is the nonproprietary name for the product marketed as
Risperdal® by Janssen Pharmaceutica. PDR, supra note 49, at 1796.
197. Olanzapine is marketed as Zyprexa® by Eli Lilly & Company. PDR, supra
note 49, at 1973. It was approved for general use in October 1996. Associated Press, A
New Drug for Schizophrenia Wins Approval from the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996,
at A21.
198. Quetiapine received FDA approval in 1997. Zeneca Given FDA Go-Ahead for
Seroquel, INDEP. (London), Aug. 2, 1997, at 19. The drug is marketed as Seroquel® by
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP. PDR, supra note 49, at 684–85.
199. Ziprasidone, marketed by Pfizer Inc. as Geodon®, is the most recent novel
agent to receive FDA approval; it was introduced in the U.S. in early 2001. PDR, supra
note 49, at 2688, 2692; Scott Hensley, Schizophrenia Drug from Pfizer Wins FDA’s
Approval, WALL STREET J., Feb. 6, 2001, at B21.
200. Herz, supra note 143, at 20–23.
201. See Jibson & Tandon, supra note 20, at 223 (graphically summarizing the
advantages, in terms of neuromotor side effects). The details of studies are reported in
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that the aripiprazole, a not-yet-approved novel agent, derives its
atypicality from being a mixed agonist-antagonist of the dopamine-D2
receptor.202 (2) Not only is the level of extrapyramidal side effects much
lower with newer agents, but the risk of developing tardive dyskinesia is
numerous articles.
See Richard L. Borison et al., ICI 204,636, an Atypical
Antipsychotic: Efficacy and Safety in a Multicenter, Placebo-Controlled Trial in Patients
with Schizophrenia, 16 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 158, 169 (1996) (reporting
that risperidone is at least as effective as haloperidol with far lower incidence of
extrapyramidal side effects); Guy Chouinard et al., A Canadian Multicenter PlaceboControlled Study of Fixed Doses of Risperidone and Haloperidol in the Treatment of
Chronic Schizophrenic Patients, 13 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 25, 25 (1993)
(reporting that risperidone is at least as effective as haloperidol with far lower incidence
of extrapyramidal side effects); Donald C. Goff et al., An Exploratory HaloperidolControlled Dose-Finding Study of Ziprasidone in Hospitalized Patients with
Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder, 18 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 296,
296 (1998) (reporting that risperidone is at least as effective as haloperidol with far lower
incidence of extrapyramidal side effects); Gary D. Tollefson et al., Olanzapine Versus
Haloperidol in the Treatment of Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective and
Schizophreniform Disorders: Results of an International Collaborative Trial, 154 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 457, 457 (1997) (reporting that olanzapine is at least as effective as
haloperidol with far lower incidence of extrapyramidal side effects).
These studies all compared the newer drugs to haloperidol well above patients’
neuroleptic threshold, that is, the minimum dose needed to produce modest
extrapyramidal side effects. For an important study of the neuroleptic threshold and its
dosing implications, see Joseph P. McEvoy et al., Optimal Dose of Neuroleptic in Acute
Schizophrenia: A Controlled Study of the Neuroleptic Threshold and Higher Haloperidol
Dose, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 739, 739–45 (1991). Some writers believe the
side effect evidence might have been less favorable toward the novel drugs had the
studies used lower haloperidol doses. Shitij Kapur et al., supra note 99, at 291–92. See
also discussion infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the impact of neuroleptic dosing on
apparent advantages of the newer drugs).
Despite this, most psychiatrists agree that the new drugs are an enormous boon to
patients, their families, and clinicians. Meltzer & Fatemi, supra note 178, at 769. For a
meta-analytic summary of the properties and advantages of the new drugs, see S. Leucht
et al., Efficacy and Extrapyramidal Side-Effects of the New Antipsychotics Olanzapine,
Quetiapine, Risperidone, and Sertindole Compared to Conventional Antipsychotics and
Placebo: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 35 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 51,
51 (1999) (“All new antipsychotic are associated with less frequent use of antiparkinson
[side-effect moderating] medication than haloperidol, with risperidone appearing to have
a slightly less favourable EPS-profile than the other new antipsychotics.”).
Why novel antipsychotics are novel, that is, why they do not cause extrapyramidal side
effects at nearly the frequency of the older drugs, is not clear. One explanation of
atypical agents’ properties may inhere in the “fast dissociation [of atypical agents] from
the D2 receptor [that] makes an antipsychotic more accommodating of physiological
dopamine transmission, permitting an antipsychotic effect without motor side effects,
prolactin elevation, or secondary negative symptoms.” Shitij Kapur & Philip Seeman,
Does Fast Dissociation from the Dopamine D2 Receptor Explain the Action of Atypical
Antipsychotics?: A New Hypothesis, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 360, 360 (2001); see also
Seeman, supra note 95, at 27 (further describing the “fast-off-D2” theory, in which rapid
dissociation from D2 receptors explains why novel antipsychotics cause fewer side
effects).
202. See Stephen M. Stahl, Dopamine System Stabilizers, Aripiprazole, and the
Next Generation of Antipsychotics, Part I: “Goldilocks” Actions at Dopamine
Receptors, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 841, 841–42 (2001).

1074

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

[VOL. 39: 1033, 2002]

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

Unbuckling the Straitjacket
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

lower as well.203 (3) Available evidence suggests that patients who need
antipsychotic medication prefer the novel agents204 and may be better off
taking them than the older D2-blockers.205 (4) One reason for this
preference may be that atypical agents leave patients less burdened with
negative symptoms than they would be were they to take neuroleptics,
possibly because the newer drugs induce less motor slowing.206 (5) A
growing number of studies suggest that the atypical antipsychotics are
better than the older drugs at ameliorating cognitive deficits that
characterize schizophrenia.207 (6) Some psychiatrists believe that the
203. Stanley N. Caroff et al., Movement Disorders Associated with Atypical
Antipsychotic Drugs, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 12, 13–16 (Supp. 4, 2002) (summarizing
findings from studies); Jibson & Tandon, supra note 20, at 224; Masand & Gupta, supra
note 191, at 304–05. Because novel antipsychotics have lower rates of acute neuromotor
side effects, “it has been suggested that atypical antipsychotics are less likely to cause
NMS [neuroleptic malignant syndrome] than conventional antipsychotics. This remains
unproven, and cases of NMS associated with clozapine, risperidone, olanzapine, and
quetiapine have been reported.” Carie D. Hatch et al., Failed Challenge with Quetiapine
After Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome with Conventional Antipsychotics, 21
PHARMACOTHERAPY 1003, 1003 (2001).
204. Shitij Kapur & Gary Remington, Atypical Antipsychotics: Patients Value the
Lower Incidence of Extrapyramidal Side Effects, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1360 (2000); Piper S.
Meyer et al., Comparison Between the Effects of Atypical and Traditional Antipsychotics
on Work Status for Clients in a Psychiatric Rehabilitation Program, 63 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 108, 114 (2002).
205. A. George Awad & Lakshmi N.P. Voruganti, Quality of Life and New
Antipsychotics in Schizophrenia: Are Patients Better Off?, 45 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY
268, 268 (1999).
206. Steven R. Hirsch et al., A 28-Week Comparison of Ziprasidone and
Haloperidol in Outpatients with Stable Schizophrenia, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 516,
519 (2002) (reporting that in previously stable patients, ziprasidone reduced negative
symptoms more than did haloperidol); Beng-Choon Ho et al., A Comparative
Effectiveness Study of Risperidone and Olanzapine in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 60
J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 658, 658 (1999) (reporting that olanzapine and risperidone
reduced negative symptoms); Jibson & Tandon, supra note 20, at 221. Some authors
have questioned whether atypicals actually ameliorate the “deficit” negative symptoms
intrinsic to schizophrenia, or merely the “secondary” negative symptoms caused by
neuroleptic side effects, lack of social stimulation, or intrusion of positive symptoms.
William T. Carpenter et al., Patient Response and Resource Management: Another View
of Clozapine Treatment of Schizophrenia, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 827, 827 (1995)
(“Treatment of primary negative symptoms is not supported by the current experimental
data.”).
207. Robert M. Bilder et al., Neurocognitive Effects of Clozapine, Olanzapine,
Risperidone, and Haloperidol in Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective
Disorder, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1018, 1018, 1024 (2002) (finding that clozapine,
risperidone, and olanzapine improved cognitive functioning in patients previously
resistant to treatment with neuroleptics and that the atypicals differed in the types of
improvements manifested); Robert W. Buchanan et al., The Comparative Efficacy and
Long-Term Effect of Clozapine Treatment on Neuropsychological Test Performance, 36
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newer drugs do more than the older drugs towards improving patients’
long-term social functioning, and that this, rather than short-term
reduction in positive symptoms, ought to become the basis upon which
the benefits of antipsychotic therapy are judged.208
Because the novel antipsychotics appear to represent pharmacologically
advantageous ways to treat psychoses, many psychiatrists believe that
these drugs have created a new standard of care for antipsychotic
therapy. In the mid-1990s, psychiatrists began suggesting that the
atypical drugs should be psychiatrists’ first choice when selecting an
antipsychotic therapy,209 and within a few years, this view became
dominant.210 That this view represents a rapid and dramatic change in
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 717, 717 (1994) (reporting that one year’s treatment with
clozapine yielded improvements on several measures of cognitive performance);
Michael F. Green & David L. Braff, Translating the Basic and Clinical Cognitive
Neuroscience of Schizophrenia to Drug Development and Clinical Trials of Antipsychotic
Medications, 49 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 374, 374 (2001) (“Neurocognitive deficits
appear to be improved with newer (atypical) antipsychotic medications across a broad
range of domains in schizophrenia patients.”); Michael Foster Green et al., Does
Risperidone Improve Verbal Working Memory in Treatment-Resistant Schizophrenia?,
154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 799, 799 (1997) (reporting improved verbal working memory);
Corinne Hagger et al., Improvement in Cognitive Functions and Psychiatric Symptoms in
Treatment-Refractory Schizophrenic Patients Receiving Clozapine, 34 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 702, 702 (1993) (reporting improvement in retrieval from reference
memory); Meltzer & McGurk, supra note 171, at 233 (reporting that risperidone
produces “relatively consistent positive effects on working memory, executive
functioning, and attention”); Scot E. Purdon et al., Neuropsychological Change in Early
Phase Schizophrenia During 12 Months of Treatment with Olanzapine, Risperidone, or
Haloperidol, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 249, 254 (2000) (reporting that olanzapine
treatment is associated with improved immediate recall and nonverbal fluency); Dawn I.
Velligan et al., Does Cognitive Function Improve with Quetiapine in Comparison to
Haloperidol?, 53 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 239, 239, (2002) (stating that patients taking
quetiapine improved more than patients taking haloperidol on overall measures of
cognitive function, including verbal fluency, attention, and verbal memory, which are
“domains of cognitive performance that have been found to predit role function and
community outcomes”).
208. Anthony F. Lehman, Developing an Outcomes-Oriented Approach for the
Treatment of Schizophrenia, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 30, 30 (Supp. 19, 1999); Sandra
L. Tunis et al., Changes in Perceived Health and Functioning as a Cost-Effectiveness
Measure for Olanzapine Versus Haloperidol Treatment of Schizophrenia, 60 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 38, 38 (Supp. 19, 1999).
209. Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Atypical Antipsychotic Drugs as a First-Line Treatment
of Schizophrenia: A Rationale and Hypothesis, 57 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 68, 68 (Supp.
11, 1996) (offering “a rationale and hypothesis for the use of atypical antipsychotic drugs
as a first-line treatment of schizophrenia”).
210. John A. Chiles et al., The Texas Medication Algorithm Project: Development
and Implementation of the Schizophrenia Algorithm, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 69, 72
(1999); Neil S. Kaye & Thomas J. Reed, Tardive Dyskinesia: Tremors in Law and
Medicine, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 315, 316 (1999); Alexander L. Miller et al.,
The Texas Medication Algorithm Project (TMAP) Schizophrenia Algorithms, 60 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 649, 652 (1999); Rowland Pearsall et al., A New Algorithm for
Treating Schizophrenia, 34 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 349, 349 (1998) (suggesting
that the “newer atypical agents may now be the treatment of choice for initiating therapy
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psychiatrists’ thinking about the pharmacotherapy of schizophrenia is
suggested by noting that, in a 1995 psychopharmacology handbook, the
discussion of risperidone occupies less than one page in a thirty-eight
page chapter on antipsychotic medications,211 and the American
Psychiatric Association’s guideline for treating schizophrenia, published
in April 1997, states that “conventional antipsychotic medications and
risperidone are all reasonable first-line medications for patients in acute
phases of schizophrenia . . . . .”212 The next Part of this Article offers
several reasons why psychiatrists may still choose to prescribe
neuroleptics as first-line therapies, despite the apparent advantages of
newer antipsychotic drugs. This Article then describes several possible
sources of liability that now might arise from using conventional
neuroleptics, and discusses the potential impact of recent cases on
courts’ thinking about whether use of the older drugs constitutes
malpractice.
IV. COST ISSUES AND THE USE OF NOVEL ANTIPSYCHOTICS AS
FIRST-LINE TREATMENTS213
Psychiatrists in the U.S. think that the newer antipsychotics should be
the drugs of first choice for patients suffering from their first episode of
in most clinical situations”); David N. Osser & Carlos A. Zarate, Jr., Consultant for the
Pharmacotherapy of Schizophrenia, 29 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 252, 253 (1999); Steven P.
Shon et al., Mental Health Care from the Public Perspective: The Texas Medication
Algorithm Project, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 16, 18 (Supp. 3, 1999); The Expert
Consensus Guideline Series: Treatment of Schizophrenia 1999, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
12, 12 (Joseph P. McEvoy et al. eds., Supp. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Guideline Series]; see
also Roger S. McIntyre, Psychotropic Drugs and Adverse Events in the Treatment of
Bipolar Disorders Revisited, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 15, 15 (Supp. 3, 2002) (“The
novel antipsychotics are now the antipsychotics of choice in the treatment of bipolar
disorders.”); David N. Osser & Robert Sigadel, Short-Term Inpatient Pharmacotherapy
of Schizophrenia, 9 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 89, 89 (2001) (“For initial oral treatment,
monotherapy with one of the new ‘atypical’ antipsychotics is favored.”); Renée E. Snow
& Sumer Verma, Late-life Psychosis: It’s Efficacy Vs. Cost in the Tug-of-War over
Treatment, 1 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY 10, 10, 14 (2002) (“In general, atypical antipsychotics are
considered first-line therapy [for treating psychotic disorders in elderly patients], unless
there is a compelling reason not to use them in an individual patient.”).
211. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 30.
212. Herz, supra note 143, at 3.
213. Portions of this and the following two Parts are adapted from two other articles.
Douglas Mossman & Douglas S. Lehrer, Conventional and Atypical Antipsychotics and the
Evolving Standard of Care, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1528 (2000); Douglas Mossman,
Malpractice Implications of Prescribing Antipsychotic Medications, 19 DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHIATRY 311 (1999).
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schizophrenia and also should be used to treat all patients with
established diagnoses of schizophrenia unless there is a good reason—a
patient’s personal preference, record of excellent response to an older
drug, or need for an injectable preparation214—to prescribe a conventional
agent.215 Indeed, given the advantages of the newer drugs summarized
214. On June 24, 2002, ziprasidone became the first novel antipsychotic available
in a short-acting injectable form. FDA Approves Pfizer’s Schizophrenia Medicine
Geodon® in Injectable Form; First Atypical Antipsychotic Approved in Intramuscular
Form to Rapidly Treat Acute Agitation in Patients with Schizophrenia, PR NEWSWIRE,
June 24, 2002, LEXIS, PR Newswire File; see also Michael D. Lesem et al.,
Intramuscular Ziprasidone, 2 Mg Versus 10 Mg, in the Short-Term Management of
Agitated Psychotic Patients, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 12, 12 (2001) (reporting that
injectable ziprasidone is effective in quelling acute psychosis).
Other novel
antipsychotic agents are available only for oral administration, although research is
proceeding on injectable forms of these drugs. See, e.g., Alan Breier, A Double-Blind,
Placebo-Controlled Dose-Response Comparison of Intramuscular Olanzapine and
Haloperidol in the Treatment of Acute Agitation in Schizophrenia, 59 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 441, 446–47 (2002) (reporting that injections of olanzapine rapidly and
safely reduce agitation); Karena Meehan et al., A Double-Blind, Randomized
Comparison of the Efficacy and Safety of Intramuscular Injections of Olanzapine,
Lorazepam, or Placebo in Treating Acutely Agitated Patients Diagnosed with Bipolar
Mania, 21 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 389, 389 (2001); Osser & Zarate, supra
note 210, at 255.
Several of the older antipsychotic drugs can be administered by intramuscular
injection. Two conventional antipsychotic drugs, fluphenazine and haloperidol, are
available as long acting preparations that can be administered in a single “depot”
injection every two or four weeks. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 10–11. By
administering one of the depot preparations, clinicians can be sure that patients are
receiving their antipsychotic medication. For a discussion of the role of injectable
antipsychotic therapy, see generally Peter Weiden & William Glazer, Assessment and
Treatment Selection for “Revolving Door” Inpatients with Schizophrenia, 68
PSYCHIATRY Q. 377 (1997), and Marcia Valenstein et al., Adherence Assessments and the
Use of Depot Antipsychotics in Patients with Schizophrenia, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
545, 545–46 (2001). Concerning patients’ feelings about depot medication, see Yuval
Bloch et al., Injections of Depot Antipsychotic Medications in Patients Suffering from
Schizophrenia: Do They Hurt?, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 855, 855 (2001), stating that
“[d]epot injections are painful.” In July 2002, the FDA refused to approve a long acting,
injectable form of risperidone. Geoff Dyer, J&J Hit by FDA Drug Snub, FIN. TIMES,
July 2, 2002, at 30.
215. Chiles et al., supra note 210, at 72; Kaye & Reed, supra note 210, at 331;
Lieberman, supra note 209, at 70–71 (“[T]he most opportune time for optimal treatment
interventions appears to be the first episode of illness. . . . [T]he greatest benefits from
the use of atypical antipsychotic drugs . . . should be seen in patients close to the onset of
illness.”); Guideline Series, supra note 210, at 12–13, 35; Miller et al., supra note 210, at
652; Osser & Zarate, supra note 210, at 253 (stating that when treating a patient with
schizophrenia, “[t]he first-line recommendation is to select one of the new generation of
antipsychotic medications”).
For example, in the Texas Medication Algorithm Project (TMAP) schizophrenia
algorithm, older neuroleptics are used only after trials of the novel agents have proven
unsuccessful. Patients may also receive a depot neuroleptic after demonstrating poor
compliance during their first trial of a novel drug. Miller et al., supra note 210, at 652;
Chiles et al., supra note 210, at 72. The TMAP is an effort by public sector psychiatrists
to establish a set of “best practices” for the pharmacological treatment of major
psychiatric disorders. The TMAP receives financial support from several pharmaceutical
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in the previous Part, why would anyone want to take or prescribe the
older ones?
A. The Costs of Novel Antipsychotics
The main reason is the cost charged to pharmacies and other third
parties that pay for antipsychotic medication.216 Acquisition prices for
the newer agents are far greater than the cost of equivalent doses of
generic conventional agents, sometimes seventy to one hundred times
higher.217 For a patient with schizophrenia, taking a novel antipsychotic
rather than a conventional agent might entail an added treatment cost of
$3000 to $4000 per year.218
If patients purchased medications with their own funds, decisions
about whether to spend more money to purchase and take the newer
drugs would be controlled by the persons who consumed the drugs and
experienced their benefits and risks. Patients could weigh the relative
advantages of older and newer medications and, after consultation with
their doctors, decide for themselves whether having a newer medication
was worth giving up some other item219 on which they were spending
their money.
However, for most patients with schizophrenia, money for medication
comes from managed health insurance dollars or public funds
administered through state budgets and Medicaid programs. This means
companies that market novel antipsychotic drugs. Don A. Gilbert et al., Texas Medication
Algorithm Project: Definitions, Rationale, and Methods to Develop Medication
Algorithms, 59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 345, 345 (1998); Miller et al., supra note 210, at
649. For a discussion of the potential impact of pharmaceutical company sponsorship,
see infra Part IV.B.1. Some clinicians outside the United States take an alternative
positionon medication choice. See Geddes et al., supra note 20, at 1371 (“Conventional
antipsychotics should usually be used in the initial treatment of . . . schizophrenia unless
the patient has previously not responded to these drugs or has unacceptable
extrapyramidal side effects.”).
216. The novel antipsychotic drugs have some side effect disadvantages when
compared to older drugs; the former seem more prone to cause weight gain and
associated medical problems. See infra Part IV.B.1.
217. Mossman & Lehrer, supra note 213, at 1529.
218. Id.
219. Most patients with schizophrenia smoke cigarettes. Some recent evidence
suggests that atypical antipsychotic drugs may promote smoking cessation. Tony P.
George et al., Nicotine Transdermal Patch and Atypical Antipsychotic Medications for
Smoking Cessation in Schizophrenia, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1835, 1838–40 (2000).
With cigarettes now costing three dollars to six dollars per pack, a heavy smoker might
conclude that purchasing a newer antipsychotic and quitting smoking was a cost neutral
decision (not to mention the many potential short- and long-term health benefits).
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that administrators of managed care organizations or publicly funded
treatment programs, rather than individual patients and doctors, must
decide whether to allocate funds that might be spent on other therapies to
the newer, more expensive drugs. To appreciate the kinds of decisions
to be made, consider the potential fiscal impact of newer antipsychotic
agents at the Ohio public sector hospital where the author works. For
the more than 300 patients that receive antipsychotic drugs, switching to
the atypicals might generate an additional pharmacy cost of about
$1,000,000 per year, which is about half of the total hospital budget for
paying the psychiatrists that treat patients.220 A recent study of Georgia
Medicaid patients treated for schizophrenia found that in constant
dollars, antipsychotic expenditures increased by nine and one half times
between 1990 and 2002, almost entirely because of the trend to use
atypicals rather than older antipsychotic drugs. The authors of the study
noted that “[t]his transition from traditional oral antipsychotics to
atypicals . . . has a profound effect on drug expenditures for systems
paying for the care of persons with schizophrenia.”221
Courts have ruled that, in some circumstances, state Medicaid
agencies are obligated to pay for qualified individuals’ treatment with
clozapine,222 and presumably the same obligation would apply to the
other novel antipsychotics. However, private and public sector agencies
also must administer psychiatric care within budgetary limits. These
agencies thus potentially face the fiscal and moral dilemma of deciding
for their patients whether the benefits of the atypicals are worth the
added pharmacy expenses.
B. Pharmacoeconomic Studies
One way out of this dilemma is suggested by several published
pharmacoeconomic studies, which assert that using novel antipsychotics
does not really increase the total cost of treating persons with
schizophrenia because the drugs allow patients to leave the hospital. If
220. Mossman & Lehrer, supra note 213, at 1529; see also Carolyn S. Dewa &
Paula Goering, Lessons Learned from Trends in Psychotropic Drug Expenditures in a
Canadian Province, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1245, 1246 (2001) (stating that despite
Ontario’s cost control mechanisms, introduction of novel agents quadrupled expenditures
for antipsychotic agents between 1992 and 1998 and in the latter year, novel agents still
accounted for only one-third of antipsychotic drug prescriptions). See infra note 259
(comparing costs of neuroleptic and novel antipsychotic medications for Veterans
Affairs patients).
221. Bradley C. Martin et al., Antipsychotic Prescription Use and Costs for Persons
with Schizophrenia in the 1990s: Current Trends and Five Year Time Series Forecasts,
47 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 281, 281 (2001).
222. Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990); Alexander L. v.
Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
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the new drugs reduce patients’ need for hospitalization, as some
interpreters of these studies have suggested,223 then using them is not
really any more costly than using the older drugs. The money saved
from reduced hospital use might even produce a net overall savings.
Whether novel antipsychotic agents really can reduce total treatment
costs is still unclear. Health outcomes researcher Dennis Revicki
recently reviewed extant pharmacoeconomic studies and summarized
their results as follows:
The evidence, from a variety of studies, indicates that clozapine is a costeffective treatment for neuroleptic refractory schizophrenia. Risperidone and
olanzapine may be cost neutral, or at best slightly cost saving, compared with
conventional antipsychotics, although they do improve patient clinical
effectiveness and quality of life outcomes. There is too little data on
pharmacoeconomic outcomes for sertindole and quetiapine to make any
conclusions about their cost-effectiveness in treating schizophrenia.224

The following sections describe several reasons why psychiatrists and
administrators should maintain a healthy skepticism about claims that
novel agents reduce total treatment costs.
1. Possible Skewing of Results
Many decisionmakers treat pharmacoeconomic studies sponsored by
drug manufacturers with skepticism “because of the potential bias of
[the] study sponsors. . . .”225 With the novel agents, “a number of the
223. Christopher G. Fichtner et al., Pharmacoeconomic Studies of Atypical
Antipsychotics: Review and Perspective, 28 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 381, 395 (1998)
(“[F]or patients who continue to take the new treatment, overall medical resource
utilization is likely to decrease, resulting in lower costs.”).
224. Dennis A. Revicki, The New Atypical Antipsychotics: A Review of
Pharmacoeconomic Studies, 1 EXPERT OPINION ON PHARMACOTHERAPY 249, 249 (2000),
LEXIS, MEDLINE Database. “Neuroleptic refractory schizophrenia” refers to patients
that suffer from the disorder and do not recover with the help of conventional (pre-1989)
antipsychotic drugs.
Sertindole is a novel antipsychotic agent that the manufacturer, Abbott Laboratories,
withdrew from consideration for FDA approval in early 1998. George Gunset, Abbott
Withdraws Drug Application, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 1998, at B1; Dolores Kong, Doctors
Criticize Placebo Testing: Mentally Ill Patients Worsened After Use, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 21, 1999, at A1 (“serlect (sertindole) . . . was withdrawn from consideration after
an FDA advisory committee questioned its safety”). The drug had been used previously
in other countries, for example, in the United Kingdom, but the Danish manufacturer
Lundbeck withdrew it from use in late 1998 because it caused potentially fatal heart
problems. Geddes et al., supra note 20 at 1373; Lesley Roberts, Drug Ban as Experts
Probe Sudden Deaths, DAILY MAIL (London), Jan. 4, 1999, at 4.
225. Peter J. Neumann, Methods of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in the Evaluation of
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comparative studies that have been published were developed and
sponsored by the pharmaceutical companies whose medications were
being evaluated, raising concerns about potential sources of bias in
experimental design or interpretation of outcomes.”226 Although no published
report provides evidence that manufacturer sponsored studies of
atypicals have been dishonest, three features of these studies may have
accentuated the newer drugs’ advantages.
First, some studies may have utilized data obtained from a large
number of treatment resistant patients, that is, individuals who did not
benefit from treatment with the older drugs.227 If this were the case, it
would lead investigators to overestimate savings that would occur in
New Antipsychotics: Implications for Schizophrenia Treatment, 60 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 9, 12 (Supp 3, 1999); see also Peter J. Neumann, Paying the Piper for
Pharmacoeconomic Studies, 18 MED. DECISION MAKING S23, S23 (Supp. 1998).
“Clinical trials form the basis of effective research and development, but their reliability
is currently imperilled by three major flaws: conflicts of interest on the part of the
investigators; inappropriate involvement of research sponsors in their design and
management; and publication bias in disseminating their results [the tendency to publish
only results of studies showing that a drug worked].” Jonathan Quick, Maintaining the
Integrity of the Clinical Evidence Base, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1093, 1093
(2001).
226. David A. Lewis, Atypical Antipsychotic Medications and the Treatment of
Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 177, 177 (2002). Two University of Michigan
schizophrenia researchers commented:
[A]ggressive marketing by pharmaceutical companies and their pervasive
involvement in continuing medical education has contributed to some
confusion among clinicians about how available pharmacologic strategies
compare and what they can realistically accomplish. Industry-sponsored drug
trials are the major source of clinical trial information, and because Phase IV
trials are conducted at least in part for marketing purposes, resulting biases can
compromise their utility.
Rajiv Tandon & Michael D. Jibson, Pharmacologic Treatment of Schizophrenia: What
the Future Holds, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 980, 984 (2001) (citations omitted).
227. For example, several pharmacoeconomic studies utilize archival data obtained
during pre-release efficacy studies that were conducted as a prelude to FDA approval.
Patients in these efficacy studies typically were hospitalized when recruited. See, e.g.,
Charles M. Beasley, Jr. et al., Olanzapine Versus Placebo and Haloperidol: Acute Phase
Results of the North American Double-Blind Olanzapine Trial, 14 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
111, 112–13 (1996) (noting that a study required patients to have a minimum level of
psychopathology and to be inpatients for two weeks); Stephen R. Marder & Richard C.
Meibach, Risperidone in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 825,
826 (1994); Joyce G. Small et al., Quetiapine in Patients with Schizophrenia: a Highand Low-Dose Double-Blind Comparison with Placebo, 54 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
549, 550 (1997). This means that the subset of patients that were doing well enough in
the community not to need hospitalization were not represented in these studies, and that
“tough-to-treat” patients were over-represented. This might also explain why response
rates for the new drugs were somewhat lower, only forty-five to fifty percent, than the
seventy percent response rate that is usually reported for conventional antipsychotic
medications. See Douglas Mossman, A Decision Analysis Approach to Neuroleptic
Dosing: Insights from a Mathematical Model, 58 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 66, 68 (1997)
(summarizing studies).
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typical populations of psychotic patients.228 Moreover, although one
recently published study demonstrated the superior efficacy of atypicals
in treating patients who had suboptimal responses to neuroleptics, “the
effects were modest and their clinical significance limited.”229
Second, the pharmaceutical manufacturers’ prerelease studies on
which many pharmacoeconomic studies have relied have compared the
performance of novel agents to effect of haloperidol dosed at ten to
twenty milligrams/day. This dose choice was reasonable, since patients
often receive such doses of haloperidol and equivalently high doses of
other neuroleptics.230 However, it has been recognized for several years
that only a fraction of patients benefit from doses above the equivalent
of haloperidol five milligrams/day.231 Above this dose, side effects
increase much more than does drug effectiveness.232 Recent evidence
suggests that individuals that have never taken a neuroleptic may need
only one to three milligrams/day.233 Even at low doses, the risk of
developing tardive dyskinesia is lower with atypicals than with
haloperidol.234 However, apparent superiority of novel drugs in reducing
negative symptoms might be less striking if a comparison were
undertaken with modest doses of haloperidol like two to five
228. Jan Volavka et al., Clozapine, Olanzapine, Risperidone, and Haloperidol in
the Treatment of Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective Disorder, 159
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 255, 260–61 (2002) (stating that in neuroleptics resistant patients,
atypicals were better at reducing symptoms than haloperidol, but selecting such patients
for study “would be expected to result in data that tend to show superior efficacy of
atypical antipsychotics”).
229. Id. at 261.
230. Marcia Valenstein et al., Delays in Adopting Evidence-Based Dosages of
Conventional Antipsychotics, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1242, 1244 (stating that between
1991 and 1995, “15 years after research reports and eight years after review articles
supported moderate dosages, a troubling proportion of patients were treated with high
dosages”); James T. Walkup et al., Patients with Schizophrenia at Risk for Excessive
Antipsychotic Dosing, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 344, 344 (2000) (reporting that
minority patients are at a higher risk for receiving excessive doses).
231. McEvoy et al., supra note 201, at 742; Mossman, supra note 227, at 69–70
(stating that at least eighty percent of patients that can benefit from neuroleptic therapy
respond at doses at or below the equivalent of haloperidol five milligrams/day).
232. P. Bollini et al., Antipsychotic Drugs: Is More Worse? A Meta-analysis of the
Published Randomized Control Trials, 24 PSYCHOLOGICAL MED. 307, 307 (1994).
233. Shitij Kapur et al., Relationship Between Dopamine D2 Occupancy, Clinical
Response, and Side Effects: A Double-Blind PET Study of First-Episode Schizophrenia,
157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 514, 517 (2000).
234. Dilip V. Jeste et al., Lower Incidence of Tardive Dyskinesia with Risperidone
Compared with Haloperidol in Older Patients, 47 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 716, 716
(1999).
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milligrams/day, rather than the ten to twenty milligrams/day doses that
were used in prerelease trials.235
Third, persons who take the newer antipsychotics are especially
susceptible to gaining weight and to developing related metabolic
problems, such as diabetes mellitus.236 Taking the older antipsychotic
agents also increases a patient’s risk of developing these problems, but
the frequency and severity of these problems are even more pronounced
in patients that take novel agents.237 In a society that greatly values
thinness, one must wonder how many patients might prefer a drug with a
higher risk of tardive dyskinesia to a drug that had a good chance of
making them fat. Moreover, psychiatrists do not yet know what will be
the long-term consequences of atypical induced weight gain.238

235. Kapur et al., supra note 99, at 292.
236. “[N]ewer antipsychotic treatments such as clozapine and olanzapine, in
comparison with typical agents, are associated with adverse effects on plasma glucose
regulation . . . .” John W. Newcomer et al., Abnormalities in Glucose Regulation During
Antipsychotic Treatment of Schizophrenia, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337, 342
(2002). See id. at 337–38 (summarizing the results of reports describing the increased
risk of weight gain and diabetes).
237. David B. Allison et al., Antipsychotic-Induced Weight Gain: A Comprehensive
Research Synthesis, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1686, 1690 (1999) (reporting that more
weight gain occurred with clozapine, olanzapine, and risperidone than with haloperidol
or placebo, and that several neuroleptics are associated with weight gain as well, but
generally less than the novel agents); Davidson, supra note 191, at 6–8 (summarizing
studies of metabolic abnormalities associated with neuroleptics and the novel agents);
Michael J. Sernyak et al., Association of Diabetes Mellitus with Use of Atypical
Neuroleptics in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 561, 561 (2002)
(noting that after controlling for age, patients who took novel agents were nine percent
more likely to be treated for diabetes than were patients taking older antipsychotic
drugs); Brian B. Sheitman et al., Olanzapine-Induced Elevation of Plasma Triglyceride
Levels, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1471–72 (1999); Maxwell Sobel et al., New-Onset
Diabetes Mellitus Associated with the Initiation of Quetiapine Treatment, 60 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 556, 556–57 (1999); Donna A. Wirshing et al., Novel Antipsychotics:
Comparison of Weight Gain Liabilities, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 358, 361–62 (1999);
Donna A. Wirshing et al., Novel Antipsychotics and New Onset Diabetes, 44
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 778, 778 (1998) (reporting six new-onset cases of diabetes
mellitus associated with clozapine and olanzapine and that four patients had substantial
weight gain); Donna A. Wirshing et al., Risperidone-Associated New-Onset Diabetes, 50
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 148, 148 (2001) (reporting two cases of diabetes); Donna A.
Wirshing et al., The Effects of Antipsychotics on Glucose and Lipid Levels, 63 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 856, 863 (2002) (presenting a chart to illustrate a study showing
elevated glucose levels and triglyceride levels in patients receiving novel agents, and
recommending that physicians “be more aggressive in monitoring glucose and lipid
levels in patients treated with these agents”).
238. Kevin R. Fontaine et al., Estimating the Consequences of Anti-Psychotic
Induced Weight Gain on Health and Mortality Rate, 101 PSYCHIATRY RES. 277, 278
(2001) (“[T]he magnitude of weight gains induced by many antipsychotic agents is likely
to have important deleterious effects on mortality and health.”).

1084

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

[VOL. 39: 1033, 2002]

Unbuckling the Straitjacket
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

2. Findings from Intent-to-Treat Studies
After clozapine was released, its recipients often were patients who
had spent great lengths of time in hospitals because they could not
benefit from the then-available antipsychotic drugs. Initial studies
comparing total pre- and post-clozapine expenditures for the previously
refractory patients who took the drug successfully suggested that
clozapine was a net money saver because patients’ reduced use of
hospitalization more than offset costs of administering the drug to
them.239 However, so-called intent-to-treat studies, which include
studies that compare all patients who were offered clozapine with all
patients offered a comparison medication, have concluded that the
financial savings from clozapine are modest at best.240 Similarly, two
intent-to-treat studies of risperidone did not demonstrate any actual
financial savings241 although studies using mathematical models had
suggested that the drug would reduce the total cost of care.242
3. Nonunanimity of Findings
Some studies have shown that in real life treatment, results with novel
agents are not necessarily better than results with conventional
239. Herbert Y. Meltzer et al., Cost Effectiveness of Clozapine in NeurolepticResistant Schizophrenia, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1630, 1636 (1993).
240. Katherine J. Aitchison & Robert W. Kerwin, Cost-Effectiveness of Clozapine:
A UK Clinic-Based Study, 171 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 125, 127–28 (1997); Daniel J.
Luchins et al., Initiating Clozapine Treatment in the Outpatient Clinic: Service
Utilization and Cost Trends, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1034, 1036 (1998) (noting that
the higher cost of clozapine treatment was only partially offset by decreased rate of
hospitalization); Rosenheck et al., supra note 192, at 812.
241. Mark J. Schiller et al., Treatment Costs and Patient Outcomes with Use of
Risperidone in a Public Mental Health Setting, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 228, 231–32
(1999) (noting a trend toward higher costs with risperidone treatment); Gary Viale et al.,
Impact of Risperidone on the Use of Mental Health Care Resources, 48 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1153, 1157–58 (1997) (noting a statistically insignificant increase in total
costs).
242. Brian S. Nightengale et al., Economic Outcomes of Antipsychotic Agents in a
Medicaid Population: Traditional Agents Vs. Risperidone, 34 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
BULL. 373, 380–81 (1998); Dennis A. Revicki, Pharmacoeconomic Studies of Atypical
Antipsychotic Drugs for the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 35 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. S101,
S107 (Supp. 1999) (noting that clozapine is cost saving for treatment refractory patients
and as standard therapy, atypical agents appear cost neutral); see also Brian C. Lund &
Paul J. Perry, Olanzapine: An Atypical Antipsychotic for Schizophrenia, 1 EXPERT
OPINION ON PHARMACOTHERAPY 305, 305 (2000) (“[P]harmacoeconomic studies are
needed to justify the large acquisition cost of olanzapine compared to typical agents.”).
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antipsychotics. In a study involving matched schizophrenic patients that
received either risperidone or conventional agents, Schiller and
colleagues found that costs and effectiveness did not differ.243 A report by
Binder and colleagues states that seventy-one percent of patients whose
doctors had prescribed risperidone for them had stopped taking the
medication two years later because of noncompliance, poor response, or
side effects.244 Another study evaluating the impact of risperidone found
not only that the drug did not reduce patient readmission rates but also
that average annual treatment costs for risperidone treated patients were
nearly double the costs for patients receiving conventional agents.245
4. How U.S. Healthcare Budgets Work
Authors in France246 and Australia247 have suggested that if their
countries switched patients from conventional to atypical agents it would
generate a net savings in healthcare expenses. Unlike the U.S., these
countries offer all their citizens government funded medical care, so
looking at potential system-wide savings is a sensible perspective from
which to judge healthcare costs. In the multiple payer U.S. system,
however, cost savings from novel antipsychotics, if indeed savings do
occur, might not go to the agencies or organizations that pay for those
drugs.248 Also, the financial benefits of atypicals might not occur within
the time horizon of healthcare organizations’ annual budgets because,
for many patients, the benefits of new medications and their associated
cost savings take many months to accrue.249
243.
244.

Schiller et al., supra note 241, at 231–32.
Renée L. Binder et al., A Naturalistic Study of Clinical Use of Risperidone, 49
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 524, 525 (1998).
245. Kim C. Coley et al., Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Therapy in a Naturalistic
Setting: A Comparison Between Risperidone, Perphenazine, and Haloperidol, 60 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 850, 854 (1999).
246. Claude Le Pen et al., Comparaison Économique de l’olanzapine Versus
Halopéridol dans le Traitement de la Schizophrénie en France [Economic Comparison
of Olanzapine Versus Haloperidol in Treatment of Schizophrenia in France], 25
ENCEPHALE 281 (1999).
247. Alison Davies et al., Risperidone Versus Haloperidol: II. Cost-Effectiveness,
20 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 196, 207 (1998). This study was supported by JanssenCilag, a firm that markets risperidone; Alison Davies worked for Janssen-Cilag when the
article was published. Id. at 211.
248. For a graphical depiction of the complex funding patterns involved in paying
for antipsychotic medications and psychiatric care in general, see William Glazer & Ruth
Dickson, Pharmacoeconomics and Resource Allocation: Lessons from North America, in
SCHIZOPHRENIA AND MOOD DISORDERS: THE NEW DRUG THERAPIES IN PRACTICE 330,
331 (Peter F. Buckley & John L. Waddington eds., 2000).
249. Meltzer et al., supra note 239, at 1636 (cost offset occurred over two years);
Robert Rosenheck et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Clozapine in Patients with High and Low
Levels of Hospital Use, 56 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 565, 569 (1999) (noting cost
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5. Are Calculated Savings Real Savings?
Although several studies of atypicals have reported cost savings from
patients’ reduced need for hospitalization, those savings have merely
been calculated. Actual cash savings do not occur unless hospitals close
wards and lay off clinicians, administrators, and support staff members.
Over the last fifteen years, lengths of stay in psychiatric hospitals have
dropped markedly as a result of managed care and other policy decisions,250
and treatment agencies may not be able to fully offset increased
pharmacy expenses through further reductions in hospital use.251
6. Would “Stepped Care” Generate More Cash Savings?
Pharmacoeconomic studies have evaluated treatment schemes in
which patients receive either a conventional neuroleptic or a novel drug
from the outset. However, two studies suggest that novel antipsychotics
lower treatment costs mainly for patients who had not benefited from
neuroleptics or had been unusually high users of hospital services.252
This suggests that the best money saving strategy may be “stepped
care.”253 Stepped care is a system in which schizophrenic patients first
receive “older, less expensive antipsychotic[s] in judicious doses,
undergo conscientious monitoring for adverse effects and clinical
response, and receive novel agents only if they do not have a good

savings after one year, but only in previously high users of hospital services).
250. See, e.g., Susan H. Garritson, Availability and Performance of Psychiatric
Acute Care Facilities in California from 1992 to 1996, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1453,
1455 (1999) (describing a twenty-six percent reduction in the length of stay in California
psychiatric hospitals).
251. Herbert Y. Meltzer, Outcome in Schizophrenia: Beyond Symptom Reduction,
60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 3, 4 (Supp. 3, 1999).
252. Rosenheck, supra note 249, at 565; Patrick R. Finley et al., Risperidone:
Clinical Outcome Predictors and Cost-Effectiveness in a Naturalistic Setting, 34
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 75, 78 (1998).
253. Other writers have called such strategies “fail-first” policies, derived from the
notion that patients must first fail to benefit from a cheaper drug before being offered a
more expensive drug. See, e.g., Omnibus Mental Illness Recovery Act § 7, http://www.
nami.org/update/omirasec7.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2002) (discussing managed care
drug formularies); Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Medicaid Formulary
Policies: Access to High-Cost Mental Health Medications, at http://www. bazelon.org/
formulary.html (Nov. 1999) (Medicaid drug formularies); National Mental Health
Association, The VA Is Restricting Access to Needed Anti-Psychotic Medication to
Veterans Across the Country!, at http://www.nmha. org/newsroom/system/lal.vw.
cfm?do=vw&rid=330 (Aug. 21, 2001) (VA antipsychotic policy).
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response to, or . . . develop problems from, a . . . neuroleptic.”254 In some
settings, first choice use of effective but inexpensive neuroleptics may
be justified by the need for prudent use of limited financial resources.255
C. Ethical Issues in Stepped Care
Of course, a stepped care policy would result in more patients being
exposed to neuroleptic side effects than would occur if atypicals were
used as first-line drugs for treating schizophrenia, and this could raise a
series of practical moral questions for a treatment agency that adopted
such a policy. A mere listing of the questions is sufficient to suggest
how complicated and troublesome they might become: (1) Would the
agency be obligated to tell patients about the policy and its restrictions
on use of the newer, less risky, more expensive drugs? (2) Would
patients’ family members be entitled to any information?256 (3) How
explicit should the agency be in describing the financial rationale for
stepped care? (4) How should the agency disclose such information?
Would it suffice to distribute written material to patients, or should
254. Mossman & Lehrer, supra note 213, at 1530. Note that this stepped care
approach assumes that the novel agents are available for patients who need them and that
treatment agencies will therefore be willing to pay for them for a portion of the
individuals they serve. Some healthcare plans restrict patients to only the neuroleptics.
See Christine Lehmann, Cost Limits Drug Options for Public-Sector Patients,
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, May 18, 2001, at 1, 1 (reporting a patient who desired risperidone
although her health plan’s restricted drug formulary only covered haloperidol and
chlorpromazine), http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/36/10/1. See William M.
Glazer, Accessibility of the New Generation Antipsychotic Medications in the United
States 9–12 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reporting the results of
a survey concerning limited access to novel antipsychotic agents in public and private
settings and describing various restrictions, including fail-neuroleptics-first policies,
preferred medications, co-payment schedules, and prior authorization requirements).
255. Michael L. Zoler, Clozapine’s Cost-Benefit Balance Questioned, CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY NEWS, Mar. 1999, at 29, 29 (citing views of VA psychiatrist Robert
Rosenheck that, for economic reasons, “[t]he best public health approach may not be
using atypical antipsychotics as first-line drugs for all patients with schizophrenia”),
http://www.medscape.com/IMNG/ClinPsychNews/1999/v27.n03/cpn2703.29.03.html;
see also Geddes et al., supra note 20, at 1375.
256. The issue of disclosure to family members is important because of
schizophrenic patients’ known limitations with regard to treatment decisionmaking.
Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III:
Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 149, 149 (1995) (finding that compared to depressed patients and patients with
heart disease, schizophrenic patients had the poorest understanding of treatment
disclosure, poorest reasoning in decisionmaking regarding treatment, and greatest
likelihood of not appreciating their illness or potential benefits of treatment); see also
William T. Carpenter, Jr. et al., Decisional Capacity for Informed Consent in
Schizophrenia Research, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 533, 533 (2000). The study by
Carpenter and his colleagues describes educational interventions that can compensate for
schizophrenic patients’ impairments. Id. at 535–38.
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patients have to sign forms acknowledging receipt of information about
the policy? (5) What disclosure obligations would physicians and other
clinicians employed by the agency, as distinct from the agency itself,
have toward patients? (6) Could agencies place the responsibility for
disclosure on physicians? If so, what ought physicians who disagreed
with stepped care do when discussing the policy with patients? (7)
Whichever party discloses information about a money saving policy,
how might such a disclosure change the doctor-patient relationship and
treatment outcomes? (8) If a patient requested a newer, expensive
antipsychotic drug before having tried a less expensive neuroleptic, how
should the agency and treating psychiatrist respond? (9) How would
agencies establish criteria for deciding what symptoms or problems a
neuroleptic treated patient would need to experience before being
changed to a more expensive atypical agent?
These questions, one must recognize, would not be new ones for
psychiatry. Accrediting agencies require state financed facilities to meet
minimum standards, but these facilities typically do not provide the
fanciest care available. State hospitals typically offer psychiatric care in
buildings that cost less to operate than private sector facilities. Private
sector facilities that, unlike state hospitals, must compete for patients,
are better staffed and more pleasant than public sector facilities. In the
author’s experience, it is extremely unusual for psychiatrists who work
in government funded facilities to talk with patients about how public
sector institutions differ from private ones.
Nor would these questions be unique to psychiatry. In an effort to
control costs, managed care organizations routinely designate “preferred
provider” panels of physicians for their covered patients, and specify
“formularies,” lists of medications that cost patients less out-ofpocket.257 Physicians, and sometimes patients, rail against these
practices,258 but they are widespread and are not fundamentally different
than a stepped care plan for new, but expensive, antipsychotic agents.
257. For an overview of these practices as they apply to psychiatric care, see
generally Jesse A. Goldner, Managed Care and Mental Health: Clinical Perspectives
and Legal Realities, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1437 (1999).
258. The most prominent psychiatrist to do so is William M. Glazer, M.D., an
associate clinical professor of psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine. See,
e.g., William Glazer, What Can Clinicians Do About Restrictive Treatment Policies?, at
http://medaccess.glazmedsol.com/articles/glazereditorial.html (urging psychiatrists to protest
managed care formulary restrictions). His website on access to atypical antipsychotics is
available at http://www. medaccess.glazmedsol.com (last visited Aug. 4, 2002).
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An adequate exploration of these ethical questions would take us far
beyond the scope of this Article. Parts V and VI of this Article focus on
some of the closely related legal issues that the new drugs may generate.
Before turning to these matters, however, the next Section reviews some
actual developments related to limitations of access to atypical antipsychotics.
D. Access to Atypicals
In July 2001, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) promulgated a
guideline for atypical antipsychotic use that contains two significant
financially based goals. It suggests that physicians:
(1) Prioritize the use of atypical antipsychotic medication for new antipsychotic
medication starts and for patients not responding to or having problematic side
effects on typical antipsychotic medication.
(2) . . . begin therapy with an effective less expensive agent. At the present
time, this would lead to the preference of quetiapine and risperidone over
olanzapine.259

The VA’s policy quickly generated protests from consumer groups, who
thought the policy would jeopardize veterans’ care.260 However, an
April 2002 report by the General Accounting Office concluded that the
“guideline . . . is sound and consistent with published clinical practice
guidelines . . . . Almost all of the public and private sector psychiatric
experts we interviewed agree that VA’s use of cost as a factor to
prioritize atypical antipsychotic drugs is reasonable, appropriate, and
consistent with providing quality and cost-effective medical care.”261
Although most VA psychiatrists who were interviewed for the report felt
that guideline allowed them to prescribe the best medication for their
259. REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, VA HEALTH CARE: IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESCRIBING GUIDELINE FOR
ATYPICAL ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS GENERALLY SOUND U.S. GAO, PUB. NO. GAO-02-579,
at 27 (2002) [hereinafter PRESCRIBING GUIDELINE]. For fiscal year 2001, the average per
patient daily costs to the VA for antipsychotic medications was as follows:
clozapine
$8.07
risperidone
3.15
olanzapine
6.28
quetiapine
2.94
ziprasidone
5.01
neuroleptics
0.26
Id. at 6.
260. See, e.g., Don Harper, Program Robs Veterans of Help, N. COUNTY TIMES (San
Diego), June 25, 2001, http://www.nctimes.com/news/2001/20010625/71401.html; Letter
from Rex Cowdry, Medical Director, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill & Andrew
Sperling, Policy Director, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, to Anthony J. Principi,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs (July 23, 2001), http://www.nami.org/
update/20010723.html; National Mental Health Association, supra note 253, at
http://www.nmha.org/newsroom/system/ lal.vw.cfm?do=vw&rid=330.
261. PRESCRIBING GUIDELINE, supra note 259, at 2–3.
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patients, nine percent did not feel free to prescribe the medication of
their choice.262
The VA’s medication guideline explicitly recommends two novel
agents as first-line therapy for psychoses. Neuroleptics are to be used
only if several atypicals have failed.263 By the year 2000, policies that
explicitly require first-use of neuroleptics had become rare to nonexistent.
However, subtle financial incentives may affect psychiatrists’ medication
choices. A study by the Bazelon Center264 found that Medicaid patients
had better access to atypicals than to comparison medications used to
treat physical illnesses, but some restrictions on novel agents still
operated. The authors noted that “Medicaid oversight of managed care
was found to be very limited,” and that in the future, “Medicaid
programs will have powerful incentives to restrict access to atypical
antipsychotics, given the likelihood of a continued increase in drug
prices, the two- to three-times higher cost of atypical antipsychotics, and
the 85 new medicines now under development to treat mental disorders.”265
A study of Medicaid managed care plans in Florida provides an
example of possible ways that access to atypicals may be limited. When
provider organizations were themselves at risk for pharmacy costs, novel
agents were prescribed at about half the rate demonstrated by programs
that were not at risk for pharmacy costs.266 Recently, a Florida federal
district court dismissed a suit by a pharmaceutical manufacturers
association opposing development of Medicaid formularies that might
limit reimbursement to specific drugs. The court held that Florida statutes
and federal Medicaid law permit “the establishment of a ‘preferred drug list’
and a ‘prior authorization program.’”267 However, the Florida Medicaid
formulary currently includes all approved atypical antipsychotic drugs.268
262. Id. at 18.
263. Id. at 27.
264. “The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law is a nonprofit
legal advocacy organization based in Washington D.C.” Bazelon Center for Mental
Health Law, Who We Are, at http://www.bazelon.org/who.html (last visited Aug. 4,
2002).
265. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, supra note 253, at http://www.
bazelon.org/formulary.html.
266. LOUIS DE LA PARTE FLORIDA MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTE, PATTERNS OF CARE:
WHAT EFFECT DO FINANCIAL INCENTIVES HAVE ON PRESCRIPTION RATES IN MEDICAID
PLANS? (2000), http://www.fmhi.usf.edu/institute/pubs/newsletters/policybriefs/issue002.pdf.
The study covered the period 1997–98, id., and may not reflect more recent practices.
267. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Medows, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1188
(N.D. Fla. 2001).
268. Agency for Health Care Administration, Florida Medicaid Preferred Drug
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Having examined some recent developments concerning availability
of antipsychotic agents, let us next consider the potential outcomes of
malpractice suits and other types of civil actions alleging damages from
having received an older drug rather than an atypical antipsychotic.
V. LIABILITY STEMMING FROM THE USE OF NEUROLEPTICS
A. The Perceived Threat of Malpractice Litigation
The view that novel antipsychotics should be the first choice treatment
for most patients with schizophrenia269 has generated speculation that
administering conventional neuroleptics could now constitute grounds
for lawsuits, even if clinicians that prescribed and managed administration
of the drugs followed treatment practices that would have seemed
impeccable in the mid-1990s. For example, at a January 2001 workshop
on liability issues sponsored by the American Health Lawyers Association,
attorney Steven B. Tannenbaum commented: “In today’s climate, I
would not like to be a defendant psychiatrist on the witness stand being
cross-examined by a plaintiff’s lawyer, having prescribed a typical drug
as opposed to an atypical drug. And I do not know under today’s
circumstances of many psychiatrists who would use a typical drug as
opposed to an atypical with the risk factors involved.”270 At the same
meeting, psychiatrist William M. Glazer agreed that prescribing cheaper
but more side effect prone neuroleptics increasingly exposes psychiatrists to
malpractice liability.271
These concerns must be considered in light of past experience, which
suggests that psychiatrists have been overly afraid that neurologic
damage from neuroleptics will lead to successful malpractice litigation,272
as well as the actual practice patterns of psychiatrists that form the basis
for judging whether alleged malpractice has occurred. Yet, a few wellpublicized cases have resulted in large judgments against clinicians that
List, at http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/Medicaid/Prescribed_Drug/pharm_thera/fmpdl.shtml
(last visited May 1, 2002).
269. See Chiles et al., supra note 210, at 72; Guideline Series, supra note 210, at
12–13; Miller et al., supra note 210, at 652; supra Part IV.
270. American Health Lawyers Association, Minimizing Physician Liability in
Psychiatric Medicine, at http://www.healthlawyers.org/publicinterest/pi_NYCsummary.
cfm (last visited Sept. 23, 2002). The workshop was funded by Eli Lilly and Company,
which markets olanzapine. Id.
271. Carl Sherman, Antipsychotic Prescribing Limits Increase Liability, CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY NEWS, March 2001, at 12, available at http://www2.eclinicalpsychiatry
news.com/scripts/om.dll/serve?action=searchDB&searchDBfor=art&artType=full&id=a
qc010290312.
272. 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 380 (2000). Despite predictions of increased tardive
dyskinesia litigation, “the expected ‘flood’ [of such cases] has not yet materialized.” Id.
(footnotes omitted).

1092

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

[VOL. 39: 1033, 2002]

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

Unbuckling the Straitjacket
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

improperly administered or monitored conventional neuroleptics,273 and
these instances have probably fueled a common tendency among
physicians to develop pervasive, inflated fears about their vulnerability
to successful malpractice litigation.274
Given this background, it is not surprising that the arrival of new
medications with fewer neurological side effects, coupled with published
proclamations that these drugs comprise a “new standard of care,” has
generated concerns about the potential for costly lawsuits stemming
from continued use of the older, more risk-prone antipsychotic drugs. In
January 1998, Dr. Steven E. Hyman, Director of the National Institute of
Mental Health, sent what has become a widely circulated letter to Sally
K. Richardson, Director of Medicaid Operations at the Health Care
Financing Administration. This letter warned that state Medicaid agencies
should not balk at paying for more expensive novel medications because
“the potential cost of lawsuits” from tardive dyskinesia “would . . . make
up the difference between the cost of generic standard antipsychotics and
the atypical antipsychotic medications currently available.”275 Similarly,
psychiatrists Kaye and Reed have warned their colleagues that allowing
state-run facilities to skimp on paying for the new drugs would
ultimately be foolish, because “expensive civil rights litigation arising
from patients developing TD [tardive dyskinesia] from older medication
is as important an economic consideration as the initial cost of
medication.”276
This Part examines potential sources of liability related to continued
use of typical antipsychotic medications. First is an explanation of why
physicians’ concern about successful malpractice lawsuits brought
simply because patients developed injuries during proper administration

273. Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917, 923 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (affirming the jury
negligence verdict of more than $750,000); Accardo v. Cenac, 722 So. 2d 302, 313 (La.
Ct. App. 1998) (ordering an increased damage award).
274. “[M]ost physicians live in constant apprehension of being named a defendant
in a medical malpractice lawsuit.” MARSHALL B. KAPP, OUR HANDS ARE TIED: LEGAL
TENSIONS AND MEDICAL ETHICS 8 (1998).
275. Letter from Steven E. Hyman, Director, National Institute of Mental Health, to
Sally K. Richardson, Director, Center for Medicaid and State Operations, Health Care
Financing Administration (Jan. 16, 1998), reprinted in National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill, HCFA Provides State Medicaid Office with Guidance on Access to Atypical
Antipsychotic Medication, at http://www.nami.org/cgi-bin/printfyl.cgi?/update/ 980225.
html (last visited Aug. 4, 2002).
276. Kaye & Reed, supra note 210, at 331.
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of older antipsychotics is, at this point, premature.277 This Article then
reviews other types of malpractice lawsuits, including claims for injuries
related to informed consent violations and wrongful death claims
stemming from failure to take available precautions, which seem more
likely to receive sound support from current clinical knowledge.278
Finally, this Part of the Article explains why litigation construing use of
older drugs as violations of civil rights and of the Americans with
Disabilities Act279 may be on the horizon.280
B. Malpractice Lawsuits: Four Potential Strategies
If a patient filed a suit for damages resulting from a conventional
antipsychotic, defending such a prescription decision might well be an
expensive and emotionally troubling experience for the accused
clinician. From a legal perspective, however, the important question is
whether such a lawsuit might succeed. The following Sections examine
four legal theories under which such a lawsuit might be filed and
consider the factors that might determine whether each type of lawsuit
might lead to a successful outcome for the plaintiff.
1. Prescribing Neuroleptics as Per Se Malpractice
The previously cited comments of Mr. Tannenbaum and Dr. Glazer
envision what one might call a “prescribing neuroleptics as per se
malpractice” claim. Such a claim might be brought by a patient281 who
received a conventional neuroleptic well after less risky medications had
become available and who, as often happens, suffered permanent neurological
damage. Central to a per se malpractice claim is the belief that even if
the prescribing physician followed prescribing practices that were
acceptable only a few years ago, the advent of novel agents has made it
possible to drastically reduce the risk of neurological damage, so that
injuries from older neuroleptics ought to be compensable in a malpractice
action. Unless a doctor has a compelling reason to prescribe a neuroleptic,
this claim might state, failure to prescribe the more benign atypicals
constitutes a deviation from the current national282 standard of care.
277. See infra Part V.B.1.
278. See infra Parts V.B.2–V.B.4.
279. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 97 U.S.C.).
280. See infra Part V.C.
281. To simplify exposition, this section refers to plaintiffs as though they were
single patient litigants. Of course, lawsuits seeking recompense for medication induced
injuries could also be brought by groups of plaintiffs or by a plaintiff’s family members.
282. For an endorsement of a national (rather than a local) standard of care, see
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How might a patient-plaintiff support this contention? If his doctor
prescribed a neuroleptic as the first choice antipsychotic therapy after
1999, the patient could point to the guidelines and algorithms cited
earlier in this Article, arguing that these publications represent the
consensus of experts about optimal care. Many prominent U.S.
psychiatrists believe that the novel antipsychotics have raised expectations
about therapeutic efficacy and functional outcomes for patients with
schizophrenia and that these drugs have changed expectations about how
to assess the effectiveness of pharmacological treatment. For example,
in contrasting the treatment of a patient with schizophrenia in 1985 with
current treatment, Dr. Ronald Pies suggests that formerly a substantial
reduction in positive symptoms with only mild side effects represented
the sought after treatment result in academic medical centers. Now,
however, academic psychiatrists examine a patient’s post-treatment
cognitive function, affective state, relationships with family, and
vocational functioning.283
Declaring novel antipsychotics the new standard of care may be an
effective and legitimate rhetorical device to encourage physicians to
update their practices and to goad public and private third party payers
into making the new drugs readily available. In medical malpractice
litigation, however, the phrase “prevailing standard of care” refers to
“the average degree of skill, care and diligence exercised by members of
the same medical specialty community in similar situations”284 as
established from the testimony of expert witnesses. Among the defenses
permitted to a physician-defendant is the assertion that the chosen course
of treatment had received the endorsement of “a respectable minority” of
physicians and that he followed “acceptable procedures of administering
the treatment as espoused by the minority.”285
Systematic, up-to-the-minute data on the selection of antipsychotic
agents are hard to come by. However, a multistate study of prescribing
practices in the late 1990s found that conventional agents accounted for
fifty-one percent of antipsychotic prescriptions.286 A 1999 publication
Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
283. Ronald Pies, The Shifting Paradigm of Antipsychotic Outcome Assessment,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Nov. 2000, at 54, 54.
284. Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ohio 1976).
285. Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), aff’d, 554
S.W.2d. 160 (Tex. 1977).
286. TAMI L. MARK ET AL., ACCESS TO NEW MEDICATIONS TO TREAT SCHIZOPHRENIA
(n.d.), at http://www.medstat.com/products/posters/mark_2k.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
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also reported that conventional neuroleptics still accounted for a
substantial fraction of U.S. antipsychotic prescriptions.287 A survey of
1998 Medicare and Medicaid funded antipsychotic prescription practices
in nine states, published in January 2000, showed that just over half of
the prescriptions for antipsychotics were for novel agents.288 A study of
1998 antipsychotic prescribing patterns in Texas prisons found that
eighty-seven percent of inmates received only conventional neuroleptics.289
In December 2000, Kapur and Remington stated that in North America,
novel agents accounted for three-fourths of new antipsychotic
prescriptions,290 implying that conventional agents still accounted for the
other quarter. Finally, from the time of her arrest in June 2001 through
her internationally publicized criminal trial in March 2002, Andrea Pia
Yates received the conventional antipsychotic drug haloperidol, which
successfully treated her psychosis.291 A few psychiatrists in the U.S.292
and Great Britain293 have voiced their support in print for trying older
antipsychotic medications before employing the newer, more expensive
agents.294 Although he was among the earliest of psychiatrists to support
first-line use of novel antipsychotics,295 Dr. Jeffrey Lieberman nonetheless
believed in late 2000 that “a clinical and public policy decision to
replace conventional with atypical antipsychotic agents, although
appealing, requires more empirical evidence.”296 Clearly, at least a
287. Meltzer, supra note 251, at 7.
288. CATHERINE HARRINGTON ET AL., THE LEWIN GROUP, ACCESS AND UTILIZATION
OF NEW ANTIDEPRESSANT AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATIONS (2002), at http://aspe.hhs.
gov/health/reports/psychmedaccess/index.htm.
289. Jacques Baillargeon & Salvador A. Contreras, Antipsychotic Prescribing
Patterns in the Texas Prison System, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 48, 51 (2001).
290. Kapur & Remington, supra note 204, at 1360.
291. Carol Christian, Yates on Video: ‘Psychosis Seems to Have Left Me’, HOUS.
CHRON., Mar. 7, 2002, at 1A. Ms. Yates was convicted of killing her five children. Jim
Yardley, Texas Jury Convicts Mother Who Drowned Her Children, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2002, at A23.
292. Robert A. Rosenheck, Taking Issue: Pharmacological Progress: Seeking
Balance, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1213, 1213 (2000). (“The clinical benefit of atypical
antipsychotics is small to modest, with little evidence of widespread dramatic gains in
quality of life. The clearest advantage is reduction of extrapyramidal side effects, but
adverse effects such as weight gain, diabetes, and hyperlipidemia threaten to take their
place.”).
293. Geddes et al., supra note 20, at 1374.
294. Worldwide, atypical agents account for only one-tenth of prescriptions for
antipsychotic drugs. Herbert Y. Meltzer, Side Effects of Antipsychotic Medications:
Physicians Choice of Medication and Patient Compliance, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
3, 3 (Supp. 8, 2000). Whether prescribing practices outside the U.S. would be relevant
evidence concerning behavior within “the same medical community” would, of course,
be a question for courts to settle.
295. Lieberman, supra note 209, at 71.
296. Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Commentary & Analysis: Atypical Antipsychotics
and SSRIs: Second Generation Drugs of the Psychopharmacological Revolution in
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respectable minority of psychiatrists still considers that first choice use
of conventional antipsychotics would constitute acceptable psychiatric
care, though experts increasingly prefer and recommend other patterns
of medication selection. Prescribing neuroleptics is not yet malpractice,
even if the older medications come with a higher risk that patients will
suffer permanent neurological damage.
2. Failure to Inform
Though there is little reason to believe that a prescribing neuroleptics
as per se malpractice claim would succeed, the opposite may be true for
a malpractice lawsuit alleging that damages stemming from failing to tell
a patient about the availability and possible advantages of the novel
antipsychotics. Among the first psychiatrists to recognize this were Dr.
Debra Pinals and Dr. Peter Buckley,297 who raised the specter of a
malpractice claim similar to that brought in Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge,
Inc.298
In the late 1970s, Raphael Osheroff, a physician, underwent hospitalization
at Chestnut Lodge, a psychiatric hospital in Maryland that had a national
reputation for treating psychiatric disorders with psychoanalytically
oriented treatment. The hospital’s clinicians conceptualized Dr. Osheroff’s
emotional problems as manifestations of personality flaws, and his
treatment consisted of psychotherapy alone. After spending seven
months at Chestnut Lodge without improving, Dr. Osheroff went to
Silver Hill Foundation Hospital in Connecticut, where clinicians
diagnosed him with severe depression and treated him with
antipsychotic and antidepressant medication. In three weeks, Dr.
Osheroff had improved. In three months he had recovered enough to
leave the hospital and soon thereafter he returned to medical practice. In
1982, Dr. Osheroff sued Chestnut Lodge, contending that the hospital
negligently failed to tell him about and offer him pharmacological
treatment. He also contended that pharmacological treatment was
backed by scientific studies showing that it would likely be effective for
treating his condition, whereas no study supported use of psychotherapy.299
Clinical Psychiatry, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1254, 1256 (2000).
297. Debra A. Pinals & Peter F. Buckley, Novel Antipsychotic Agents and Their
Implications for Forensic Psychiatry, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 7, 16 (1999).
298. 490 A.2d 720 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
299. Gerald L. Klerman, The Psychiatric Patient’s Right to Effective Treatment:
Implications of Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 409, 410 (1990).
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Osheroff has received little discussion in formal legal circles300 and
ultimately produced no official legal precedent or standard concerning
the obligation to provide information about treatment because it was
settled before trial.301 Yet the case has been the subject of intense debate
within psychiatry, where it has symbolized the specialty’s ongoing and
contentious disagreements about the comparative merits of pharmacological
and psychotherapeutic treatments, and physicians’ obligations in selecting
those treatments.302
For the present discussion, the importance of Osheroff stems from the
effect of an institution wide approach to managing psychiatric patients
on the plaintiff’s treatment. Psychiatrists whose drug selections reflect
institutional policies, particularly money saving policies that reflect
managed care incentives or limitations in public sector funding, find
themselves in therapeutic contexts that are analogous to those litigated in
Osheroff. When a treating clinician prescribes one form of therapy but
knows, or at least should know, about alternative therapies that other
doctors might recommend under the circumstances, what is the doctor’s
obligation to his patient?
300. As published, Osheroff does not discuss the plaintiff’s substantive malpractice
claims. Subsequent cases have cited Osheroff in connection with judicial review of
malpractice arbitration claims but not regarding standards of care themselves. See, e.g.,
State Cent. Collection Unit v. Gettes, 584 A.2d 689, 693 n.3 (Md. 1991). Two law
review articles briefly discuss aspects of Dr. Osheroff’s complaints about his treatment at
Chestnut Lodge and his lawsuit’s potential implications for mental health professionals.
See Ron Nichwolodoff, Expert Psychological Opinion Evidence in the Courts, 6 HEALTH
L. J. 279, 289 (1998); Note, Deborah Pergament, Internet Psychotherapy: Current Status
and Future Regulation, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 233, 254 (1998).
301. Alan A. Stone, Law, Science, and Psychiatric Malpractice: A Response to Klerman’s
Indictment of Psychoanalytic Psychiatry, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 419, 420 (1990).
302. The centerpieces of the debate are the two just cited articles by Klerman and
Stone. Letters responding to these articles filled eight pages in subsequent issues of the
American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) principal scientific publication. See
Comments on the Klerman-Stone Debate on Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 148 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 139 (1991); see also Gerald L. Klerman, The Osheroff Debate: Finale, 148
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 387 (1991). For a recent discussion, see DAVID HEALY, THE
ANTIDEPRESSANT ERA 217–55 (1997).
Dr. Klerman died in 1992. Summarizing his views in the case, psychologist Myrna
Weissman wrote:
[M]y late husband, Gerald L. Klerman, M.D. (a developer of
psychotherapy and an expert in treatment evaluation), argued that a patient had
the right to receive treatments that had been demonstrated to be effective for
his or her condition. Osheroff’s serious psychotic depression had resulted in
his hospitalization and damage to his personal life and had not responded to
psychotherapy alone. The empirical evidence, Klerman argued, pointed to
treatment with antidepressants, with or without psychotherapy, rather than longterm psychoanalytic psychotherapy alone, which had not been demonstrated to
be effective for psychotic depression and had not been effective in this case.
Myrna M. Weissman, Book Review, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1475, 1475 (1998)
(reviewing DAVID HEALY, THE ANTIDEPRESSANT ERA (1997)).
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O’Keefe v. Orea,303 the only published appellate level psychiatric
malpractice case that concerns the issue of choosing a typical versus a
novel antipsychotic drug,304 addresses this specific issue. Ruth O’Keefe
sued the psychiatrist who treated her son Christopher as an inpatient at
Florida’s Baptist Medical Center in 1993. After leaving the hospital,
Christopher attacked his mother and father, killing the latter.305 During
the hospitalization, a consultant psychiatrist had evaluated Christopher
and had suggested consideration of a clozapine trial.306 The lawsuit
alleged that the treating physician had failed to discuss this suggestion
with Christopher’s parents and that this failure, along with many other
alleged errors, constituted negligence.307 Although the trial court dismissed
Mrs. O’Keefe’s suit, an appellate court reversed.308 Among the appellate
court’s holdings was the conclusion that the psychiatrist’s fiduciary
obligations included “a duty to inform Christopher’s parents
concerning . . . the diagnosis of other physicians who had observed
Christopher, together with his personal treatment recommendations and
the treatment recommendations of other physicians.”309
U.S. legal requirements regarding a physician’s duty to disclose
information fall into one of two major categories. Most jurisdictions
assess the duty using a “customary” or “professional standard,”310
303. 731 So. 2d 680 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
304. At least three other published malpractice cases have concerned alleged misuse
of clozapine. See Baker v. Lane County, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295–97 (D. Or. 1999)
(permitting a new trial over a clozapine related death because the previous verdict had
been against the great weight of evidence, and the trial court had improperly admitted
prejudicial evidence about the decedent); Presto v. Charter Peachford Behavioral Health
Sys., Inc., 494 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the trial court’s grant of
Charter Peachford’s motion for summary judgment); Presto v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 487
S.E.2d 70, 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’
claims against Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation and affirming the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Caremark, Inc.). A fourth case does not mention
clozapine, but concerns a patient who gained weight and died of respiratory failure while
taking the drug. Patten v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 517, 520 (Va. 2001) (affirming
the trial court’s decision to dismiss because the defendants were protected by sovereign
immunity); see also Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 2001) (describing
weight gain from clozapine).
305. O’Keefe, 731 So. 2d at 682.
306. Id. at 683.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 681.
309. Id. at 686.
310. “[I]n most jurisdictions, . . . the duty is measured by a professional medical
standard: either the customary disclosure practices of physicians or what a reasonable
physician would disclose under the same or similar circumstances.” Laurent B. Frantz,
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according to which physicians must disclose the information that other
similarly qualified and situated physicians would disclose in the same
situation.311 In contrast, a minority of jurisdictions apply a “materiality
of the information” approach,312 which requires physicians to disclose to
patients all information that would be considered “material” to a
reasonable patient making a decision about a physician’s proposed
course of treatment.313 Rules in some states, including Louisiana,314
Iowa,315 Oregon,316 and Tennessee,317 represent variations on these two
major approaches.318

Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician’s Duty to
Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R. 3d 1008 § 2(a) (1978)
(footnote omitted).
311. For example, in Nebraska, “Informed consent . . . mean[s] consent to a
procedure based on information which would ordinarily be provided to the patient under
like circumstances by health care providers engaged in similar practice in the locality or
in similar localities.” Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156, 162 (Neb. 1997).
312. “A number of jurisdictions, however, have recently embraced the view that a
physician’s duty to inform his patient of the risks of a proposed treatment is measured,
not by a professional medical standard, but by the patient’s need for information material
to his decision whether to accept or reject the proposed treatment.” Frantz, supra note
310, § 2(a).
313. The most influential decision espousing the “materiality” standard, Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), explicitly rejected the “professional”
disclosure standard, id. at 783–84, and held that doctors must tell patients about “the
inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that
treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated,” id., at 787–88.
For a listing of cases following this later rule, see Frantz, supra note 310, § 6.
314. Louisiana statutory law requires disclosure of known risks of death, brain
damage, paralysis, loss of limb, loss of function of organs, and disfiguring scars. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.40 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002). If the consent forms do not
meet the statutory requirement, the materiality standard applies. LaCaze v. Collier, 437
So. 2d 869, 870 (La. 1983) (Dennis, J., concurring).
315. The Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted Iowa statutes as codifying the
materiality standard. Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Iowa
1987) (interpreting IOWA CODE § 147.137 (1981)).
316. In Oregon, physicians must disclose only in general terms the nature of the
procedure and that there may be alternatives and risks. OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097(1)
(2001). The physician must then ask the patient if a more thorough explanation is
desired, and if so, all material risks and viable alternatives are to be disclosed. Id. §
677.097(2).
317. In Tennessee, “[i]f informed consent is not effectively obtained, the
Defendants’ departure from the standard of care is not negligence, but battery, because
the doctrine of battery is applicable to cases involving treatment performed without
informed or knowledgeable consent.” Roddy v. Volunteer Med. Clinic, Inc., 926 S.W.2d
572, 576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); see also Ray v. Scheibert, 484 S.W.2d 63, 70 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1972) (discussing the distinction between cases based on lack of informed consent
and cases alleging injury that resulted from negligent treatment).
318. Some jurisdictions have applied the materiality standard as an additional
requirement beyond what physicians customarily tell patients in similar circumstances.
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 702
(Minn. 1977), modified, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1980).
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O’Keefe articulates a disclosure requirement that appears consistent
with the latter approach, that is, a requirement that the psychiatrist
disclose not just the information about the particular proposed therapy,
which some decisions endorsing the materiality standard have
emphasized,319 but also of the existence of other therapies and the
benefits and risks of those therapies.320 In O’Keefe this requirement
stemmed from the recommendation of another psychiatrist who had
personally evaluated Christopher. It would not be surprising, however,
for courts in jurisdictions that follow the materiality standard to view as
potentially liable for damages a psychiatrist who prescribed neuroleptics
but did not tell his patient about the novel antipsychotic drugs.321 This
319. See, e.g., Blincoe v. Luessenhop, 669 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1987). A prima
facie case in an informed consent action is established when the plaintiff shows:
1. the doctor failed to inform plaintiff of certain risks of the medical
procedure;
2. the undisclosed risks were “material,” i.e. the reasonable person, in what
the physician knows or should know to be the plaintiff’s position, would
be likely to attach significance to the allegedly undisclosed risks in
deciding to accept or to forego the proposed treatment;
3. the prudent person, in the plaintiff’s position, would have decided to
decline treatment if suitably informed of all perils bearing significance;
4. the undisclosed risk actually manifested itself and caused the damage for
which plaintiff seeks recovery.
Id. at 616 (citations omitted). Ohio follows the same standard. Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477
N.E.2d 1145, 1148–49 (Ohio 1985).
320. Compare Blincoe, 669 F. Supp. 513, with Bigay v. Garvey, 575 N.W.2d 107
(Minn. 1998), and Farina v. Kraus, 754 A.2d 1215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). In
Bigay, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that:
To establish a claim of negligent nondisclosure, a plaintiff must show five
elements: (1) a duty on the part of a physician to know of a risk or alternative
treatment plan; (2) a duty to disclose the risk or alternative program; (3) a
breach of that duty; (4) causation, i.e., the undisclosed risk must materialize in
harm; and (5) damages.
Bigay, 575 N.W.2d at 111 n.3. In Farina, the court stated that:
[T]he informed-consent basis of malpractice, as opposed to deviation from the
applicable standard of care, rests not upon the physician having erred in
diagnosis or administration of treatment but rather in the failure to have
provided the patient with adequate information regarding the risks of a given
treatment or with adequate information regarding the availability of alternative
treatments and the comparative risks and benefits of each.
Farina, 754 A.2d at 1222–23.
321. John H. Derrick, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Liability for Failure of
Physician to Inform Patient of Alternative Modes of Diagnosis or Treatment, 38 A.L.R.
4th 900, 903 (1985):
[T]here is a duty imposed on the physician to disclose to the patient the
existence of any methods of . . . treatment that would serve as feasible
alternatives to the method initially selected by the physician . . . . The failure
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may apply even if the psychiatrist had disclosed the risks of neuroleptics
and monitored his patient carefully, and notwithstanding agency or
institutional policies that endorsed a stepped care approach322 to drug
selection.
Available empirical data suggest that in actual practice, psychiatrists
often do not inform patients of serious material risks associated with
neuroleptic therapy.323 Also, studies suggest that psychiatrists typically
do not document discussions about informed consent with patients that
take antipsychotic drugs324 nor have they documented telling most
patients that take neuroleptics either about the availability of atypicals or
about their lower incidence of side effects.325
3. Injuries from Mandated Depot Neuroleptics
Malpractice litigation also might arise from medication selection in
circumstances where informed consent to treatment is attenuated, such
as outpatient civil commitment (OPC).326 OPC is just one method used
by agencies, institutions, or individuals to induce, or coerce, nonhospitalized
mentally ill persons to get psychiatric treatment, including medication.
Examples of other means include conditioning receipt of welfare
benefits on obtaining treatment, tying favorable disposition of a criminal
case to the defendant’s receiving treatment mandated by a mental health
court, and advance directives.327 It is easily conceivable that the liability
issues discussed here concerning OPC might apply, mutatis mutandis, to
these other forms of leveraged treatment. American psychiatrists have
endorsed OPC under certain circumstances328 as a treatment for severely
of a physician to disclose feasible alternatives has been held to permit a finding
that the physician thereby failed to obtain the patient’s informed consent to the
method employed by the physician . . . and that the physician was thereby
liable for malpractice.
322. See supra Part IV.B.6 (discussing the stepped care approach).
323. Irwin Kleinman & Debbie Schachter, Obtaining Informed Consent of Patients
at Risk of Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1182, 1183
(2000).
324. Debbie Schachter & Irwin Kleinman, Psychiatrists’ Documentation of
Informed Consent, 43 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 1012, 1015 (1998).
325. Prakash S. Masand et al., Prescribing Conventional Antipsychotics at Two
Veterans Administration Hospitals: Are There Geographical Differences?, 6 CNS
SPECTRUMS 894, 895 (2001).
326. A recent discussion of the history of OPC and empirical research was prepared
under the auspices of the APA’s Council on Psychiatry and Law as an information
source for persons preparing legislation. See Joan B. Gerbasi et al., Resource Document
on Mandatory Outpatient Treatment, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 127, 127
(2000).
327. John Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment: Beyond Outpatient
Commitment, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1198, 1199–1201 (2001).
328. See generally DAVID STARRETT ET AL., INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT TO
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mentally ill persons that suffer frequent psychotic relapses because they
stop taking medication.329 Such patients also appear to be at a
heightened risk for becoming violent shortly after they leave the
hospital.330 Long-acting, “depot” injections of medication are often
recommended for patients who will not or cannot comply with oral
antipsychotic therapy, but the only depot preparations currently available
in the United States contain neuroleptics.331
A person subject to an OPC order could develop tardive dyskinesia
because he was required to receive depot injections of neuroleptics.332
Thus far, litigation about OPC related medication has focused on
whether courts could require individuals to take drugs as part of the OPC
order333 and what legal consequences might ensue if a patient did not
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT
COMMITMENT 16 (1987) (stating the APA’s position favoring the judicious use of OPC).
329. Thomas W. Haywood et al., Predicting the “Revolving Door” Phenomenon
Among Patients with Schizophrenic, Schizoaffective, and Affective Disorders, 152 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 856, 856 (1995); see also S. Davies, Involuntary Out-patient Commitment
and Supervised Discharge, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 183, 183 (2000) (reporting
recidivism that was reduced in British outpatients); Marvin S. Swartz et al., Can
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce Hospital Recidivism?: Findings from a
Randomized Trial with Severely Mentally Ill Individuals, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1968,
1973 (1999) (reporting long-term OPC reduced recidivism in North Carolina patients).
But see Henry J. Steadman et al., Assessing the New York City Involuntary Outpatient
Commitment Pilot Program, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 330, 332–33 (2001) (reporting
that OPC did not affect rates of rehospitalization).
330. Marvin S. Swartz et al., Violence and Severe Mental Illness: The Effects of
Substance Abuse and Nonadherence to Medication, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 226, 230
(1998) (finding an increased risk of violence among discharged patients who use drugs
but do not take prescribed psychotropic medication); see also Jeffrey W. Swanson et al.,
Involuntary Out-Patient Commitment and Reduction of Violent Behaviour in Persons
with Severe Mental Illness, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 324, 329 (2000) (reporting OPC
successful in reducing violence).
331. The neuroleptics are haloperidol and fluphenazine. For a chemical description
of long-acting injectable haloperidol, see PDR, supra note 49, at 2535–56.
332. Several statutes include medication compliance as a criterion for invoking
OPC. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33–6–602(2) (1997) (stating that an OPC patient
may be “obligat[ed] to participate in any medically appropriate outpatient treatment,
including . . . medication”); WIS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(dm) (1999–2000) (stating that OPC
is permissible if a patient’s dangerousness “is likely to be controlled with appropriate
medication administered on an outpatient basis”). Although North Carolina’s statute
does not authorize forcible administration of medication, most patients believe that OPC
mandates compliance with medication. Randy Borum et al., Consumer Perceptions of
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1489, 1489–90 (1999).
333. See, e.g., In re K.B., 562 N.W.2d 208, 211–12 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(reasoning that returning an outpatient to a hospital involuntarily after refusing to take
antipsychotic medication is not a violation of due process).
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take medication.334 The arrival and increased U.S. usage of novel
antipsychotics suggests another type of litigation addressed not to the
requirement of medication itself, but to the type of antipsychotic
medication that was required. A patient might bring a malpractice
lawsuit alleging negligence because his doctor insisted that he needed a
compliance-guaranteeing depot neuroleptic preparation and did not try
one of the orally administered novel antipsychotics. Even the strong
proponents of the novel agents believe that outpatient noncompliance is
an unambiguous indication for a depot neuroleptic.335 Therefore, a key
issue in a malpractice case would be the evidence the psychiatrist could
muster to show that the patient would not have taken oral medication,
would have been likely to experience quick relapse and dire consequences,
and therefore needed a long-acting injectable antipsychotic drug.
Although successful suits for tardive dyskinesia have been uncommon to
date,336 evidence on patients’ compliance with and acceptance of new
medications337 may increase the likelihood that injuries from neuroleptics
could lead to successful litigation over the next few years.
4. Neuroleptics and Harm to Self or Others
Persons with schizophrenia appear to be at unusually high risk for
334. In re Matter of Tarpley, 581 N.E.2d 1251, 1252 (Ind. 1991) (finding that the
trial court lacked authority to either require the patient to take medication or hold him in
contempt for noncompliance); In re Matter of Utley, 565 N.E.2d 1152, 1156–67 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991) (stating that the trial court committed error in finding the patient guilty of
criminal contempt for failing to take medication without a determination that the
patient’s noncompliance was willful and not caused by illness).
335. Guideline Series, supra note 210, at 12; Miller et al., supra note 210, at 652.
336. 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 354–55 (2000); Kaye & Reed, supra note 210, at 331.
337. See, e.g., Julio Bobes et al., Risperidone: A Real Alternative to Depot
Neuroleptic Treated Patients, 28 ACTAS ESP. PSIQUIATR. 367 (2000) (reporting that
risperidone improved disability, psychotic symptoms, and tolerability in patients); John
G. Csernansky et al., A Comparison of Risperidone and Haloperidol for the Prevention
of Relapse in Patients with Schizophrenia, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 16, 18 (2002)
(reporting that patients treated with risperidone had a lower risk of relapse, and were less
likely to stop treatment, than were patients taking haloperidol); N.M. Desai et al.,
Switching from Depot Antipsychotics to Risperidone: Results of a Study of Chronic
Schizophrenia, 16 ADVANCES THERAPY 78 (1999) (stating that patients previously taking
depot neuroleptics benefited from, complied with, and preferred risperidone).
This evidence is not unanimous. A study of prescription refill patterns suggests that
outpatients’ compliance with most oral atypicals is no better than with neuroleptics.
Mark Vanelli et al., Refill Patterns of Atypical and Conventional Antipsychotic
Medications at a National Retail Pharmacy Chain, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1248,
1249 (2001). The exception was clozapine, where the demands for frequent blood
drawing required eight pharmacy visits per month, plus additional visits to psychiatrists.
“This process may have resulted in better patient engagement,” or it may have been the
case that the patients doctors selected to receive clozapine were more compliant patients
or patients with good social support. Id.
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committing suicide338 and have an increased risk of acting violently
toward others.339 Self-harming behavior that results in serious injury and
aggression by patients towards others are well known sources of
malpractice litigation for psychiatrists.340 In 1999, Pinals and Buckley
described published reports on the superiority of novel antipsychotic
agents in reducing patients’ aggressiveness.341 Recent studies have
found that arrest rates fall after patients began receiving clozapine342 and
338. Herz et al., supra note 143, at 5 (“[S]uicide . . . occurs in up to 10% of
patients” with schizophrenia.).
339. See, e.g., Louise Arseneault et al., Mental Disorders and Violence in a Total
Birth Cohort: Results from the Dunedin Study, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 979, 982
(2000) (reporting that persons with schizophrenia are 2.5 times more likely to become
violent than nondisordered persons and persons with schizophrenia and marijuana
dependence had far higher rates of violence); Patricia A. Brennan et al., Major Mental
Disorders and Criminal Violence in a Danish Birth Cohort, 57 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 494, 494 (2000) (“Individuals hospitalized for schizophrenia and men
hospitalized with organic psychosis have higher rates of arrests for violence than those
never hospitalized.”); Sheilagh Hodgins et al., Mental Disorder and Crime: Evidence
From a Danish Birth Cohort, 53 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 489, 489 (1996) (“Women
and men who had been hospitalized in psychiatric wards were more likely to have been
convicted of a criminal offense than persons with no history of psychiatric
hospitalization.”); Bruce G. Link et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental
Patients Reconsidered, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 275, 275 (1992) (reporting that the risk of
violence stems from active symptoms of the disorder, not from having the disorder per
se); Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Psychotic Symptoms and Disorders and the Risk of
Violent Behaviour in the Community, 6 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 309, 317
(1996) (reporting that the risk of violence stems from active symptoms of the disorder,
not having the disorder per se); Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric
Disorder in the Community: Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys,
41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 761, 769 tbl.7 (1990) (reporting that schizophrenia
increases the risk by approximately six times); Jari Tiihonen et al., Specific Major
Mental Disorders and Criminality: A 26-Year Prospective Study of the 1966 Northern
Finland Birth Cohort, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 840, 840 (1996) (“[The] risk of criminal
behavior was significantly higher among subjects with psychotic disorders, even though
the socioeconomic status of the childhood family was controlled.”).
340. Douglas Mossman & Marshall B. Kapp, Malpractice and the Psychiatrist: A
Primer for Residents, 21 ACADEMIC PSYCHIATRY 11 (1997). Under a variety of
circumstances, psychiatrists face potential malpractice liability for wrongful death claims
stemming from a patient’s suicide. See 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 7A–8 (2000)
(discussing suicide cases and related commentary). The leading case finding therapist
liability for failing to protect the potential victim of his patient is Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). For a discussion of Tarasoff, its
case law progeny, and related commentary by legal scholars and mental health
professionals, see 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 7C–2 (2000).
341. Debra A. Pinals & Peter F. Buckley, Novel Antipsychotic Agents and Their
Implications for Forensic Psychiatry, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 7, 7 (1999).
342. W. Gordon Frankle et al., Clozapine-Associated Reduction in Arrest Rates of
Psychotic Patients with Criminal Histories, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 270, 273 (2001)
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that olanzapine reduced scores on a scale measuring intentional
aggressive behavior.343 Conceivably, following violence done to a third
party by a neuroleptic treated patient, especially a patient who
previously had exhibited behavior indicative of a propensity to act
aggressively,344 the injured party or his relatives might sue the patient’s
psychiatrist, alleging that by not prescribing a novel antipsychotic, the
clinician had negligently failed to take reasonable measures to reduce a
foreseeable risk.345 Family members of a neuroleptic treated patient who
committed suicide and had exhibited depressive symptoms might lodge
a similar claim against their relative’s psychiatrist. To support their
claim, they could cite prominent psychiatrists’ beliefs that atypical
agents reduce schizophrenic patients’ depressive symptoms and risk of
suicide.346

(“[A]rrest rates of the patients taking clozapine were significantly lower while they were
taking the drug than before they were given the drug.”).
343. Narendran et al., supra note 50, at 515.
344. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965) (“One who takes charge
of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to
others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third
person to prevent him from doing such harm.”). That doctors have a long recognized
legal duty to protect persons from a patient with a known propensity toward violence is
illustrated in University of Louisville v. Hammock, 106 S.W. 219 (Ky. 1907). In
Hammock, the court stated that a patient’s
disease being known, as it was, to a physician of the institution [and other
personnel], . . . and their further knowledge, especially that of the physician,
that a person so afflicted might reasonably be expected to become violent,
uncontrollable, and dangerous at any time, ought to have induced them to take
such reasonable precautions with reference to his control or confinement as
would have prevented his inflicting injury upon other inmates . . . .
Id. at 220.
345. In an article authored before the advent of novel antipsychotic agents,
Appelbaum listed administration of medication as one potential option for reducing a
patient’s risk of violence. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Tarasoff and the Clinician: Problems
in Fulfilling the Duty to Protect, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 425, 426 (1985).
346. Paul E. Keck, Jr. et al., The Efficacy of Atypical Antipsychotics in the
Treatment of Depressive Symptoms, Hostility, and Suicidality in Patients with
Schizophrenia, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 4, 8 (Supp. 3, 2000); Herbert Y. Meltzer et
al., Assessing Cardiovascular Risks Versus Clinical Benefits of Atypical Antipsychotic
Drug Treatment, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 25, 27 (Supp. 9, 2000); William H. Reid et
al., Suicide Prevention Effects Associated with Clozapine Therapy in Schizophrenia and
Schizoaffective Disorder, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1029, 1032 (1998). But see
Fontaine et al., supra note 238, at 286 (finding absence of data to support claim of
decreased mortality associated with clozapine or olanzapine); Michael J. Sernyak et al.,
Impact of Clozapine on Completed Suicide, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 931, 935 (2001)
(reporting that taking clozapine was associated with a decreased death rate but not with a
decrease in the suicide rate). For a case involving a therapist’s not taking “appropriate
preventive measures” prior to a patient’s suicide (although ultimately barred due to the
statute of limitations), see Bellah v. Greenson, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538–39 (Ct. App. 1978).
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C. Neuroleptics as Civil Rights Violations and Discrimination
Besides malpractice lawsuits, psychiatrists and treatment agencies that
provide care to patients with psychoses must consider two additional
types of litigation as possible consequences of administering older
neuroleptics: civil rights actions and actions alleging discrimination
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
1. Neuroleptics as Civil Rights Violations
A patient who was involuntarily committed to a government run
hospital and who received treatment from hospital employed physicians
could file an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983347 alleging that using
neuroleptics as drugs of first choice constituted a violation of his civil
rights. The starting point for any analysis of such a claim is Youngberg
v. Romeo.348
During a two-year stay at the Pennhurst State School and Hospital,
Nicholas Romeo, a severely retarded, involuntarily committed resident,
sustained scores of bodily injuries that had been inflicted by himself and
other residents, including cuts, broken bones, and damaged genitalia.349
His mother filed a next friend civil rights suit alleging that administrators’
failure to protect Romeo violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. After the suit was filed, Romeo was transferred to the
facility’s hospital for treatment, where he was restrained daily. His
mother’s suit was subsequently amended to seek relief from excessive
restraint and compensation for failure to provide him with treatment.350
In its Fourteenth Amendment analysis of Romeo’s claim, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that institutionalized individuals in Romeo’s
position were entitled to “adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical
347. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
348. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
349. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated, 457 U.S. 307
(1982). Some skin injuries became infected either because of inadequate attention or
failure to clean up human excrement. Id.
350. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 311–12.
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care,”351 and to the substantive due process rights of safe conditions352
and freedom from excessive restraint.353 In addition, Romeo had a
limited right, if not to treatment, then to training that could “ensure his
safety and . . . facilitate his ability to function free from bodily
restraints.”354
The Court also said, however, that the proper standard for assessing
whether these rights had been satisfied was only whether the decision
concerning the patient’s care had been that of an appropriate “professional
decisionmaker”355 and had reflected “professional judgment.” A decision
by an appropriate professional was presumptively valid, and liability
could be imposed only if “the decision by the professional
[represented] . . . such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”356
Professionals would not be liable individually if they could not satisfy
their normal professional standards “because of budgetary restraints.”357
Several cases that predated novel antipsychotics established that a
psychiatric inpatient might enforce his right to refuse involuntarily
administered psychotropic medication through a § 1983 claim, while
affirming that professional judgment was the standard against which a
violation of that right must be judged.358 With the availability of novel
351. Id. at 324. The Court characterized these items as “the essentials of the care
that the state must provide,” id., despite Romeo’s having been lawfully committed to
Pennhurst.
352. Id. at 315–16.
353. Id. at 316.
354. Id. at 324.
355. Id. at 323. The Court defined “professional decisionmaker” as “a person
competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision
at issue. Long-term treatment decisions normally should be made by persons with
degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training . . . .” Id. at n.30. Momentto-moment decisions could be made by employees “subject to the supervision of
qualified persons.” Id. The choices concerning psychotropic medications focused on
here clearly are long-term treatment decisions that would be properly made by
psychiatrists.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. See, e.g., Walters v. W. State Hosp., 864 F.2d 695, 697 (10th Cir. 1988)
(stating that the patient’s right to refuse psychotropic drugs was clearly established when
the defendants allegedly deprived the plaintiff of this right); Dautremont v. Broadlawns
Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300 (8th Cir. 1987) (recognizing the right to maintain a § 1983
claim against forced administration of medication); Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823,
825 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to
involuntarily committed mental patients violates a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in freedom from bodily restraint); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 268 (3rd Cir.
1983) (stating that involuntarily committed patients have a constitutional right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs and endorsing the “acceptable professional judgment” standard
enunciated in Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
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antipsychotics, a new twist has been added: Can administration of
conventional neuroleptics, even judicious administration to patients who
had not refused antipsychotic drug therapy, generate a successful civil
rights claim? Might a court find that it was “a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards”359 for an
institution to make financial rather than clinical considerations the
primary factor in its drug selection policies?
In her analysis of this issue, attorney Susan Stefan describes a
hypothetical situation in which a public sector psychiatrist did not offer
his patient clozapine360 because the state had not budgeted funds for the
costly drug. She suggests that “the ‘decision’ not to use Clozaril may
not represent a judgment by the professional at all, but a [financial]
decision by agency administrators who are not mental health
professionals.”361 The distinction between “acceptable professional
standards based on expertise in diagnosis and treatment” and policies
“developed on the basis of state budgetary or resource considerations,”
Ms. Stefan argues, was implied in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to
exempt state professionals from individual liability for financially
induced departures from professional judgment.362 The Youngberg
standard, says Ms. Stefan, implies “that it is not appropriate to consider
budgetary constraints”363 in determining what constitutes the prevailing
professional standard. The professional judgment standard contemplates
“an assessment of challenged actions at a given institution against
professional standards developed nationwide.”364 The proper question to
ask is whether the allegedly inadequate treatment “would be among the
options offered this patient in a private setting,”365 where patients make
decisions for themselves about how much to spend on various alternative
therapies. “If so, then the professional judgment standard is met.”366
Accordingly, it would be acceptable for a state not to provide clozapine
or, presumably, the other novel agents now available, to all patients who
359. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
360. In 1992, when Ms. Stefan’s article was published, clozapine was the only
available novel agent.
361. Stefan, supra note 41, at 691.
362. Id. at 696 (citing American Psychiatric Association, Ethical Principles of
Psychologists, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 390–95 (1989) (discussing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at
323)).
363. Stefan, supra note 41, at 696 n.277.
364. Id. at 697.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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might receive potential benefit from the drug only “if there [we]re other
more economical treatments that [we]re sufficiently effective that
professionals in the private sector would also prescribe them.”367
If Ms. Stefan’s analysis is correct, then a financially motivated
approach to antipsychotic treatment selection probably would not
represent a violation of a public sector patient’s civil rights. When
treating a cost conscious patient, a private psychiatrist might well
recommend treatment with an inexpensive conventional agent, with
plans to try an atypical antipsychotic agent only if a cheaper medication
were inadequately effective or caused intolerable side effects.368
Complete refusal to provide novel drugs at all, even after failed
treatment with neuroleptics, might yield a somewhat different result.
Due to the fact that clozapine is the first atypical agent to become
available in the U.S., the five major decisions concerning institutionalized
patients’ access to novel antipsychotics have focused on that drug.369
The first two decisions were issued in the early 1990s following
clozapine’s U.S. release. Although these cases did not address the
concerns of institutionalized patients only, they clarified a key obligation
in the program that pays for many patients’ clozapine treatment, state
funded Medicaid. Courts in Kansas370 and New York371 found that state
367. Id. at 699.
368. Patients may prefer older drugs for reasons besides cost. Although some
weight gain is a concomitant of most antipsychotic therapy, the novel agents appear
more prone to inducing this problem; the neuroleptic molindone appears to be associated
with some weight loss. Masand & Gupta, supra note 191, at 301. According to one
recent review, atypical associated “weight gain . . . is highly distressing to patients, may
reduce treatment adherence, and may increase the relative risk for diabetes mellitus and
hypertriglyceridemia.” Roger S. McIntyre et al., Antipsychotic Metabolic Effects:
Weight Gain, Diabetes Mellitus, and Lipid Abnormalities, 46 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY
273, 273 (2001). Also, the pharmacotherapy of schizophrenia can last for decades.
Psychiatrists’ experience with risperidone treatment comprises just nine years, and we
have even less experience with the other novel agents. Lieberman et al., supra note 296,
at 1256.
369. A sixth case addresses the rights of a woman who had been jailed for less than
20 hours. Eres v. County of Alameda, No. C-96-2094 MHP, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1385, at *31–32 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1999) (finding that failure of county jail personnel to
provide an inmate with risperidone was not deliberate indifference). A seventh case,
granting summary judgment to prison officials in a case alleging that deliberate
indifference led to an inmate’s suicide, discusses the allegation that prison therapists did
not administer clozapine because of the drug’s expense. Pelletier v. Magnusson, 201 F.
Supp. 2d 148, 168 (D. Me. 2002) (stating that plaintiff’s assertion about financial
motivation “is nothing more than a theory”). The inmate had been receiving risperidone.
Id. at 159.
370. Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1990). In Visser, the plaintiff’s
action was authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Kansas Medicaid’s refusal to cover
clozapine in its prescription drug program violated 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) because it
was an arbitrary reduction in services to eligible individuals. Id. at 504, 507–08.
Furthermore, the court required state Medicaid coverage of clozapine for eligible patients
and ordered the drug to be included in the program’s formulary list. Id. at 507–08.
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Medicaid programs were obligated to include clozapine in formularies
and cover the drug’s costs. The option to take clozapine had to be
available to patients whose physicians believed the drug was necessary
and appropriate therapy.372
Three other decisions have looked at whether particular individuals or
classes of patients were entitled to clozapine therapy. In a 1993
unpublished decision, a Massachusetts federal district court dismissed a
§ 1983 action brought by Sherman Miller, who had been a resident of
the Bridgewater (Massachusetts) Treatment Center for Sexually
Dangerous Persons (BTC) for about fifteen years following his 1978
conviction for rape.373 Although Miller had been offered several
psychosocial and nonpharmacological therapies, he claimed that “his
only hope of release might rest on securing clozapine therapy” and that
BTC’s failure to prescribe clozapine for him therefore represented
inadequate treatment.374 The court of appeals supported the district
court’s dismissal of Miller’s claim, including the lower court’s ruling
“that, without more, the BTC’s mere failure to provide this one
recommended treatment was insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue
of material fact.”375
In Gates v. Shinn, a 1996 decision dealing with California prisoners,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a 1990 consent
decree mandating “appropriate psychiatric care for prisoners” did not
obligate the state to make clozapine therapy available to inmates.376 In
371. Alexander L. v. Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that a
mandamus order is an appropriate remedy to compel the state’s health commissioner to
include clozapine in the Medicaid formulary). “Cost alone, or unique but necessary
medical care for Medicaid recipient have not been a bar to Medicaid Coverage.” Id.
372. Following the Visser decision, Pennsylvania officials abandoned that state’s
lottery system for assigning clozapine therapy three months after a § 1983 action was
brought against the practice. Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Pa., Inc. v. White, No. 906389, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15994, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1991).
373. Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 91-2183, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17463, at *1
(1st Cir. July 14, 1993).
374. Id. at *9.
375. Id. at *17–18.
376. Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463, 464, 472 (9th Cir. 1996). The case originated as a
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 29 U.S.C. § 794. Gates v. Gomez, 60
F.3d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1995). It challenged the medical care, psychiatric care, and
conditions of confinement at the California Medical Facility and Main Northern
Reception Center in Vacaville, California, and also challenged the treatment of HIVinfected inmates. Id. The case went to trial in September 1989. Id. After the plaintiffs
rested their case, settlement negotiations culminated in a consent decree that was
approved March 8, 1990. Id.
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reaching this decision, the court cited an affidavit filed several months
before the decision by Richard Yarvis, M.D., the prison system’s
psychiatric expert, whose opinions had been considered in mediation
discussions. Dr. Yarvis believed that not treating prisoners with
clozapine made sense, because low staffing levels would make it
difficult to administer the medication safely. He added, however, that
“new medications with potentially less risk are about to come on line in
psychiatric practice.”377
Finally, a 1997 federal court ruling378 concerning adherence to treatment
standards promulgated in the original Wyatt v. Stickney379 case criticized
Alabama state facilities for sloppy record keeping and for leaving longterm patients “on stagnant medication regimes.”380 However, the court
declined to fault clinicians for not prescribing clozapine. The court felt
it could not, “and should not, fault the defendants for deciding, in their
professional judgment, not to use [clozapine]. Moreover, the court’s
duty does not extend to such minuscule oversight.”381
These five cases suggest the following conclusions. A financially
motivated institutional posture that precluded any use of the newer
antipsychotics might trigger an ultimately successful § 1983 action.
However, U.S. courts have not held that civil rights considerations
obligate psychiatrists, institutions, or public agencies to treat a particular
patient with a particular drug. Medication choices that reflect professional
judgment, including use of old neuroleptics, would pass constitutional
muster.382 Courts have not held that psychiatrists or government
agencies must use novel antipsychotic drugs rather than neuroleptics as
first-line treatment for all patients that need antipsychotic therapy. As
long as patients can get novel agents when their doctors think they need
them, it seems permissible to make drug choices using a financially
377. Gates, 98 F.3d at 470. The medications to which Dr. Yarvis referred are the
atypical antipsychotics released since 1994 which, unlike clozapine, do not require
frequent blood testing.
378. Wyatt v. Rogers, 985 F. Supp. 1356 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
379. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The subsequent history of the Wyatt
litigation is summarized in Wyatt, 985 F. Supp. at 1361–83. For a thorough,
perspicacious description of the background, development, and impact of Wyatt v.
Stickney, see 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, §§ 3A-3, 3A-14.2 (1999).
380. Wyatt, 985 F. Supp. at 1386.
381. Id. at 1396.
382. Failure to offer any reasonable treatment might well be unacceptable, however.
If a prisoner could show a serious need for psychiatric treatment and that prison
authorities displayed deliberate indifference in declining to provide medical attention, he
might successfully litigate a constitutional rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297–98
(1991). Merely negligent treatment is not cognizable under § 1983. Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). However, such treatment might be the basis for a
tort action (unless barred by sovereign immunity). Id.
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motivated policy of stepped care, that is, trying cheaper drugs first and
using atypicals if neuroleptics fail or cause side effects.383 This would
seem particularly acceptable if professional judgment had deemed the
policy to represent the best use of limited but adequate treatment
resources. Not giving clozapine to prisoners also appears permissible if
staffing is not sufficient to make sure that the medication can be
administered safely. Lack of staffing would not excuse a prison from
not treating inmates with the other atypicals, however, because these
drugs are no harder to administer than cheaper, conventional
neuroleptics.
Before concluding this section, we must distinguish a judicious,
stepped care approach that manages atypicals wisely and provides them
when patients need them from a situation that results from a state’s
failure to allocate sufficient funds to make atypical antipsychotics
available at all. That the latter scenario, which reflects legislative
budgetary decisions and not professional judgment, represents a civil
rights violation was endorsed by the Clinton Administration’s Justice
Department. In an October 6, 1999 letter384 to Virginia Governor James
S. Gilmore III that summarized findings of an investigation385 of
conditions at Western State Hospital in Staunton, Virginia, Bill Lann
Lee, then the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Justice
Department’s Civil Rights Division, described what he termed
“constitutional and federal statutory violations at Western State.”386
383. For a fuller definition of stepped care as used in this Article, see supra Part
IV.B.6.
384. Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, to the Honorable James S. Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia (n.d.), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/westernfl.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Letter from Lee]. The state of Virginia agreed to federal monitoring under a
consent decree reached May 6, 1999. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Virginia
Institution for the Mentally Ill Agrees to Improve Conditions Under Justice Department
Agreement (May 6, 1999), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/May/175cr.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2002).
385. The investigation was conducted pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2000).
386. Mr. Lee’s letter does not specify which of the problems discussed in his letter
are constitutional violations, violations of statutes, or both. His letter mentions the
Olmstead decision, discussed in Part V.C.2. Letter from Lee, supra note 384.
The Justice Department’s investigation is mentioned in Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d
829, 833 (4th Cir. 2001). Interestingly, the Patten plaintiff’s § 1983 action alleged, inter
alia, that allowing an already obese, civilly committed inpatient with respiratory
problems to gain thirty-seven pounds while taking clozapine represented a departure
from professional judgment. Id. at 831. The Court found that the Youngberg standard
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Mr. Lee noted:
Western State frequently fails to provide necessary psychotropic medications to
its patients. Our expert consultants found that the restricted availability of
particular psychotropic medications is a significant deficiency in psychopharmacologic
practice at Western State. Facility officials and staff report that when a
physician determines that a patient requires one of the newer, more effective
antipsychotic medications, known as “atypicals,” the required medicine is not
available because of budgetary restrictions. As a result, Western State
psychiatrists prescribe antipsychotic medications based on budgetary constraints,
rather than clinical indications. Physicians on all units indicated that the
unavailability of atypicals is a significant impediment to providing appropriate
patient care. Western State’s clinical psychopharmacologist confirmed that the
budget has allowed no new prescriptions of atypical antipsychotic medication
since December 1997. As a result, many Western State patients are not
receiving medications that their psychiatrists have determined to be clinically
necessary and appropriate. Citing numerous examples of patients who would
benefit from atypical medications, our psychiatric consultant concluded that
patients deprived of appropriate medications are harmed by suffering prolonged
psychotic symptoms, endure unnecessary painful physical side effects, suffer a
greater risk of suicide, and are subjected to seclusion and restraint beyond what
would be required if appropriate medications were available.387

2. Treatment Selection and the Americans with Disabilities Act
A final source of potential litigation stems from the limited
effectiveness of conventional agents in ameliorating negative symptoms
and cognitive deficits, which are major sources of long-term disability in
schizophrenia.388 A patient who received treatment only with conventional
agents might allege that an atypical antipsychotic drug could have
permitted him to live successfully in a less restrictive setting or to
achieve greater success in a community setting. To support this claim,
the patient could cite the opinion of many clinicians that medication
induced improvements in cognition can lead to better overall social
functioning389 as well as studies suggesting that the newer drugs improve
cognitive functioning390 and do more to reduce negative symptoms than
do the neuroleptics.391
was applicable, but that the defendants’ alleged conduct constituted (at most) negligence,
rather than a failure to exercise professional judgment. Id. at 845–46.
387. Letter from Lee, supra note 384.
388. See supra Part III.D.2.
389. It is becoming increasingly apparent that cognitive impairment and the
possible therapeutic reduction of this impairment will have an important
contribution to the emotional, interpersonal, and vocational implications of
schizophrenia. . . . An improved cognitive profile is likely to contribute to
educational and occupational opportunities that may also require the
simultaneous addition of creative rehabilitative and psychotherapeutic strategies
directed toward full reintegration.
Purdon et al., supra note 207, at 257.
390. See supra note 207.
391. See supra note 206.
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Accumulating data showing that the atypicals improve the long-term
prospects of schizophrenic patients may soon provide scientific
justification for a lawsuit alleging failure to provide the pharmacological
means to allow good community functioning.392 Such a claim might be
grounded on assertions about psychiatric patients’ rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act393 (ADA) as construed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C.394
Olmstead concerned two institutionalized, mentally retarded women
who sued various Georgia officials for failing to place them in
community settings that their doctors believed could provide appropriate
care. The state, which had paid for the plaintiffs’ care and had cited
limited funding for such placements, claimed that the women had not
been denied community placements and services “by reason of” their
disabilities, and had therefore not experienced disability based
discrimination.395 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding “that unjustified
institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of
discrimination”396 under the ADA for two reasons:
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life. Second,
confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of
individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic
independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.397

Justice Ginsburg’s plurality opinion in Olmstead addressed Georgia’s
claim that an ADA-based mandate to place plaintiffs in the least
restrictive setting possible would require the State to expend funds and
would therefore constitute a violation of established principles of
federalism. After examining the Justice Department regulation concerning
392. See, e.g., Meyer et al., supra note 204, at 108 (stating that a study evaluating
ability to work in patients treated with neuroleptics and atypicals found that: “[The] type
of medication prescribed was associated with better symptom control but not better work
status. The association between symptoms and work status, however, may suggest an
indirect link favoring atypical antipsychotics for achieving paid employment.”).
393. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C.).
394. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
395. Id. at 598.
396. Id. at 600.
397. Id. at 600–01 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court noted that the ADA and
its regulations do not mandate community placements of persons who cannot function as
outpatients; also, persons who do not desire community placements may not be forced to
accept them. Id. at 601–02.
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reasonable modifications,398 Justice Ginsburg concluded that states must
have some flexibility in complying with the ADA’s integration mandate399
and that courts must consider costs when determining the appropriate
remedy for a state’s failure to comply with that mandate. Nonetheless,
Title II of the ADA requires states
to provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities
when the State’s treatment professionals determine that such placement is
appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the
placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources
available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.400

Olmstead’s ultimate impact will be a function of how lower courts
interpret and apply its general principles; funding decisions by local
governments; and the behavior of local, state, and federal agencies that
actually help patients obtain services that allow them to function in
community placements.401
In a few cases, plaintiffs with mental disabilities have cited Olmstead
as a basis for claiming that private, employer sponsored health benefits
for psychiatric illnesses should equal the health benefits for other
medical illnesses.402 Courts have dismissed these claims,403 pointing out
398. “A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” General Prohibitions
Against Discrimination, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2000).
399. If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive,
effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities
in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace
not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated,
the reasonable modifications standard would be met.
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605–06.
400. Id. at 607.
401. For a brief summary of recent developments, see Kate Mulligan, States Slow to
Implement Community-Care Mandate, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, MAY 17, 2002, at 4, 20.
President George W. Bush accurately summarized the current state of affairs when he
stated: “Olmstead has yet to be fully implemented.” GEORGE W. BUSH, NEW FREEDOM
INITIATIVE 20 (2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/freedominitiative/
freedominitiative.html.
402. See also Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998) (“So
long as every employee is offered the same plan regardless of that employee’s
contemporary or future disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the
plan offers different coverage for various disabilities.”). But see Boots v. Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (D.N.H. 1999) (concluding that providing
disparate long-term disability benefits to physically and mentally disabled insured
persons may violate the ADA).
403. See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1117–18 (9th
Cir. 2000) (“Olmstead does not speak to insurance classifications . . . and Congress’s
clear instruction in the insurance safe harbor [shows] that the Act was not intended to
reach common insurance practices such as underwriting of risks.”); El-Hajj v. Fortis
Benefits Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 (D. Me. 2001) (holding that the ADA does not
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that Olmstead concerned Title II of the ADA, which concerns public
accommodations,404 rather than employment matters, which are addressed
by Title I.405 At least two cases have looked at the extent to which the
ADA’s “integration mandate” requires state Medicaid programs to
modify their programs and services. A federal district court ruled, in
Makin v. Hawaii, that using a wait list to implement a housing program
for individuals with mental retardation
could potentially force Plaintiffs into institutions in violation of the ADA’s nondiscrimination policy . . . . Since the State provides the [housing] services, it
create a cause of action against insurers that provide lower levels of coverage for
mentally disabled persons versus persons with physical disabilities); Pelletier v. Fleet
Fin. Group, Inc., No. 99-245-B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16456, at *10–11 (D.N.H. Sept.
19, 2000) (stating that the reasoning underlying Olmstead did not invalidate private
employer’s disability insurance policy that limited the benefit period for mental illness);
see also Witham v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., No. 00-268-M, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7027, at *7, *11 (D. N.H. May 31, 2001) (following Pelletier); Morrill v.
Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. 00-214-B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18810, at *5–8 (D. N.H.
Dec. 7, 2000) (following Pelletier and holding that an employer health plan that
provided less favorable coverage for outpatient psychotherapy than for other forms of
outpatient treatments did not violate the ADA); Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods., Inc.,
117 F. Supp. 2d 92, 97 (D. Mass. 2000) (stating that the ADA does not require a private
employer sponsored disability plan to provide equal benefits for mental and physical
disabilities and distinguishing Olmstead as involving ADA provisions which govern
reasonable accommodation by public entities); Hess v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99-384-PC, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12258, at *26 (D. Me. Aug. 2, 2000) (stating that there is “no
requirement under the ADA that insurance policies provide the same benefits to all
categories of disabled people”). For additional citations with similar findings, see
Pelletier, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16456, at *7 (citing other circuits’ decisions, including
several that were issued before Olmstead).
404. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (stating that “no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability . . . be subjected to discrimination by any
[public] entity”).
405. Cf. id. § 12112 (setting forth numerous definitions of disability discrimination
in employment matters covered under Title I of the ADA). For example, in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Staten Island Savings Bank, the court
concluded that: (1) Title I does not explicitly prevent an employer from adopting a
disability plan that provides reduced benefits for mental illness, (2) the ADA’s
legislative history strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to restrict an
employer’s ability to impose special limitations on disability insurance coverage for
mental illness, (3) the inclusion of a safe harbor provision in the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §
12201, suggests that disability plans may lawfully place special limitations on mental
illness coverage, (4) the reasoning in Olmstead does not invalidate the type of disability
insurance policy that is at issue in this case, and (5) Congress would have spoken more
clearly had it intended to prohibit the well-established practice of provided differential
(lesser) benefits for mental illness. 207 F.3d 144, 149–153 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, the
court held that the Bank’s long-term disability plan did not violate Title I of the ADA
even though it authorized two years of disability benefits for psychiatric conditions, but
more extended benefits for other types of disabilities. Id. at 152–53.
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cannot discriminate against the disabled by denying them services in an
‘integrated’ setting since that could constitute unjustified isolation. . . . if a state
is found to have discriminated against disabled individuals through the
administration of a program, it must modify the program to remedy the situation
unless it can prove that any modification would fundamentally alter the
program.406

By contrast, the Second Circuit held, in Rodriguez v. New York, that
providing “safety-monitoring” services for a mentally disabled person
was not required by the ADA, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ claims that
they needed such services to remain able to live in the community.407
The court held that the plaintiffs were requesting new services, whereas
Olmstead had held only that “[s]tates must adhere to the ADA’s
nondiscrimination requirements with regard to the services they in fact
provide.”408
Moreover, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, a decision issued in
February 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, absent “a pattern of
discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment,”
the U.S. Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment barred state employees
from seeking money damages in federal court for a state’s alleged failure
to comply with Title I of the ADA.409
The influence of Garrett on lower court decisions is not yet clear
regarding cases that involve treatment or services provided by entities
operated by states and their subdivisions that fall under the ADA’s Title
II. For example, in Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County,410 a federal
district court’s pre-Garrett reading of the ADA led to its refusing to
dismiss a claim alleging that Baltimore County, Maryland’s zoning
regulations discriminated against the subgroup of substance abuse
patients that needed to take methadone. The court cited Justice
Department regulations that prohibit public entities from providing some
qualified individuals with opportunities and services not equal to those
given to other qualified individuals, from limiting qualified individuals’
access to benefits or services, or from administering services that subject
qualified individuals to disability related discrimination.411 The same
regulations, the court noted, prevent public entities from imposing or
applying unnecessary eligibility criteria that might prevent persons with
disabilities from taking advantage of services or programs412 and require
406. Makin v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1034 (D. Haw. 1999) (interpreting
Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581, 605–606 (1999)).
407. Rodriguez v. New York, 197 F.3d 611, 613–14 (2d Cir. 1999).
408. Id. at 619 (citing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603 n.14).
409. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrettt, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
410. 68 F. Supp. 2d 602 (D. Md. 1999).
411. Id. at 620 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(1)(ii), (vii), (b)(3)(i) (2001)).
412. Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8)).
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public entities to make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices,
or procedures” unless doing so “would fundamentally alter” the services
or programs.413 The court concluded that even if the zoning policy had a
rational basis, the county’s special methadone policy placed
“disproportionate burdens on . . . opiate addicts who require methadone
therapy” and unless it could not be eliminated through “reasonable
modifications,” it would violate the ADA.414
This case and the quoted regulatory language suggest that limiting
public sector patients’ access to novel antipsychotic medications might
be suspect under the ADA. Patients who did not get the newer drugs
might be deemed not to have received services and opportunities equal
to those who did get them. To date, no published decision has addressed
this issue concerning atypicals, but it is endorsed by the Bazelon
Center,415 which, in its interpretation of Olmstead, concluded,
An important part of the treatment for a mental illness is access to the newer
“atypical” medications for psychiatric disorders. These drugs have significantly
fewer and less severe side effects; they are also more effective than older
antipsychotics.
....
In addition to being in violation of the Medicaid statute, a state that fails to
provide adequate access to the atypical medications in compliance with these
federal Medicaid rules will have weakened its defense under the ADA that it is
unable to provide necessary services for all individuals who are or are at risk of
unnecessary institutionalization.416

However, the holding in Frederick L. v. Department of Public
Welfare417 suggests that after Garrett, courts may not be favorably
inclined toward ADA-related arguments about psychiatric patients who
take antipsychotic drugs. Frederick concerned four adults hospitalized
at Norristown State Hospital (NSH) who had sued a state agency (DPW)
and the Secretary of Public Welfare, alleging § 1983 violations,
413. Id. at 620–21 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).
414. Id. at 621–22 (citing Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of
Greenfield, 23 F. Supp. 2d 941, 953 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (stating that the ADA confers
“protected class” status to disabled persons, so a “rational basis [argument] will no
longer support a law which burdens the disabled”)).
415. It may also have been implicitly endorsed by the Clinton Administration’s
Justice Department. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
416. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Under Court Order: What the
Community Integration Mandate of the Supreme Court Ruling in Olmstead v. L.C.
Means for People with Mental Illness, at http://www.bazelon.org/lcruling.html (last
visited Aug. 14, 2002).
417. 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 512–14 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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violations of the ADA’s Title II, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.418 The plaintiffs, suing on behalf of themselves and other
patients at NSH, challenged their needless institutionalization and the
state’s failure to provide them with treatment in the community. The
problem was summarized by the court as follows:
The DPW has the authority to shift funds used for institutionalized care to
community care. The counties make annual requests to the DPW for funds
needed to provide appropriate community-based services. The DPW, however,
has consistently failed to satisfy the requests of those counties whose residents
are institutionalized at NSH (Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and
Philadelphia). As a result, all of the individuals with mental disabilities who
could be appropriately served in the community cannot be accommodated and
remain unnecessarily institutionalized where they are either not recommended
for discharge or placed on waiting lists for community care indefinitely.419

The suit alleged that the defendants unlawfully had failed to “properly
assess the Plaintiffs’ community service needs and fund sufficient
appropriate community-based programs to serve them,” and sought “an
injunction compelling the Defendants to remedy the ongoing violations
of federal law.”420 The DPW and the Secretary moved to dismiss,
arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and that plaintiffs had otherwise failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.421
In a complex decision,422 the court held that the plaintiffs could
proceed on their section 504 and § 1983 claims against the DPW and the
official, but it dismissed the ADA claims against the DPW.423 Concerning
the section 504 claims, the court cited statutory language,424 Lane v.
Pena,425 and several decisions by courts of appeals,426 to “conclude that
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

Id. at 512.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 512.
Reflecting this, District Judge Schiller concluded his decision:
The fact that federal judges have a great many constitutional powers and
duties which enable them to resolve difficult issues with authority is put to the
test in a situation like this where the law is developing and many of the
principles are amorphous. Even had I the benefit of the Oracle at Delphi some
of these issues will be finally resolved in another forum. Nonetheless, I believe
that at this stage of the pleadings plaintiffs are entitled to proceed on several of
their claims.
Id. at 541.
423. Id. at 512.
424. “A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . .” Id. at 520 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1)
(2000)).
425. 518 U.S. 187, 200 (1996) (stating that in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1),
Congress unmistakably expressed its intent to waive the states’ sovereign immunity but
not the federal government’s).
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section 504 unambiguously expresses Congress’ intent to condition the
grant of federal funds on a States’ [sic] consent to suit . . . .”427
Concerning the ADA claim, and with Garrett expressly in mind, the
Frederick court held that Congress had not sufficiently identified a
“history and pattern” of discrimination by states against persons with
mental disabilities that would make the ADA applicable.428 Even if
Congress had done so, the court said, the plaintiffs would still have to
show that their sought-after remedy met the “congruence and
proportionality” test set out in Garrett regarding the rights and remedies
created by Title II.429 The plaintiffs’ proposed remedy exceeded what
was constitutionally required:
State public welfare agencies are not constitutionally required to undergo a
comprehensive modification of their rules, policies, and practices in order to
accommodate all disabled individuals. . . . [E]nforcement of the substantive due
process right asserted here by the Plaintiffs may require modification of State
policies that irrationally interfere with the provision of treatment recommended
by professionals, but the Constitution does not require the State to make all
modifications necessary to prevent discrimination.430

Similarly, an Oregon court held that a state’s health plan431 that
refused to pay for a combined lung and liver transplant did not violate
the ADA’s nondiscrimination mandates. Stroeder v. Office of Medical
Assistance Programs found that Olmstead “held only that ‘States must
adhere to the ADA’s nondiscrimination requirement with regard to the

426. Frederick, 157 F. Supp. at 521 (citing Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079,
1082 (8th Cir. 2000); Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2000); Pederson v.
La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 875–76 (5th Cir. 2000)).
427. Id.
428. Id. at 528.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 530 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the ADA’s
implementing regulations state that “[a] public entity shall make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary
to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the
service, program, or activity.” Id. at 529–30 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2000))
(alteration in original) (emphasis added).
431. In Oregon, the Office of Medical Assistance Programs coordinates the state’s
Medical Assistance Program, which provides for payment for health care services to
Oregonians eligible for Medicaid and other state and federally funded assistance
programs. See OR. ADMIN. R. 410-120 (LEXIS through 2002 filings); see also 42 USC §
1396(a)(5) (2000) (authorizing the creation of state agencies to administer state plans of
medical assistance).
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services they in fact provide.’”432 The administrative regulation
governing treatment for the claimant’s condition “does not provide
coverage for a combined lung and liver transplant for any Oregon Health
Plan recipient. Thus, . . . claimant cannot demonstrate that . . . denial of
that benefit or service to her has discriminated against her on the basis of
any disability she may have.”433
Finally, courts considering Olmstead claims of discrimination appear
very sensitive to the decision’s focus on costs as a factor in the
defendants’ decisionmaking. Two cases illustrate this.
First, Sanon v. Wing434 concerned three elderly women plaintiffs with
multiple medical disabilities who had received Medicaid funded twentyfour hour home care from New York City and state health agencies. The
agencies decided to terminate the home care, which would likely
necessitate having the women go to nursing home for the care they
needed. In response to the plaintiff’s claim that the decision to terminate
home care violated the ADA, the defendants argued that the cost of
continuing home care would fundamentally alter the state’s Medicaid
program. The court reversed the agencies’ decision,435 saying that the
defendant agencies could not merely assert that an increase in cost
would create a fundamental alteration; the agencies would have to make
some factual showing that a fundamental alteration would occur.436
However, the court found
no indication in the record that any factual inquiry took place here . . . . Nor has
DSS [a defendant agency] demonstrated that there would be a “massive” change
in the program.
Before that determination can be made, DSS must demonstrate what the
cost of such an undertaking would be with respect to the system as a whole
and not just the comparative cost with respect to the individual. . . . Unless
respondents can demonstrate that accommodating Medicaid recipients who
otherwise qualify for 24-hour home care would result in a fundamental
alteration in the Medicaid program, respondents must provide services in “the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of” petitioners.437

Second, in Williams v. Wasserman,438 a case that raised “complex
medical, social and fiscal issues not easily addressed by litigation,”439 twelve
brain injured or developmentally disabled patients brought claims under
432. Stroeder v. Office of Med. Assistance Programs, 37 P.3d 1012, 1021 (Or. Ct.
App. 2001) (quoting Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618–19 (2d Cir.
1999); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 603 n.14 (1999)).
433. Id.
434. No. 403296/98, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 139 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000).
435. Id. at *23–24.
436. Id. at *18.
437. Id. at *18–20 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2001)) (other citations omitted).
438. 164 F. Supp. 2d 591 (D. Md. 2001).
439. Id. at 595.
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the Due Process Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the ADA, seeking relief
for Maryland’s failure to provide them community placements rather
than inpatient treatment in state institutions. After finding that “the
staffs at the state hospitals were [not] so undertrained as to deprive the
patients of their due process rights,”440 the court addressed the plaintiff’s
Olmstead based contention that their continued institutionalization
violated their rights under the ADA.441 Against this claim, Maryland
offered a cost-based defense, arguing that placing the patients in the
community would require added expenses. The hospital would need
additional monies to house the placed patients but still would have to
preserve the availability of hospital beds for persons that needed them.442
Noting the state’s significant progress at reducing the number of mental
patients persons treated in hospitals,443 the court concluded that
Olmstead supported Maryland’s claim that the cost of immediately
placing patients in the community would constitute a “fundamental
alteration of the State’s provision of services,”444 and entered a judgment
in favor of the defendants.
Taken together, what can Olmstead, Garrett, and the other previously
discussed cases tell us about how a federal court would respond to a
lawsuit seeking relief under the ADA concerning a state agency’s
financially motivated, stepped care drug policy? Following Olmstead,
the agency could defend the policy by showing that using the more
expensive, novel antipsychotic drugs could not “be reasonably
accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State
and the needs of others with mental disabilities.”445 Certainly, providing
the newer drugs to all eligible patients would not “fundamentally alter”
pharmacological treatment in the public sector to nearly the same degree
that finding hospitalized patients a community placement alters patterns
of overall psychiatric care. However, the agency might reasonably argue
that paying for more expensive medicines would critically compromise
the other nonpharmacological services being provided to its clientele.
The agency also might argue, following Garrett, that providing patients
440. Id. at 627.
441. Id. at 630.
442. Id. at 637. The case offers a nice example of the complex calculations needed
to determine whether clinical intervention, applied to a healthcare system, actually saves
money in the short or long term. Id. at 637–38.
443. Id. at 634–36.
444. Id. at 638.
445. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
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with free neuroleptic therapy did not constitute a “history and pattern” of
discrimination, especially when those drugs were standard therapy in the
mid-1990s and remain the predominant therapy in Europe, and
especially when the atypical agents were available to patients who could
not tolerate or benefit from neuroleptics. Finally, if the policy applied to
all patients in a state program, the agency might argue that no ADA
prohibited discrimination based on disability had taken place because the
stepped care policy applied to everyone, not just persons who had a
mental disability.
What about situations in which a state’s asserted inability to fund
expensive new drugs stems from a less than adequate apportionment of
total tax dollars to mental disability care and treatment? What part of a
state’s total budget might come under scrutiny in assessing its ADA
related obligations to improve patients’ chances for integrated
community life? In Helen L. v. DiDario,446 a pre-Olmstead decision that
found an ADA violation where a Pennsylvania plaintiff was confined to
a nursing home despite needing only home health care, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit commented:
It is not now up to us to invent a funding mechanism whereby the Commonwealth
can properly finance its nursing home and attendant care programs. However,
the ADA applies to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, and not just to DPW
[the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare]. DPW can not rely upon a
funding mechanism of the General Assembly to justify administering its
attendant care program in a manner that discriminates and then argue that it can
not comply with the ADA without fundamentally altering its program.447

The Third Circuit’s reading of the ADA suggested that, at least in some
evaluations of whether increased funding constituted a “reasonable
accommodation,” a court could look to a state’s entire budget as a
resource for rectifying discrimination. Olmstead, however, indicated
that in deciding whether making a proposed accommodation was
“reasonable” or would pose an “undue hardship” to the state, a court’s
inquiry should only examine the particular program under which a
recipient was receiving treatment.448 Having “a waiting list that moved
446. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
447. Id. at 338.
448. In a footnote, the plurality opinion noted that Congress had required the
Attorney General to make ADA TITLE II regulations consistent with the regulations that
implement section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Justice Ginsburg wrote:
The § 504 regulation upon which the reasonable modifications regulation is
based provides now, as it did at the time the ADA was enacted:
“A recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or
employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.” 28 CFR § 41.53
(1990 and 1998 eds.).
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at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its
institutions fully populated” would be a reasonable accommodation,
Justice Ginsburg wrote.449 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy
was even more explicit about the degree to which courts could influence
states’ funding choices. States are free to apportion their limited resources as
they see fit, he wrote, and “must make hard decisions on how much to
allocate to treatment of diseases and disabilities. . . . [Such decisions]
may be unfortunate. The judgment, however, is a political one and not
within the reach of the statute.”450 A state may not be forced to create
programs where they do not exist, wrote Justice Kennedy.451 Moreover,
“[t]he State is entitled to wide discretion in adopting its own systems of
cost analysis, and, if it chooses, to allocate health care resources based
on fixed and overhead costs for whole institutions and programs.”452
* * * * *
Malpractice suits, civil rights claims, and ADA related challenges to
medication practices are nascent areas of litigation that may someday
affect patients that take antipsychotic drugs and caregivers that
administer those medications. By contrast, several cases have already
addressed how the distinctive properties of novel antipsychotics may
influence judicial decisions about forcing persons to take psychotropic
drugs. It is to an examination of these cases that we now turn.

While the part 41 regulations do not define “undue hardship,” other § 504
regulations make it clear that the “undue hardship” inquiry requires not simply
an assessment of the cost of the accommodation in relation to the recipient’s
overall budget, but a “case-by-case analysis weighing factors that include: (1)
[t]he overall size of the recipient’s program with respect to number of
employees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget; (2) [t]he type of
the recipient’s operation, including the composition and structure of the
recipient’s workforce; and (3) [t]he nature and cost of the accommodation
needed.” 28 CFR § 42.511(c) (1998); see 45 CFR § 84.12(c) (1998) (same).
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 606 n.16 (alterations in original).
449. Id. at 606.
450. Id. at 612 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
451. Id. at 613.
452. Id. at 615.
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VI. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT: CHANGING
JUDICIAL ATTITUDES
A. Background
No issue in mental disability law has more polarized psychiatrists and
legal academics453 than the right of involuntarily institutionalized
patients to refuse treatment with antipsychotic medication.454 On one
side are most psychiatrists, whose professional ethos, medical school
socialization, and training experiences lead them to see patients as sick
persons with diseases that can and must be treated.455 Psychiatrists
regard psychotropic medication as an effective means for improving
patients’ functioning and for reducing the risk patients pose to
themselves and other persons. Psychiatrists also point out that without
medication, many patients who undergo involuntary hospitalization
would be subject to long-term institutionalization and, potentially, longterm use of physical restraints.456 On the other side, some legal scholars
and patient advocates, while acknowledging, sometimes only in
passing,457 that antipsychotic medication is effective, have emphasized
that antipsychotic drugs can cause serious side effects458 and that
453. Cichon, supra note 35, at 286 (“The right to refuse antipsychotic drugs soon
became the most controversial and divisive issue between the medical and legal
professions.”); Sheldon Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugging—Atomistic and Structural
Remedies, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 222 (1983–84) (stating that lawsuits have been
“unusually contentious”); Jonathan Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo and Rogers: The Burger
Court and Mental Health Law Reform Litigation, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 323, 345 (1983)
(stating that the right to refuse was “the most controversial issue in forensic psychiatry
today”); 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 166 n.28 (1999) (stating that “[t]he rhetoric has
certainly been contentious” and citing examples).
454. Although lawsuits and other legal actions might, in principle, have involved
involuntary use of any psychotropic medication, all the major litigation in this area has
focused on antipsychotic medication. Perlin lists several interrelated reasons for this
focus, including the risk of wrongful administration of these drugs arising from incorrect
diagnoses, the high percentage of state hospital patients that received them, and the use
of the drugs for purposes other than treatment of psychiatric problems (for example, for
behavioral control). Yet the main reason, Professor Perlin suggests, was the uniquely
toxic neurological effects of phenothiazines and other older antipsychotic medications. 2
PERLIN, supra note 4, at 157–65 (1999).
455. Cichon, supra note 35, at 284; Thomas G. Gutheil, In Search of True
Freedom: Drug Refusal, Involuntary Medication, and “Rotting with Your Rights On,”
137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 327, 327 (1980).
456. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 350 (2d ed. 1997).
457. See, e.g., 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 159 (1999) (mentioning the benefits of
antipsychotic medication in one sentence, while misuse, limitations, and drawbacks are
discussed over nine pages).
458. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 758–60 (La. 1992) (describing the
purpose and benefits of neuroleptics in twenty-eight words, and devoting nearly thirty
times as much space to the drugs’ side effects); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d
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unwanted administration of medications automatically raises a host of
legal issues.459 At the core of these issues is the “sacred . . . [and]
carefully guarded . . . right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”460 As
Cichon has succinctly expressed: “The professional discord surrounding
the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs reflects the inherent tension
between the law’s respect for the values of self-determination and bodily
integrity and the medical profession’s concern for the treatment and care
of the mentally ill.”461
Common law rules preventing unwanted medical treatment would
seem applicable in toto to persons undergoing psychiatric hospitalization,462
and rules requiring informed consent463 would seem as appropriate to
psychiatric care as to any other type of medical treatment. When the
seminal “right to refuse treatment” cases were litigated, however, courts
40, 52–54 (Mass. 1981) (using twelve words to acknowledge the benefits of
antipsychotic drugs and devoting 1400 words to potential adverse effects); Cichon, supra
note 35, at 292–310 (summarizing the drugs’ benefits in approximately 220 words and
the limitations and detailing side effects in approximately 3400 words); cf. Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1136–38 (D.N.J. 1978) (devoting more than 700 words to the
benefits of neuroleptics and approximately 460 words to their side effects), suppl., 476 F.
Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and
remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 14–40 (discussing
antipsychotic drugs in their 1995 psychopharmacology text and emphasizing
neuroleptics’ toxicity, discussing then available alternatives treatments for psychoses,
and devoting eight pages to indications for neuroleptics, nine pages to their therapeutic
usage, and eight pages to side effects).
459. MELTON, supra note 456, at 350.
460. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
461. Cichon, supra note 35, at 288.
462. Ordinarily, the mere apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact by another
is actionable in tort. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (W. Page Keeton
ed., 5th ed. 1984).
463. The doctrine of informed consent establishes a prohibition against unwanted
medical treatment. There are several important cases establishing that nonconsensual
treatment is battery. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1972); In re Quackenbush, 383
A.2d 785, 789 (Morris County Ct. 1978); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.
92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”). Other leading cases discuss the
requirements for valid consent. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C. Cir.)
(stating that a doctor must disclose all “material” risks relevant to a patient’s decision
about a treatment); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that a provider’s duty includes disclosing “any facts
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient”); Natanson
v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (stating that a provider must disclose the
nature of proposed treatment, probability of success, alternative treatments, and risks).
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had not previously held that these traditional tort remedies were available to
institutionalized persons.464 Instead, mentally disabled inpatients were regarded
as “per se incompetent to make rational treatment decisions.”465 Therefore,
lawyers that represented institutionalized patients offered arguments that
saw “the Constitution as a potential source of a right to refuse
treatment.”466 When courts accepted the arguments of patient advocates,
it was often the potential side effects of antipsychotic drugs, rather than
a principled opposition to nonconsensual medical treatment per se, that
gave force to a patient’s constitutionally based right to refuse treatment.467
Because neuroleptic side effects played such a pivotal role in earlier
decisions about refusing antipsychotic therapy, one might wonder
whether the availability of less noxious medications might now make
courts more favorably disposed toward involuntary treatment. At least
two courts suggested that this might occur. Following a highly critical
description of then-available antipsychotic drugs, Chief Justice
Hennessey of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrote, in In re
Guardianship of Roe:468
We admit the possibility and express the hope that future medical advances may
produce antipsychotic drugs free from the severe adverse side effects we have
described above. At the same time, it must be noted that the intended effect of
the medication—to alter mental processes—by definition cannot be eliminated
from those drugs we have described as “antipsychotic.” Nevertheless, we do
not foreclose reconsideration of these issues when and if it can be shown that
the characteristics of antipsychotic drugs have changed.469

In his concurring opinion in Riggins v. Nevada,470 Justice Kennedy
argued that society might have to forego prosecution of some psychotic
defendants because side effects of the antipsychotic medications then
464. 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 168–70 (1999).
465. Cichon, supra note 35, at 315; see, e.g., Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905,
911 (Minn. 1976) (relying on “the need for the state to assume the decision-making role
regarding the psychiatric treatment for one who, presumptively, based on the fact of
commitment on the grounds of mental illness, is unable to rationally do so for himself”
(footnote omitted)); Denny v. Tyler, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 225, 227, 228–29 (1861)
(holding that involuntarily hospitalized patient cannot form “a judgment concerning his
own condition,” and “abstract” liberty guarantees “can have no legitimate application
where . . . the person who is alleged to be . . . restrained of his liberty is insane”).
466. 2 PERLIN, supra note 4, at 170 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
467. See, e.g., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929–32 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (describing
common law bases for a right to refuse treatment, but ultimately grounding the right in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process guarantee). But see Rivers v. Katz, 495
N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) (grounding the right to refuse psychotropic medication in
common law principles, New York case law, and New York statutes that affirm a
competent patient’s right to decline medical treatment even when “the recommended
treatment may be beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient’s life”).
468. 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981).
469. Id. at 54 n.12.
470. 504 U.S. 127 (1990).
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used to restore competence could compromise their right to a fair trial.471
Yet, he noted: “The state of our knowledge of antipsychotic drugs and
their side effects is evolving and may one day produce effective drugs
that have only minimal side effects.”472
As the twenty-first century commences, atypical antipsychotics are
indeed shifting judicial attitudes about refusals of antipsychotic
medication by mentally disabled persons. Decisions issued before wide
use of novel agents often contain scathing descriptions of the horrors of
then standard psychiatric treatment of psychotic disorders. Part VI.B
provides summaries and examples of such cases, organized according to
the various types of federal and state constitutional rights putatively
implicated by drug side effects. Part VI.C contains examples of
published holdings from the last decade in which trial level and appellate
court judges have demonstrated an awareness of the advantages of
atypical agents. These cases express less concern about potential side
effects and often emphasize the advantages of antipsychotic medications
to patients that might receive them involuntarily.
B. Constitutional Arguments from the Neuroleptic Era
1. Side Effects and the First Amendment
Professor Bruce J. Winick has argued that involuntary administration
of antipsychotic medication necessarily implicates the First Amendment’s
free expression guarantee473 because psychotropic medications influence
emotions and change how patients think.474 Although State v. Perry475
was decided on state constitutional grounds, this decision invoked
freedom of thought as one of several grounds for barring involuntary
treatment to restore competence for execution. The Louisiana Supreme
Court described involuntarily medicating a condemned inmate as an
471. Id. at 142.
472. Id. at 145.
473. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment was found
applicable to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The Supreme
Court has held that the free speech clause contains protections for related activities,
including the freedom to think about what one wishes. Thus, in ruling unconstitutional a
Georgia law prohibiting private possession of pornographic materials, the Court wrote:
“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power
to control men’s minds.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
474. Winick, supra note 18, at 103.
475. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
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“invasion of his brain and body[,] . . . the seizure of control of [the
prisoner’s] mind and thoughts, and the usurpation of his right to make
decisions,”476 the “chemical[] alter[ation of] his mind and will,”477 and as
compelling the prisoner “to yield control of his thoughts and will to the
state.”478 The court deemed involuntary psychotropic treatment equivalent to
governmental “thought control” prohibited by Stanley v. Georgia.
“Government does not have ‘the power to control men’s minds’ or ‘the
right to control the moral content of a person’s thought.’”479
Though a treatment that could change someone’s thoughts, feelings,
mood, and attitudes might seem to raise First Amendment issues, most
courts have generally not taken Winick’s view. That is, although side
effects of medication could be violative of an individual’s First
Amendment rights, courts have not held that psychotic thinking deserves
First Amendment protection from the intended, beneficial effects of
antipsychotic drugs.480 This makes sense for two reasons. First, persons
who are psychotic have severely impaired thinking abilities, and
antipsychotic medications can, by reducing this impairment, improve
thinking and thereby confer greater freedom of expression on their
recipients. As Gutheil points out: “[P]sychosis is itself involuntary mind
control of the most extensive kind and itself represents the most severe
‘intrusion on the integrity of a human being.’ The physician seeks to
liberate the patient from the chains of illness . . . .”481 Some forms of
psychosis render meaningful expression impossible. During the acute
phase of catatonic schizophrenia, for example,
patients may demonstrate marked negativism or mutism, profound psychomotor
retardation or severe psychomotor agitation, echolalia (repetition of words or
phrases in a nonsensical manner), echopraxia (mimicking the behaviors of
others), or bizarreness of voluntary movements and mannerisms. . . . Patients
with catatonic stupor . . . may remain in the same position for weeks at a
time.482

Second, psychotropic medications do not alter a patient’s thoughts
476. Id. at 747.
477. Id. at 758.
478. Id. at 760.
479. Id. at 758 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565–66 (1969)).
480. Cichon, supra note 35, at 321–24 (noting that “courts have been hesitant to
extend First Amendment protection to disordered thoughts,” but discussing several cases
in which courts found that potential side effects raised First Amendment issues).
481. Gutheil, supra note 455, at 327. Similar reasoning led Judge Brotman to
conclude that in treating a patient who wished “to be cured, not warehoused,” a
hospital’s administration of medication to “alter his thinking disorder cannot be seen as a
first amendment violation.” Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978),
suppl., 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated
and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
482. Pinals & Breier, supra note 52, at 931–32.

1130

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

[VOL. 39: 1033, 2002]

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

Unbuckling the Straitjacket
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

about specific political or social issues. Properly administered, they
improve a psychotic patient’s ability to think about whatever he wishes.
Antipsychotic medications “restore existing imbalance toward the
balanced norm . . . [and] are generally incapable of creating thoughts,
views, ideas or opinions de novo, or of permanently inhibiting the process
of thought generation.”483 As the author has pointed out elsewhere in
discussing the majority’s flawed First Amendment reasoning in Perry:
The majority opinion analyzes “positive symptoms” such as hallucinations and
delusions as though they were unpopular moral viewpoints or expressions of
individual privacy that neuroleptics “suppress.” When neuroleptics alleviate
schizophrenic hallucinations and delusions, however, the drugs do not act on the
basis of the peculiar moral or intellectual content of psychotic thoughts. Thus,
when antipsychotic medications restore patients’ ability to think logically,
entertain doubts about or evidence that conflicts with delusional beliefs,
consider alternatives, formulate coherent sets of wishes, and make those wishes
known, the action of antipsychotic drugs should not be construed as performing
the intrapsychic equivalent of “banning books” or abolishing specific thoughts
because their content is objectionable.
In altering neuronal transmission, antipsychotic medications do not
“censor” particular thoughts, “seize control” of patients’ minds, nor “alter”
patients’ will. Medications also do not let the state “usurp” one’s right to make
decisions. . . . When an individual’s very ability to make (legally cognizable)
decisions does not exist without medication, it makes little sense to suggest that
medication could usurp his “ability to control his own mind and thoughts.”
Neuroleptics are to psychosis what eye glasses are to myopia: both interventions
remove impediments to perception; neither proscribes particular thoughts or
actions, though both may enhance decision-making and the ability to
respond.484

When courts have accepted First Amendment arguments against
involuntary antipsychotic therapy, they usually have done so because of
the drugs’ potential adverse side effects, rather than their therapeutic
impact on thinking.485 For example, in an appellate decision reversing
the district court’s dismissal of an involuntary medication case, the Third
Circuit found that “involuntary administration of drugs which affect
mental processes, . . . could amount . . . to an interference with [the
plaintiff’s] rights under the first amendment.”486 In Rogers v. Okin,487
483. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, “Rotting with their Rights On”:
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306, 308 (1979) (footnote omitted).
484. Douglas Mossman, Denouement of an Execution Competency Case: Is Perry
Pyrrhic?, 23 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 269, 274 (1995) (footnote omitted).
485. Cichon, supra note 35, at 320–22.
486. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976).
487. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), rev’d in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).
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one of the seminal “right to refuse” cases, the district court declared that
“[t]he right to produce a thought . . . is a fundamental element of
freedom.”488 Similarly, the potential side effects of neuroleptics, including
their “capacity to severely and even permanently affect an individual’s
ability to think and communicate,”489 led the Tenth Circuit to rule that
“less restrictive courses of action” should be considered before
medication was forced on a pretrial inmate.490
In some cases, courts have explicitly considered whether side effects
interfere with First Amendment rights, but have rejected this as a basis
for the right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Davis v.
Hubbard cited First Amendment cases as a conceivable basis for a
constitutional right to refuse, but ultimately grounded the right in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process protections.491 In
Rennie v. Klein, the district court held that a medication that induced
“temporary dulling of the senses” did not constitute a First Amendment
violation.492
2. Side Effects and the Eighth Amendment
In cases litigated before Bell v. Wolfish,493 some courts held that
neuroleptic side effects could, under some circumstances, give rise to a
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment,494 particularly if the drugs were used inappropriately in
correctional settings. For example, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the Eighth Amendment applied in a case involving a juvenile correctional
facility where antipsychotic drugs were administered without adequate
medical guidance and were used “not as part of an ongoing
psychotherapeutic program, but for the purpose of controlling excited
behavior.”495
488. Id. at 1367.
489. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1394 (10th Cir. 1984).
490. Id. at 1396.
491. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980). In declining to
ground the protection of “a person’s interest in being free to use his mind as he so
desires” in the First Amendment, the Davis court stated: “It is enough to observe that
‘the power to control men’s minds’ is ‘wholly inconsistent’ not only with the
‘philosophy of the first amendment but with virtually any concept of liberty.’” Id. at 933
(quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565–66 (1964)).
492. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978), suppl., 476 F. Supp.
1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982).
493. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
494. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber makes the Eighth Amendment applicable to states. 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).
495. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 356 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Scott v. Plante,
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Whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual
punishment” applies outside correctional settings is unclear.496 In 1977,
the U.S. Supreme Court avoided the issue, holding that a case addressing
whether the Eighth Amendment applied to corporal punishment
administered in schools497 provided “no occasion . . . to consider
whether or under what circumstances persons involuntarily confined in
mental or juvenile institutions can claim the protection of the Eighth
Amendment.”498 Two years later, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, was the
appropriate vehicle for evaluating constitutional claims about a jail’s
living conditions and restrictions for pretrial detainees.499 In a pre-Bell
decision, the district court ruled that the Eighth Amendment could apply
to psychotropic medication if it were “found to have no proven
therapeutic value and its use was not recognized as acceptable medical
practice, . . . [or] the adverse effects seemed unnecessarily harsh,” or it
were “used improperly and for punishment rather than as part of an
ongoing psychotherapeutic program.”500 Three years later, however,
when the court of appeals issued its decision in the same case, it relied
on Bell to reject the Eighth Amendment as a standard against which to
assess involuntary treatment.501 Patients, the court said, were “entitled to
more humane consideration”502 than convicts. Cichon pointed out,
however, that “[t]he Court [in Bell] did not hold that the Eighth
Amendment protects only those convicted of crimes.”503 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court ruled, in In re K.K.B., that it was a violation of the
Eighth Amendment to use drug treatment on an involuntary patient “for
control or punishment, rather than as part of an on-going psychotherapeutic

532 F.2d 939, 946–47 (3d Cir. 1976) (reinstating an involuntary medication complaint,
citing “conceivable constitutional deprivations,” including “an eighth amendment
issue”), vacated by, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982).
496. Cichon, supra note 35, at 318.
497. The majority ruled that the Eighth Amendment did not apply in this setting.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (stating that the Eighth Amendment “was
designed to protect those convicted of crimes”).
498. Id. at 669 n.37.
499. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
500. Rennie v. Klein, 426 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D.N.J. 1978), suppl., 476 F. Supp.
1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982).
501. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 844 n.10.
502. Id. at 844.
503. Cichon, supra note 35, at 319 n.215 (emphasis added).
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program designed to aid the patient.”504
Although State v. Perry was decided on state constitutional grounds,
the Louisiana Supreme Court certainly characterized the effects and side
effects of competence restoring treatment for a condemned inmate as
cruel and unusual punishment. The court said that after receiving
neuroleptics, the prisoner
will be forced to linger for a protracted period, stripped of the vestiges of
humanity and dignity usually reserved to death row inmates, with the growing
awareness that the state is converting his own mind and body into a vehicle for
his execution.
....
Unlike sane death row prisoners who retain dignity until the end, Perry
would . . . experience an indefinite period of indignity, anxiety and fear,
assimilating unwanted antipsychotic drugs into his brain and body against his
will at the risk of harmful and fatal side effects. . . . These circumstances . . .
[would] degrade human dignity and reach a sum in which there is something
inhuman, barbarous, and analogous to torture.505

3. Side Effects and the Due Process Protections of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments
In Youngberg v. Romeo506 and Vitek v. Jones,507 the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized that mentally disabled patients and prison inmates
retain a liberty right to freedom from certain government intrusions508
despite their having been legally confined. In two later cases,
Washington v. Harper509 and Riggins v. Nevada,510 drug side effects led
the Supreme Court to recognize that convicted prisoners and pretrial
detainees retained liberty rights to avoid unwanted administration of
antipsychotic medication.

504. 609 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1980).
505. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 766, 768 (La. 1992).
506. 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982) (stating that institutionalized persons retain a
substantive due process right of freedom from excessive restraint).
507. 445 U.S. 480, 492–93 (1980) (stating that the transfer of a prisoner to a mental
hospital for treatment without a hearing violates the Due Process Clause because the
prisoner retains the “right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified
intrusions on personal security” (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
508. The Supreme Court’s Vitek decision notes explicitly that at the hospital, the
prisoner might have to undergo a “mandatory behavior modification [program] as a
treatment for mental illness,” but does not describe the program. Id. at 494. According
to the brief filed by Jones’s counsel, the treatment included involuntary administration of
the neuroleptic Thorazine® (chlorpromazine). Brief of Appellee Larry D. Jones at 16,
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (No. 78–1155).
509. 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (stating that a convicted prisoner “possesses a
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
. Amendment”).
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
510. 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992).
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Washington v. Harper examined the propriety of a state prison
procedure that allowed involuntary medication to be given following a
finding by a three member administrative panel that the drug was a
medically appropriate remedy for the inmate’s grave disability or risk of
harm.511 Harper contended that the prison’s procedure was an unconstitutional
violation of his due process rights and that forcible medication should
occur only after a judicial finding that he was incompetent to refuse
treatment.512 The majority opinion recognized the drugs’ potentially
“serious, even fatal” adverse effects and concluded that “forcible
injection of medication into an nonconsenting person’s body represents a
substantial interference with that person’s liberty.”513 Though the
majority holding and the dissent in Harper disagreed on the type of
procedural protections that were constitutionally required, both opinions
agreed that because of the risk and severity of side effects, some sort of
systematic review was necessary before a prisoner could receive
antipsychotic medication over his objection.514
511. The panel consisted of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and associate
superintendent of corrections. For a description of the prison’s policy, see Harper, 494
U.S. at 215–16.
512. The Washington Supreme Court had agreed partially with Harper, stating that:
[A] judicial hearing must be held to determine whether the State can treat a
prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his will. A court may order
imposition of antipsychotic drug treatment upon a nonconsenting prisoner
when the State proves (1) a compelling state interest to administer
antipsychotic drugs, and (2) the administration of the drugs is both necessary
and effective for furthering that interest.
Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358, 364 (Wash. 1988) (en banc), rev’d, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
Notice that the Washington Supreme Court did not require the state to prove that an
inmate is incompetent to make treatment decisions. See id.
513. Harper, 494 U.S. at 229.
514. The majority concluded that the prison’s internal review procedure struck an
acceptable balance between the prisoner’s liberty interests and the prison’s need to
maintain order and protect inmates. Id. at 229–31. Justice Stevens’s dissent maintained
that this procedure was inadequate, because the panel members would be subject to
internal pressure from colleagues and because institutional interests of jail personnel
would undermine their professional judgment about the inmate’s medical condition. Id.
at 251–53 (Stevens J., dissenting). He concluded:
[I]t is difficult to imagine how a committee convened under [the prison’s]
Policy . . . could conceivably discover, much less be persuaded to overrule, an
erroneous or arbitrary decision to medicate or to maintain a specific dosage or
type of drug. Institutional control infects the decisionmakers and the entire
procedure. . . . I would affirm the decision of the Washington Supreme Court
requiring a judicial hearing, with its attendant procedural safeguards, as a
remedy in this case.
Id. at 257 (citation omitted).
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In Riggins, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction and death
sentence of a Nevada prisoner who contended that the antipsychotic drug
Mellaril he received before and during his trial for capital murder had
compromised his right to a fair trial.515 The majority quoted Harper’s
view that forced medication is a substantial interference with liberty.
Citing Harper’s descriptions of the adverse effects of antipsychotic
drugs,516 the Riggins court noted that the interference with a person’s
liberty caused by “antipsychotic drugs like Mellaril . . . is particularly
severe.”517 Comparing Harper’s situation to that of Riggins, the Court
concluded that a pretrial detainee deserved “at least as much protection”
as a prisoner before receiving involuntarily administered drugs.518 The
state could meet its burden by demonstrating that administering a drug
was medically appropriate and necessary for the safety of the inmate or
others, or that there was no less intrusive means for the state to make the
prisoner able to proceed with criminal adjudication.519
Although the Supreme Court has not yet stated what procedural
protections are due to persons institutionalized outside of correctional
settings, many lower court decisions have, again concluding that the side
effects of medications implicate liberty interests that require some sort of
procedural protection. In Davis v. Hubbard,520 a federal district court
examined conditions of treatment at the Lima State Hospital in Ohio.521
As was the case with the Washington Supreme Court’s ruling, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Harper ruling permits involuntary administration of medication irrespective of
the inmate’s capacity to make informed treatment decisions. Harper, 494 U.S. at 226.
Thus, the Harper majority countenances administering antipsychotic drugs over the
objections of competent inmates.
515. Throughout his trial, Riggins received the maximum FDA-approved dose (800
milligrams/day) of the antipsychotic medication thioridazine (trade name Mellaril®).
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 131 (1992). Among conventional antipsychotic
medications, thioridazine has a high potential to cause sedation. HYMAN ET AL., supra
note 9, at 8.
516. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 229–30).
517. Id.
518. Id. at 135.
519. Id.
520. 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
521. In addition to evincing concern about neuroleptics’ side effects, the Davis
court was troubled by how the drugs were being used:
Psychotropic drugs are not only overprescribed; they are also freely
prescribed. They are prescribed by both licensed and unlicensed physicians.
Both licensed and unlicensed physicians regularly prescribe drugs for any
patient in the institution without regard to whether he is personally assigned to
the patient or whether he has even seen the patient. It is not unusual for
attendants to recommend a certain dosage or increased dosage. Such
recommendations are often accepted by the physician without having
examined the patient. Further, when dealing with an especially disturbed
patient, attendants can obtain additional medication by submitting appropriate
forms to the pharmacy when there is no physician available. . . . [P]atients are
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After reviewing the side effects associated with neuroleptics, the court
concluded that a right to refuse treatment derived from each patient’s
constitutional entitlement to “substantive due process, or phrased
differently, as an aspect of ‘liberty’ guaranteed by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”522
Similarly, the final ruling in Rennie v. Klein523 specified that although
exercise of professional judgment was sufficient to override an
involuntary patient’s Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse treatment,
doctors must consider “whether and to what extent the patient will suffer
harmful side effects.”524 Although Project Release v. Prevost525 ultimately
concluded that then-existing New York state regulations were adequate
to protect patients’ due process rights, drug side effects were again cited
as the source of a constitutionally significant liberty.526 In Johnson v.
Silvers,527 the Fourth Circuit relied on Project Release in reaching its
similar conclusion that the side effects of antipsychotic medication were
sufficiently intrusive to implicate protected liberty interests.528
4. Side Effects and Privacy Protections
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health, “many state courts have held that a right to refuse
treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of

generally not given the opportunity to refuse psychotropic drugs, although
roughly 85% of the patients are capable of rationally deciding whether to
consent to their use.
Id. at 926–27. Besides medication issues, the Davis court examined the hospital’s
staffing, treatment planning, and physical plant. Id. at 917–22.
522. Id. at 929.
523. 720 F.2d 266 (1983).
524. Id. at 269. In his concurrence, Judge Seitz noted the “dangerous and
irreversible side effects” of then-available antipsychotic drugs as grounds for explicitly
holding “that the Due Process Clause at a minimum requires the authorities to administer
antipsychotic drugs to an unwilling patient” only when such administration derives from
a professional judgment about the patient’s welfare. Id. at 273–74 (Seitz, C.J.,
concurring).
525. 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
526. Id. at 978–80. In Rivers, a New York appellate court held that state
constitutional guarantees required more extensive procedural protections before
involuntary medication could be administered, including a judicial hearing and
determination of incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Rivers v. Katz, 495
N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986).
527. 742 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1984).
528. Id. at 825.
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privacy.”529 Privacy was first recognized as an implicit constitutional
right in Griswold v. Connecticut, a 1965 U.S. Supreme Court case holding
that state law could not preclude a person’s use of contraception.530 In
those court decisions that rely on privacy rights as reasons for precluding
automatic administration of antipsychotic drugs to nonconsenting
persons, side effects are often cited as the source of this potential
constitutional violation. For example, in Bee v. Greaves,531 the Court of
Appeals of the Tenth Circuit characterized antipsychotic medications as
“potentially dangerous drugs” in concluding “that the decision whether
to accept treatment with antipsychotic drugs is of sufficient importance
to fall within this category of privacy interests protected by the
Constitution.”532 The characterization of antipsychotic therapy as a
“potentially dangerous treatment”533 supported the view of the Court of
Appeals of the First Circuit that “a person has a constitutionally
protected interest in being left free by the state to decide for himself”
whether to receive such medication.534 A scathing description of
antipsychotic drug therapy led the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court to recognize a constitutionally protected privacy interest as the
source of the right of patients or guardians to decide whether to permit
treatment with antipsychotic medication.535
5. Side Effects and State Constitutional Justifications
In a number of cases, state courts have held that individuals enjoy
529. 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990). The Court continued, however, that “we have
never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest.” Id.
530. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). In his plurality opinion, Justice Douglas argued that
“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras” that give citizens “zones of
privacy” protected from state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 484.
Justice Goldberg’s concurrence finds that privacy is a nonenumerated right preserved by
the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, however,
stated that privacy is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and found its basis in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
531. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
532. Id. at 1392–93.
533. Id. at 1395.
534. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated, Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291 (1982).
535. In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 n.9 (Mass. 1981). The Court
deemed antipsychotic therapy an “extraordinary medical treatment.” Id. at 51. The
Court further noted: “We can identify few legitimate medical procedures which are more
intrusive than the forcible injection of antipsychotic medication. . . . [W]e treat these
drugs in the same manner we would treat psychosurgery or electroconvulsive
therapy. . . . [T]he impact of the chemical upon the brain is sufficient to undermine the
foundations of personality.” Id. at 52–53 (footnote omitted).
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additional substantive and procedural protections beyond those that
federal constitutional law requires.536 Here again, the side effects of
antipsychotic drugs have figured prominently in state appellate courts’
deliberations. After summarizing the benefits and adverse effects of
neuroleptic medication,537 the court of appeals in Rivers v. Katz
concluded that New York’s state constitution “affords involuntarily
committed mental patients a fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic
medication.”538 The court directed judicial decisionmakers to consider
“adverse side effects associated with the treatment and any less intrusive
alternative treatments” in determining whether the state had shown, by
clear and convincing evidence, that “the proposed treatment is narrowly
tailored to give substantive effect to the patient’s liberty interest.”539
Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court, after noting that “the final
decision to accept or reject a proposed medical procedure and its
attendant risks is ultimately not a medical decision, but a personal
choice,” found that the intrusive side effects of neuroleptics implicated a
state constitutional right to privacy. This right, the court claimed, could
be protected only by requiring that doctors get judicial approval before
administering medication over a patient’s objection.540
C. Case Law Since the Arrival of Atypical Agents
Since the arrival of novel antipsychotic agents, several courts have
held that the substantive and procedural protections owed to patients
who wished to refuse treatment with neuroleptics also applied to patients
who wished to refuse atypical antipsychotic agents. Some cases discuss
older and newer antipsychotic agents together without mentioning the
special features or more benign side effect profiles of the newer drugs.541
536. The U.S. Supreme Court noted this with specific reference to antipsychotic
medication in Mills v. Rogers. 457 U.S. 291, 299–300 (1982).
537. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 339 n.1 (1986).
538. Id. at 341.
539. Id. at 344.
540. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 145, 148–49 (Minn. 1988).
541. See, e.g., In re Locks, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495, 500 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that
the petitioner being held and treated at state mental hospital for insanity while habeas
relief was sought was not entitled to a hearing to determine his competence to refuse
treatment with haloperidol or olanzapine); State v. Kotis, 984 P.2d 78, 93 (Haw. 1999)
(applying the three-fold test articulated in Riggins v. Nevada to pretrial medication with
novel antipsychotic drugs); In re Frances K., 749 N.E.2d 1082, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)
(using the same statutorily prescribed seven-factor test in jury trial concerning the
administration of psychotropic medication against a patient’s will), appeal denied, 763
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In re Gwendolyn N.542 reversed a trial courts’ involuntary medication
order for older and newer agents because the order did not specify drugs
and dosages. This decision noted that newer antipsychotic “drugs have
fewer side effects” but noted that “death” remains a possible side effect
of the atypicals.543 In Steinkruger v. Miller, the South Dakota Supreme
Court found that previous federal and state case law applied to refusals
of novel antipsychotics, despite its explicit recognition of the advantages
of novel agents. After citing the list of neuroleptic side effects found in
Justice Stevens’s Harper concurrence,544 the Steinkruger court stated: “We
recognize that pharmaceutical advancements have brought into use new
medications with fewer side effects, but adverse reactions have not been
eliminated.”545 The Steinkruger court concluded: “As forced medication intrudes
on a patient’s basic rights, due process requires that psychotropic drugs not
only be deemed medically appropriate, but before approving their forced
administration the court must also consider ‘less intrusive alternatives.’”546
In contrast to the often harsh descriptions of antipsychotic therapy that
one finds in decisions on forced treatment with neuroleptics, a few
appellate decisions concerning involuntary administration of atypical
antipsychotics have described these newer drugs favorably. Moreover,
the reduced risk and superior effectiveness of the novel antipsychotics
have, on occasion, been factors that convinced courts to favor involuntary
treatment.

N.E.2d 318 (Ill. 2001); In re Len P., 706 N.E.2d 104, 108–09 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (stating
that specifying the type and dosage of antipsychotic medication implicated a substantive
right and was not a mere procedural formality and that failure to specify the dose
justified the reversal of the trial court’s medication order); In re Edward S., 698 N.E.2d
186, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (stating that because the state did not make a diligent effort
to tell the patient about the risks and benefits of psychotropic medication, the order to
medicate was manifestly erroneous); In re Mental Commitment of Laura J.M., No. 011174-FT, 2001 Wisc. App. LEXIS 832, at *1 (Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2001) (unpublished
opinion) (reversing the involuntary medication order and remanding because the trial
court failed to make the findings required by Virgil D. v. Rock County, 524 N.W.2d 894
(1994)).
Haloperidol is the generic name for the conventional neuroleptic marketed under the
trade name Haldol®. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 8.
542. 760 N.E.2d 575, 578–79 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
543. Id. at 577.
544. Harper, 494 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that neuroleptic
“reactions include drowsiness, excitement, restlessness, bizarre dreams, hypertension,
nausea, vomiting, loss of appetite, salivation, dry mouth, perspiration, headache, constipation,
blurred vision, impotency, eczema, jaundice, tremors, and muscle spasms”).
545. Steinkruger v. Miller, 612 N.W.2d 591, 598 (S.D. 2000).
546. Id. at 599 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)).
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1. Involuntary Administration of Atypicals to Civil Patients
a. Minnesota Appellate Cases
In a series of Minnesota cases, the advantages of atypicals have been
noted explicitly by appeals courts, and in some instances have served as
reasons for involuntarily administering novel agents, particularly
clozapine. First, In re Stewart547 involved an appeal of an involuntary
medication order in which the trial court authorized either the conventional
neruoleptic loxapine or clozapine. However, Stewart wished to be
treated only with clozapine. Although the appeals court ruled that the
trial court properly left the choice of medication “to the discretion of the
medical professionals,”548 it also noted that the trial court had
“recognized that the use of Clozaril would further reduce the risk of
tardive dyskinesia.”549
Next, Dibley v. Gomez550 concerned a long-term inpatient who denied
that he was mentally ill, but also objected to antipsychotic therapy
because of its side effects. Despite its decision to affirm the trial court’s
involuntary medication order, the appeals court was
concerned about the hospital’s failure to . . . use the newer medications that do
not precipitate the adverse side effects associated with the older
neuroleptics. . . . Clozaril or other new medication may forever eliminate the
need for Dibley to confront the regrettable side effects of traditional
neuroleptics. We must, however, leave to the treating professionals the decision
of how best to proceed.551

In re Tyler552 reviewed a trial court’s authorization of antipsychotic
medication for a patient who had suffered from delusions that ceased
during treatment with the neuroleptic fluphenazine (Prolixin®), but
whose aggressiveness had not sufficiently diminished. His doctors
wanted to prescribe clozapine. In affirming the trial court’s order, the
appeals court noted:

547. No. C3-91-439, 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 697 (Ct. App. July 10, 1991)
(unpublished opinion).
548. Id. at *5.
549. Id. at *3.
550. No. C4-94-870, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 801 (Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1994)
(unpublished opinion).
551. Id. at *6–7.
552. No. C4-95-1432, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1403 (Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1995)
(unpublished opinion).
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Clozaril is known to be more effective with some patients than other
neuroleptics, and he may not experience many of the side effects which Prolixin
causes. . . . There is a possibility that an atypical neuroleptic such as
[r]isperidone or Clozaril may better treat appellant’s remaining problematic
behaviors, and there is little disadvantage to either medication.553

In addition, the superiority of clozapine figured importantly in two
appellate court decisions to allow administration of medication by nasogastric
tube, which would require passing a tube through the patient’s nose and
down his esophagus, if the patient refused to swallow it.
In re Witthans554 concerned a patient who would take haloperidol and
risperidone, but refused clozapine. The patient’s doctors had recommended
clozapine because the patient was not responding to his medication.
Because clozapine cannot be administered by injection, Witthans’s
doctors sought and received the trial court’s permission to administer the
drug via nasogastric tube if Witthans would not swallow it. The
appellate court backed the trial court’s decision. Witthans was not
participating adequately in psychosocial treatments,555 and the appeals
court recognized that “Clozaril can produce significant improvement in
individuals who do not respond to typical neuroleptics.”556 The appeals
court agreed with the trial court that
the use of a nasogastric tube to administer the Clozaril . . . [is] a routine medical
procedure involving no significant risk of serious harm. . . . If appellant
continues his refusal to take it orally, the only alternative is to use a nasogastric
tube. Since there is present medical necessity for the Clozaril, the trial court did
not clearly err in authorizing the use of a nasogastric tube to administer it.557

Involuntary nasogastric tube administration of clozapine was the chief
issue examined in In re Martin.558 Based on evidence heard by the trial
court that clozapine decreased Martin’s delusional preoccupations and
aggressiveness, the appellate court concluded:
Clozaril is a better medication for Martin because it greatly reduces his
symptoms of mental illness and makes him more amenable to other treatment
while avoiding the risk of tardive dyskinesia. . . .
....
. . . If the medication is medically necessary, the means to administer it must be
medically necessary as well. The trial court’s weighing of the extent of the intrusion
of the tube, and authorization of the procedure, were not clearly erroneous.559
553. Id. at *6–7. Although this decision refers to the novel agents clozapine and
risperidone as “neuroleptics,” psychiatrists usually reserve this term for older, “typical”
antipsychotic drugs.
554. No. CX-94-1280, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 934 (Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1994)
(unpublished opinion).
555. Id. at *2–3.
556. Id. at *8.
557. Id. at *8–9.
558. 527 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
559. Id. at 172–73.
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b. Appellate Cases from Other States
In a New York appellate opinion that approved a trial court’s
involuntary medication order, the advantages and diminished side effect
burden of atypicals was acknowledged, and indeed, exaggerated. The
opinion said that giving an incompetent patient antipsychotic therapy “in
turn would allow him to take newer antipsychotic drugs which have no
side effects and to participate in schooling and training programs which
would allow reentry into the community.”560
In re R.A.J.561 reviewed a trial court’s involuntary medication order
that authorized administering either “Haldol and Tegretol or Risperdal
and Tegretol.”562 But because risperidone has fewer side effects that
haloperidol, the appeals court stated that
the least restrictive combination of medications for R.A.J. is oral Risperdal and
Tegretol, and that the combination of injectable Haldol and Tegretol is to be
given only if R.A.J. should change his mind and refuse Risperdal. Accordingly,
we direct modification of the order to authorize the combination of Haldol with
Tegretol only if R.A.J. should refuse Risperdal while it is prescribed. . . .
So modified, we affirm the forced medication order.563

The potential advantages of novel agents in a risk benefit calculus
became the key issue in In re Nancy M.,564 which examined an Illinois
jury’s decision to authorize forced medication with haloperidol,
risperidone, and olanzapine. At trial, the patient’s doctor testified that
haloperidol had more risk of neurological side effects than did the other
drugs. The doctor had requested haloperidol only because the newer
drugs were not injectable, and therefore could not be given to a patient
who might refuse oral therapy.565 In her trial testimony, the patient
denied having a mental illness, but said she would take the novel agents
if ordered because they were less dangerous than Haldol.566
Using a form that did not name any particular drug, the jurors
“returned a general verdict” saying the patient met Illinois’s criteria for
receiving involuntary medication, and the trial court judge authorized all
560. Mausner v. William E., 694 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (App. Div. 1999).
561. 554 N.W.2d 809 (N.D. 1996).
562. Id. at 812. Tegretol® (generic name carbamazepine) is an antiseizure
medication that is sometimes used by psychiatrists to treat emotional and behavioral
conditions, including mania and aggressiveness. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 131–35.
563. In re R.A.J., 554 N.W.2d at 812–13.
564. 739 N.E.2d 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
565. Id. at 610.
566. Id. at 611.
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three medications.567 The appeals court ruled that this was improper.
After reviewing the doctor’s trial “testimony that the medications were
very different,” the appeals court reversed the trial court’s order, citing
the failure of
the verdict forms . . . [to] distinguish the medications. Based on the testimony
presented, the jury reasonably could have found that the benefits of
administering either [o]lanzapine or Risperdal to respondent outweighed the
harm and that the benefit of administering Haldol to respondent did not
outweigh the harm to her. However, the jury’s verdict simply states that respondent
qualifies for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. The
verdict does not show that the jury found that the benefits of administering
Haldol to respondent outweighed the harm it would pose to her, nor does it
show that the benefits of administering Risperdal or [o]lanzapine to respondent
outweighed the harm. The verdict here fails to show that the jury clearly
intended to authorize the involuntary administration of all three medications.568

2. Involuntary Administration of Atypicals to Pretrial Detainees569
The relatively benign side effect profile of the newer antipsychotic
drugs figures importantly in at least three federal court decisions that
concern the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to restore
competence to stand trial. Two570 of these decisions involve Russell
Eugene Weston, Jr., the man charged with killing two Capitol police
officers in July 1998.571
In April 1999, the district court found Weston incompetent to stand
trial and ordered him to undergo competence restoring treatment at a
federal correctional hospital.572 Later that year, the district court
approved involuntary medication for Weston. In March 2000, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeal remanded the case to the district court to
consider whether medication was medically appropriate, necessary to
567. Id.
568. Id. at 615–16.
569. This section focuses on the Weston courts’ recognition of the special properties
of novel agents, and how that recognition has influenced decisionmaking. For a
summary of developments in Weston’s case through March 2000, see Siegel et al., supra
note 35, at 308–12.
570. United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 255 F.3d
873 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
571. On December 10, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Weston’s
appeal of the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision. Weston, 122 S. Ct. 670 (2001). Therefore,
after going three years without antipsychotic medication, Weston finally began receiving
treatment that could permit him to undergo trial. Neely Tucker, High Court Passes on
Capitol Suspect: Decision Clears Way for Medicating Weston, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,
2001, at B01. For a recent case that follows the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning, see United
States v. Arena, No. 00 CR. 398(JFK), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17522 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29,
2001). As of early August 2002, Weston continued to receive antipsychotic medication,
but had not achieved competence to stand trial. Judge Rules Capitol Gunman Can Be
Forced to Take Medicine, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at A11.
572. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
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restore Weston’s competence, and could be administered without unacceptably
compromising Weston’s fair trial rights.573 In his latest ruling, district
court Judge Sullivan concluded that involuntary administration of
antipsychotic medication to Weston could be accomplished in a manner
that met all these tests.
Judge Sullivan’s latest decision contains an extensive574 discussion of
the properties of older and newer antipsychotic drugs. He noted that:
Atypical antipsychotics have a more favorable side effect profile and are better
tolerated by the average patient. . . . Dr. Zonana testified that atypicals have so
few side effects that studies use them on individuals who have not yet been
diagnosed with schizophrenia, but who only have symptoms that suggest they
might develop the disease. . . . In short, “there is a world of difference”
between the antipsychotic medications described in the judicial opinions of the
early 1990s and the current atypical antipsychotic medications now available.575

This helped “persuade the [c]ourt that antipsychotic medication is
appropriate, notwithstanding the potential side effects since they can be
managed with close oversight.”576
The district court also considered whether the side effects of
competence-restoring antipsychotic therapy might impair Weston’s
ability to undergo trial and adversely affect his demeanor and appearance
before a jury. The court noted that drug therapy probably would
improve many trial related abilities, including Weston’s abilities to
consult with counsel, pay attention, and concentrate.577 However, the
advantages of atypicals were central to the court’s conclusions about
how medication would affect Weston’s presentation. Citing psychiatrists’
testimony at hearings concerning the newer medications, Judge Sullivan
specifically addressed the concerns about side effects expressed in
Justice Kennedy’s Riggins concurrence578 as follows:
Advances in the primary antipsychotic medications and adjunct therapies make
such side effects less likely. Additionally, medications that help control side
effects are available and Weston will be very closely monitored. In fact,
antipsychotic medication is likely to make Weston’s affect more, rather than
less, appropriate.579

573. United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
574. The discussion extends for approximately 1000 words, and describes the
benefits and side effects in detail. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 123–25.
575. Id. at 124 (citations omitted) (quoting Dr. Sally Johnson).
576. Id. at 125.
577. Id. at 133.
578. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138–43 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
579. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (citation omitted).
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In a decision issued July 27, 2001, a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.580 After summarizing the
side effects of “typical antipsychotics” and atypical agents in a
footnote,581 the circuit court panel cited the benefits of antipsychotic
therapy as a factor favoring its administration to Weston.
[T]he record [of medical testimony heard by the district court] indicates that
medication will likely enhance rather than impair Weston’s right to a fair
trial. . . . The possibility of side effects from anti-psychotic medication is
undeniable, but the ability of Weston’s treating physicians and the district court
to respond to them substantially reduces the risk they pose to trial fairness.”582

The panel quoted the favorable views of novel agents offered by the
district court’s independent psychiatric expert583 and commented that
“[a]ntipsychotic drugs have progressed since Justice Kennedy discussed
their side effects in Riggins. There is a new generation of medications
having better side effect profiles.”584
The “better side effect profiles” of the atypicals also figured
importantly in recent thinking about competence restoration articulated
by the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit. Like the Weston cases,
United States v. Gomes585 concerned a defendant whose lawyers wished
to have their client avoid involuntarily administered antipsychotic
medication, the purpose of which was to restore competence to proceed
with adjudication.586 The appellate court articulated a five-factor standard
for administering antipsychotic medication under these circumstances,
and sent the case back to the district court for further fact finding related
to these factors.587 However, the court of appeals clearly saw the
580. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
581. Id. at 877 n.3.
582. Id. at 885.
583. “General experience with antipsychotics, particularly the newer medications,
indicates that given their benefits they are reasonably safe and well-tolerated.” Id. at 886
(quoting report of Dr. David G. Daniel, M.D.).
584. Id. at 886 n.7. The panel went on to quote from an article by attorney Paul
Nidich and psychiatrist Jacqueline Collins:
[I]n light of the progress made in the development of new antipsychotic
medications since the Supreme Court’s Riggins decision in 1992, the courts
should revisit this issue with an open mind. . . . [Because of new atypicals,]
the fear of side effects should not weigh heavily in the decision whether to
treat pretrial detainees or civilly committed persons with antipsychotic
medication against their will when that treatment is medically appropriate.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Paul A. Nidich & Jacqueline Collins, Involuntary
Administration of Psychotropic Medication: A Federal Court Update, 11 HEALTH LAW.,
May 1999, at 12, 13).
585. 289 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002).
586. Id. at 75.
587. The five factors are: (1) the government’s interest in prosecuting the defendant
versus the defendant’s interest in being free of medication, (2) the medical
appropriateness of the defendant’s proposed treatment, (3) whether medicating the
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availability of atypicals in much the same light as did the Weston courts:
[W]e first note that significant improvements have been made in antipsychotic
medication in the decade since Justice Kennedy expressed his misgivings in
Riggins. Justice Kennedy himself presciently acknowledged then that “[t]he
state of our knowledge of antipsychotic drugs and their side effects is evolving
and may one day produce effective drugs that have only minimal side effects.”
As the American Psychiatric Association has pointed out [in an amicus brief
filed in the case], a new generation of antipsychotic drugs “largely post-dating
Riggins” and with a “more favorable side effect profile” has appeared. The
American Psychological Association agrees, stating [in an amicus brief filed in
the case] that these new drugs, called atypicals, “generally exhibit equal or
improved therapeutic efficacy in comparison to the traditional or conventional
agents, yet they have a more favorable side effect profile.” Most of the
atypicals present relatively low risks of the serious side effects associated with
conventional drugs such as Mellaril, the drug at issue in Riggins.
Gomes’s effort to discount the significance of the atypicals is not
convincing.588

D. Observations and Comments
Although several years have passed since risperidone became
defendant was necessary because less invasive means of restoring competency are not
available, (4) the need for continued monitoring of the defendant to assess the actual
effects of medication on the defendant’s ability to stand trial, and (5) the impact of
medication on a defendant’ s ability to mount an insanity defense. Id. at 85–88. The
court of appeals reasoned that the lower court’s decision to permit involuntary
medication had not adequately addressed the first four of these factors. Id. at 85.
In articulating this standard, the Gomes court determined, as did the court in
Weston, that heightened scrutiny was the appropriate standard for evaluating whether
involuntary medication would adversely affect a pretrial detainee’s due process rights.
Id. at 82; Weston, 255 F.3d at 880. By contrast, in a case involving use of antipsychotic
drugs to restore competence of a defendant charged with mailing a threatening letter, the
Sixth Circuit held that courts must apply a strict scrutiny standard when the state wishes
to forcibly medicate a nondangerous pretrial detainee. United States v. Brandon, 158
F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998). In a case involving a dentist charged with filing false
Medicaid and private insurance claims, the Eighth Circuit adopted heightened scrutiny as
its standard, and explicitly rejected the strict scrutiny approach taken in Brandon. United
States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567–68 (8th Cir. 2002). On November 4, 2002, the U.S.
Supreme Court agreed to review the Sell decision solely on “the following question:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting petitioner’s argument that allowing the
government to administer antipsychotic medication against his will solely to render him
competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses would violate his rights under the First,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.” Sell v. United States, No. 02-5664, 2002 U.S. LEXIS
8315, at *1 (Nov. 4, 2002). One may expect that the Supreme Court’s decision will
resolve the conflicting standards for reviewing involuntary competence; it will be
interesting to see whether the availability and properties of novel antipsychotics play a
role in the Court’s opinion.
588. Gomes, 289 F.3d at 83 (citations omitted).
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available in the U.S. as a first-line therapy for psychosis, the ultimate
impact of current and future novel agents on “right to refuse treatment”
litigation remains unclear. For several reasons, it seems very unlikely
that courts will undo the cautions and procedural protections embodied
in litigation that addressed involuntary treatment with older, more
noxious antipsychotic drugs. First, the newer drugs, though much more
tolerable, still carry some risk of the neurological side effects that
alarmed courts in the 1970s and 1980s. Second, the newer drugs appear
to place patients at more risk than neuroleptics of developing
troublesome metabolic conditions, including obesity, alterations in lipid
metabolism, and diabetes mellitus.589 Though these conditions are not as
uncomfortable as the acute neurological side effects induced by
neuroleptics, they are sources of concern for doctors and patients and
should receive courts’ consideration as well.590 Third, when the new
drugs serve their intended purpose, they lead to changes in the way
patients think. Almost any reasonable observer would characterize
quelling psychosis as a desirable outcome of medical treatment. Yet this
means that novel antipsychotic drugs are indeed “mind altering,” and
their unwanted administration therefore should raise legally significant
questions about intrusions into a person’s privacy. Finally, current legal
rules and procedures concerning involuntary drug therapy may, and
probably should, be preserved because they serve a valuable ethical
purpose beyond protecting patients from side effects. Even if legal
barriers to automatic administration of unwanted medication were
initially justified in consequentialist terms, these protections also serve
the nonconsequentialist purpose of respecting the personhood of
patients. This is especially true in those states that require a judicial
finding of incompetence before authorization of involuntary medication.
Though courts can be expected to preserve currently existing legal
barriers against automatic treatment of drug refusing psychotic patients,
In re Tyler, In re Martin, In re Nancy M., Gomes, and the Weston
decisions may show us how future courts will evaluate and make
decisions about involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs. In these
cases and others discussed in the previous Part, the flaws of antipsychotic
medications are often noted, but so are their benefits. Gone are extensive
judicial diatribes about horrible side effects that all but ignore the benefits of
medication and the horror of being psychotic. In some cases, courts have
even endorsed the values of antipsychotic therapy, and because such treatment
589. See supra notes 236–38 and accompanying text.
590. Both of the Weston decisions did so explicitly. See United States v. Weston,
134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 124 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Weston,
255 F.3d at 877 n.3.
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can be delivered with less risk to a patient’s nervous system, judges have
seemed more willing to approve of its involuntary administration.
The cases discussed in Part VI.C also demonstrate that at least some
courts are capable of receiving and understanding complicated, nuanced
scientific information about currently available antipsychotic therapy.
This should encourage psychiatrists and other medical experts who
testify or otherwise provide information about treatment to courts. Psychiatrists
have always had an obligation, when presenting information to courts, to
provide legal decisionmakers with up-to-date, detailed information on
newly developed treatments. Recent legal developments give psychiatrists
reason to believe that when judges consider information about antipsychotic
therapy, they now may be more inclined to accept physicians’ generally
pro-treatment position and less persuaded by the antimedication views of
some patient advocates.
VII. CASES MENTIONING NOVEL ANTIPSYCHOTICS: A SHORT
QUANTITATIVE SUMMARY
The previous Parts review legal issues concerning novel antipsychotic
agents that have been addressed in cases published as of late June 2002.
Can we gain additional insight into these cases by examining them as a group?
Figures 1 and 2 address this question by summarizing information from
cases listed in this Article’s Appendix, which constitute all cases as of
October 1, 2002 in the LEXIS database of federal and state cases after
1944591 discovered using the search strategy described earlier.592 Figure 1
describes the frequency with which cases mention the various atypical
agents.593 Most cases mention a single drug. Olanzapine and risperidone
are the drugs most frequently named, appearing in fifty-five and ninetynine cases, respectively. This finding in part reflects the fact that these
drugs were the first two first-line atypical antipsychotics approved in the
U.S.594 At least five cases contain language referring to the special
591. This database provides all available case law decided since 1945, including
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal courts of appeals, federal district courts
and state cases. It also includes decisions of specialty courts dealing with military
appeals, customs, patents, tax law, trade, commerce, veterans’ appeals, and bankruptcy.
592. See supra note 28.
593. In both Figures, “clz” refers to a case that mentions clozapine, “rsp” to one that
mentions risperidone, “olz” to olanzapine, and “que” to quetiapine. No case had yet mentioned
the latest novel agent, ziprasidone. The abbreviation “atyp” designates cases that discuss
the properties of atypical agents in general, independent of mentioning a specific drug.
594. See supra Parts III.D.1, III.D.2.
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properties of atypical antipsychotics, either from testifying physicians,595 or
from the court itself.596
Figure 2 shows the frequency with which each drug has been
mentioned since atypical agents became available.597 Looked at this
way, the corpus of cases suggest the following trends.
First, with one exception (1997), no more than six cases mentioning
clozapine have appeared each year, and such cases do not seem to be
increasing in frequency. One reason for this is that clozapine’s use is
largely restricted to patients that cannot tolerate or benefit from other
antipsychotic agents.598 Therefore, only a fraction of patients who need
antipsychotic therapy take clozapine, and the drug receives a limited
number of mentions. However, as the discussions in previous Parts of
this Article have shown, many cases that refer to clozapine have addressed
major legal issues concerning the use or availability of atypical agents.599
When courts address important principles related to antipsychotic therapy,
clozapine often gets mentioned. Yet, courts hear just a few cases each
year that raise such issues, and the rate at which this occurs has been
fairly constant.
Second, an increasing number of cases are mentioning novel
antipsychotic agents. Cases mentioning risperidone first appear in 1994, the
year of the drug’s U.S. release, and increase steadily in frequency after that.

595. United States v. Gigante, 996 F. Supp. 194, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting
psychiatric testimony that “[m]odern day atypical anti-psychotic medication has
completely destroyed th[e] myth” that “[c]onsistent deterioration of personality
functioning is . . . the rule when talking about psychotic disorders such as
schizophrenia”), amended by 989 F. Supp. 436 (1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999);
State v. Jung, 724 N.E.2d 1262, 1263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (quoting psychiatrist
Douglas Songer as asserting “that there are several newer medications which have fewer
side effects” than neuroleptics which had bothered the patient).
596. United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 877 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (differentiating
atypicals and typical agents, that is, neuroleptics); United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp.
2d 115, 124 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“‘[T]here is a world of
difference’ between the antipsychotic medications described in the judicial opinions of
the early 1990s and the current atypical antipsychotic medications now available.”
(quoting Dr. Sally Johnson)); Mausner v. William E., 694 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (App. Div.
1999) (discussing “newer antipsychotic drugs which have no side effects”).
597. Although clozapine became available in late 1989, no case mentioned any
atypical agent until 1990. Data shown for 2002 represent those cases that had been placed in
the LEXIS database of federal and state cases after 1944, as of October 7, 2002.
598. See supra Part III.D.1.
599. See, e.g., Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 1996) (prisoners’ access to
clozapine); Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990); O’Keefe v. Orea,
731 So. 2d 680, 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring a psychiatrist to disclose
clozapine as a treatment option); Alexander L. v. Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (Sup. Ct.
1992) (inclusion of clozapine in Medicaid formulary); supra Part VI.C.1.a (discussing
five cases mentioning clozapine while discussing special properties of atypicals as they
relate to the involuntarily administered therapy).
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A similar pattern obtains for olanzapine, and perhaps for quetiapine,
which psychiatrists appear to have used less than the two other first-line
novel agents. In contrast to what one finds in the clozapine cases, many
cases that mention the other novel agents are not concerned with
medication issues themselves. The drugs’ names simply appear in
descriptions of the treatment received by persons with psychiatric
disorders. Exceptions to this finding are found in cases that mention
more than one atypical agent. Often, for example, olanzapine and
risperidone occur together as examples of new antipsychotics that are
recognized to have different and usually more desirable properties when
compared to the older antipsychotic drugs.600
A third point emerges when one determines what fraction of all cases
discuss antipsychotic drugs discuss novel agents. A search of the LEXIS
database of federal and state cases after 1944 for the years 2000 and
2001, using a strategy that contained names of the most commonly used
neuroleptics as well as novel antipsychotic drugs601 yielded 265 cases
that mentioned an antipsychotic drug by name. Sixty-five of these cases
included the name of one or more atypical antipsychotics. In other
words, at a time when an estimated three-fourths of U.S. antipsychotic
drug prescriptions were for novel agents,602 fewer than one quarter of the
published cases mentioning antipsychotic therapies referred to atypicals.
Clearly, the frequency with which various drugs are mentioned in U.S.
case law does not reflect American psychiatrists’ current pattern of drug
selection.

600. See, e.g., In re Nancy M., 739 N.E.2d 607, 610, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(finding that with the doctor’s testimony that risperidone and olanzapine “have the same
possible neurological side effects [as neuroleptics] but at a substantially reduced rate,”
the jury reasonably could have concluded that the benefits of atypicals outweighed their
risks, but that the opposite was true for haloperidol); In re Len P., 706 N.E.2d 104, 106
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (stating that the newer drugs “have fewer side effects”); Baer v.
Baer, 738 A.2d 923, 926 n.2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (doctor recommends risperidone
or olanzapine as “safe medicines”); Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 96-11156(001-004),
1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 664, at *3 (Dist. Ct. Dec. 18, 1998) (noting that pretrial
detainee regained competence with risperidone, “an atypical antipsychotic medication,”
after treatment with a neuroleptic had been unsuccessful).
601. The search strategy was: “cloza! or risperid! or resperid! or respirid! or risperd!
or resperd! or respird! or olanzap! or zyprexa or quetiapine or seroquel or ziprasidone or
geodon or haldol or haloperidol or navane or thiothixene or mellaril or thioridazine or
trilafon or perphenazine or molindone or moban or stelazine or trifluoperazine or
prolixin or fluphenazine or loxitane or loxapine or thorazine or chlorpromazine and
date(geq (01/01/2000) and leq (01/01/2002)).”
602. Kapur & Remington, supra note 204, at 1361.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
For patients who need antipsychotic therapy and for the psychiatrists
who provide their care, the arrival of novel antipsychotic drugs has had
enormous therapeutic significance. Older antipsychotic agents clearly
helped most psychotic patients who took them and freed many psychotic
patients from the horrors of their illness. Yet for many persons, neuroleptic
therapy was an unpleasant experience fraught with uncomfortable side
effects and risk to the nervous system, and, for a small fraction of the
millions of patients who took the older antipsychotic drugs, their
experience could rightfully be likened to being placed in a chemical
straitjacket.603 Atypical agents have all the antipsychotic benefits of the
older drugs but are more easily administered at doses that cause few or
no extrapyramidal side effects.604 In addition, investigators are developing
and accumulating evidence that these drugs, when administered to
persons with schizophrenia, may rectify some of the neuropsychological
dysfunction that underlies and contributes to the disability associated
with the disorder.605
Because antipsychotic therapy is, in so many situations, a legally as
well as medically significant phenomenon, current trends in the
psychopharmacology of psychotic disorders are important to attorneys
who represent and judges who hear cases concerning mentally disabled
litigants. Moreover, an understanding of what schizophrenia is and of
how its current treatment works is vital to the work of scholars and
academics who supply legal decision makers with perspectives on the
issues faced by litigants who take antipsychotic drugs. This Article has
endeavored to explain to legal readers how psychiatrists think about
antipsychotic medications and the illnesses they treat. The Article has
also tried to suggest several ways in which an important development in
psychiatric medicine has a growing legal significance, that is, has altered
the way attorneys and courts should think about the actions and legal
ramifications of antipsychotic drugs.
603. This experience was, for the vast majority of patients, avoidable through the
skillful prescription and monitoring of medication. Unfortunately, psychiatrists’ dosing
practices typically fell far short of the ideal. See Mossman, supra note 227, at 66, 71–72
(describing psychiatrists’ ham-handed dosing of neuroleptics and their nonclinical
reasons for using needlessly large amounts of these drugs).
604. Jibson & Tandon, supra note 20, at 223.
605. See supra Part II.A.3.e (discussing cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia);
supra notes 206–07 (citing studies concerning partial reversal of deficits using novel agents).
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To summarize this Article’s major points:
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)
(7)
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As of October 2002, nearly 200 published cases had
mentioned novel antipsychotic agents. These cases
feature discussions of informed consent, the right to
refuse treatment, and the rights of Medicaid patients and
prisoners to have these drugs available.
Psychiatry’s perception of what schizophrenia is changed
markedly in the last three decades of the twentieth
century. During that period, scientists accumulated a
huge body of evidence from sources such as genetic
studies, population studies, and brain imaging procedures,
which shows that schizophrenia is a brain-based disorder.
The crazy beliefs, hearing voices, social withdrawal, apathy,
and other clinically detectable symptoms of schizophrenia
reflect faulty brain circuitry. Although signs and symptoms
vary enormously over time and among persons with
schizophrenia, persons with the disorder typically have
distinctive problems in performing discrete, precisely
measurable neuropsychological tasks.
The novel antipsychotic agents appear to have several
advantages over older neuroleptics.
These include
reduced neuromotor side effects, lower risk of tardive
dyskinesia, fewer drug-induced negative symptoms, and
the potential to alleviate cognitive deficits and improve
patients’ social functioning. Also, patients who have
taken both types of medication typically prefer the newer
drugs.
Novel agents are not free of side effects. As a group, they
appear more likely than older neuroleptics to induce
weight gain and related metabolic problems, including
diabetes mellitus and hyperlipidemia.
At present, the chief disadvantage of novel agents is their
high acquisition cost relative to oral neuroleptics.
Because of this, third party payers, including public sector
hospitals and employer funded managed care
organizations, have a financial incentive to limit access to
the newer drugs. This does not mean, however, that
payers will act on these incentives.
Despite the claims of several extant pharmacoeconomic
studies, prescribing novel agents may not yield enough
savings to completely offset the higher cost of the new drugs.
A growing number of American psychiatrists believe that

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

[VOL. 39: 1033, 2002]

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

Unbuckling the Straitjacket
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

novel agents should be the first-line therapy for patients
that need antipsychotic medication.
A respectable
minority of psychiatrists has questioned this
recommendation, however, and it remains the case that a
substantial fraction of prescriptions for antipsychotic
medications are written for neuroleptics.
Despite
suggestions from some psychiatrists and attorneys to the
contrary, psychiatrists appear not to be at risk of being
held liable simply because they have continued to
prescribe conventional antipsychotics.
Damages that stem from failing to properly inform
patients about the option of taking newer medications
appear more likely to give rise to successful malpractice
litigation.
Conceivably, plaintiffs might also sue doctors for failing
to minimize risk of harm to self or others. Reports
suggesting that atypicals reduce aggression and lower the
likelihood of suicide might support such claims.
Lack of access to atypicals has attracted the attention of
legal scholars as a potential source of civil rights claims or
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Extant
litigation and several published appellate decisions have
already signified that these areas, rather than malpractice
cases, could become a major source of medication-related
liability.
Cases litigated before the early 1990s often contain severe
criticisms of antipsychotic therapies. By contrast, in
several recently decided cases that mention novel agents,
one detects less judicial concern about drug side effects
and more recognition of the benefits of antipsychotic
medications to patients who might receive them involuntarily.
These recently decided cases also show that some courts
can receive and assimilate complicated, nuanced scientific
information about currently available antipsychotic therapy.
This should encourage psychiatrists and give them reason
to believe that courts may be more sympathetic to
physicians’ pro-treatment positions than to the frequently
asserted anti-medication views of some patient advocates.
Although the names of novel agents are appearing with
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increased frequency in U.S. case law, older agents still
account for the majority of instances in which published
decisions discuss antipsychotic therapy.
Chemical straitjacketing is rapidly becoming an unusual phenomenon
for patients who take antipsychotic medication. The last decade’s advances
in psychopharmacology require courts and legal scholars to re-evaluate
the role and value of antipsychotic drugs without being misled by
distorted and increasingly outdated views found in existing case law and
secondary legal sources.
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IX. APPENDIX
CASES MENTIONING NOVEL ANTIPSYCHOTIC AGENTS
SEARCH COMPLETED JULY 1, 2002
CASE NAME
1. In re Ingram
2. Visser v. Taylor
3. Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Inc.
v. White
4. In re M.H.
5. In re Reinhold
6. In re Stewart
7. Adelson v. GTE Corp.
8. Alexander L. v. Cuomo
9. Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Inc.
v. White
10. Holmes v. Kizer
11. In re Welsh
12. Lafleur v. Hogan

13. Miller v. Dep’t of Corr.
14. Dibley v. Gomez
15. In re Witthans
16. People v. Bell
17. Hanafin v. United States

CITE
No. C2-90-700, 1990 Min. App. LEXIS 723
(Minn. Ct. App. July 24, 1990).
756 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1990).
No. 90-6389, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15994 (E.
D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1991).
475 N.W.2d 552 (N.D. 1991).
No. C1-90-2650, 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS
314 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 1991).
No. C3-91-439, 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS
697 (Minn. Ct. App. July 16, 1991).
790 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1992).
588 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
No. 90-6389, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13191 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1992).
13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 746 (Ct. App. 1992).
No. 6666, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 17, 1992).
No. CV 89-0370170 S, 1993 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2673 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 13,
1993).
998 F.2d 1001 (1st Cir. 1993) (unpublished
table decision).
No. C4-94-870, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS
801 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1994).
No. CX-94-1280, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS
934 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1994).
36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 746 (Ct. App. 1994).
No. 1:95:CV:128, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14450 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 1995).
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18.
19.
20.
21.

In re Herbolsheimer
Hertwig-Brilliant v. Wright
In re Martin
In re Tyler

22. Lopez v. Chater
23. Allen v. Wray

24. Gates v. Shinn
25. In re Bradshaw
26.
27.
28.
29.

In re R.A.J.
Bisch v. Lindquist
In re Israel
State v. Martin

30. State of Pallotolo
31. Clements v. Clements

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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DeSario v. Thomas
In re Joseph O.
In re G.B.R.
Jurasek v. Payne
Presto v. Charter Peachford
Behavioral Health Sys., Inc.
Presto v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp.
Suel v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs.
U.S. v. Gigante
U.S. v. Moses
Wyatt v. Rogers
Commonwealth v. Brown

1/30/2020 4:01 PM

650 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
622 N.Y.S.2d 450 (App. Div. 1995).
527 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
No. C4-95-1432, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS
1403 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1995).
No. 94 C 832, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18136 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1995).
No. 01A0l-9511-CH-00505, 1996 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19,
1996).
98 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1996).
No. C4-95-2225, 1996 Minn. App. LEXIS 77
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1996).
554 N.W.2d 809 (N.D. 1996).
542 N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 1996).
664 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
No. 02-C0l-9512-CR-00374, 1996 Tenn.
Crim. App. LEXIS 745 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Dec. 2, 1996).
No. CR21-21986, 1996 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 29 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1996).
No. FA 95328252, 1997 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2036 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 24,
1997).
963 F. Supp. 120 (D. Conn. 1997).
666 N.Y.S.2d 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
953 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App. 1997).
959 F. Supp. 1441 (D. Utah 1997).
494 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
487 S.E.2d 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
No. 90-935V, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS
210 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 22, 1997).
996 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
106 F.3d 1273 (6th Cir. 1997).
985 F. Supp. 1356 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
No. 96-11156(001-004), 1998 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 664 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Dec. 18,
1998).
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43. Dinardo v. State
44. Dunson v. Stricklin
45. Hesler v. Osawatomie State
Hosp.
46. Hurt v. State
47. In re Anonymous
48. In re J.V.N.
49. O’Keefe v. Orea
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

People v. Barichello
In re Barry B.
In re Edward S.
People v. Harris
In re J.J.C.
In re Perona
Roth v. Blue Cross

57. Smyrski v. Weber
58. United States v. Cochran
59. Baer v. Baer
60. Baker v. Lane County
61. Best v. Best
62. Closs v. Weber
63. Dion v. O’Keefe

64. Dunbar v. Brown
65. Eres v. County of Alameda

742 So. 2d 287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
No. 96-0072-CB-S, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11082 (S.D. Ala. July 7, 1998)
971 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1999).
694 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)
1998 Pa. D. & C. LEXIS 20 (Pa. July
15, 1998).
1998 Pa. D. & C. LEXIS 147 (Berks
County, Oct. 29, 1998).
731 So. 2d 680 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
711 N.E.2d 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
693 N.E.2d 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
698 N.E.2d 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689 (Ct. App. 1998).
689 N.E.2d 1172 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998).
690 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998).
No. 95-CV-1332, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15554 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1998).
No. 32942, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1218 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 1, 1998).
No. 97-6314, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
2889 (4th Cir. 1998).
738 A.2d 923 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
33 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (D. Or. 1999).
No. A-98-632, 1999 Neb. App. LEXIS
107 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1999).
87 F. Supp. 2d 921 (D.S.D. 1999).
No. C2-99-191, 1999 Minn. App.
LEXIS 818 (Minn. Ct. App. July 20,
1999).
No. 97-951, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4441 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 1999).
No. C-96-2094, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1385 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1999).
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66. In re M.M.
67. In re TT Boat Corp.
68. Kevin S.E. v. Diana M.E.
69. Mausner v. William E.
70. Ohene Boakye-Yiadom v. City &
County of San Francisco
71. People v. Callahan
72. In re Len P.
73. Pudlo v. Pudlo
74. Sobowitz v. Sobowitz

75. State v. Jung
76. State v. Kotis
77. State v. Williams
78. Steadman v. Newhart
79. Blackston v. Warner-Lambert
Co.
80. Consilvio v. Diana W.
81. In re Moenisha B.
82. Floyd v. State

83. In re Breanna R.
84. In re Campbell
85. In re Curtis
86. In re E.L.
87. In re Erin B.
88. In re Locks
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No. 09-98-234, 1999 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1502 (Tex. App. Mar. 4, 1999).
No. 98-0494, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19541 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 1999).
520 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 1999).
694 N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999).
No. C-99-0574, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12981 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18,
1999).
87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838 (Ct. App. 1999).
706 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
No. 016336, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS
3110 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 1999).
No. FA 980719025, 1999 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2758 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Oct. 13, 1999).
724 N.E.2d 1262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
984 P.2d 78 (Haw. 1999).
No. 98-CA-1, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS
6426 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1999).
No. 2:98CV260, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11768 (E.D. Va. July 1, 1999).
No. CV-98-P-2974-S, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1114 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2000)
703 N.Y.S.2d 144 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000).
2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1241
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 19, 2000).
No. M2000-00318-CCA-R3-CD
2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 991
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2000).
2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 766 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2001).
116 F. Supp. 2d 937 (M.D. Tenn.
2000).
No. 9-99-74, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS
1708 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2000).
736 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000).
751 So. 2d 946 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303 (Ct. App. 1999).
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89.
90.

In re Locks
In re Samuel P.

91. In re D.L.M.
92. Logerquist v. McVey
93. McClellan v. Apfel
94. Montgomery v. State
95. Nevis v. Apfel
96.
97.
98.

People v. Melka
In re Nancy M.
In re Rayshawn P.

99. Saltzman v. Apfel
100. State v. Goldsberry
101. Thompson v. State
102. United States v. Keeven
103. Allen v. Apfel
104. Bolling v. Massanari
105. Brown v. United States
106. Collier v. Ram Partners, Inc.
107. Commonwealth v. Morasse
108. DeBuhr v. Barnhart
109. Dixon v. Hensley
110. In re Jacob R.
111. In re Laura J.M.

94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495 (Ct. App. 2000).
No. L-99-1153, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS
1626 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2000).
31 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000).
No. 98-1288-WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5333 (D. Kan. Apr. 12, 2000).
781 So. 2d 1007 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
No. C 98-04953 SI, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4174 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2000).
744 N.E.2d 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
739 N.E.2d 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3346 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 2000).
125 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 115 (Del.
Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2000).
No. 14-98-00643-CR, 2000 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3581 (Tex. Ct. App. June 1, 2000).
115 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
No. 00-0705, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2940 (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 2001).
No. 00 C 6717, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9203 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2001).
766 A.2d 530 (D.C. 2001).
159 F. Supp. 2d 889 (D. Md. Aug. 21,
2001).
No. 9977CR1999-01420, 2001 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 511 (Mass. Dec. 4, 2001).
No. C01-4018-MWB, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23455 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 18, 2001).
No. 3:99-CV-1513, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1952 (D. Conn. Feb. 16, 2001).
2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2739 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 2001).
635 N.W.2d 28 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001)
(unpublished table decision).

1161

FINALMOSSMAN.DOC

112. In re Oliver

113. In re P.G.R.
114. Jones ‘El v. Berge
115. Kujawski v. United States Filter
Wastewater Group, Inc.
116. LaSalle v. Benson Car Co.
117. McCollom v. State
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Patten v. Nichols
In re Frances K.
In re Gwendolyn N.
People v. Kirchner
People v. Simmons

123. Rector v. Bridgestone (U.S.A.),
Inc.
124. Ricci v. Apfel
125. Salvador L. v. Superior Court
of Orange County 2001
126. San Diego Trolley v. Superior
Court
127. Smith v. Mann
128. State v. Hutchins

129. State v. Muncie
130. Turnage v. Massanari
131. United States v. Arena
132. United States v. Jiminez-Villasenor
133. United States v. Juvenile Male N.R.
134. United States v. Weston
135. United States v. Weston
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No. CA2001-01-006, 2001 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3462 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6,
2001).
No. C7-01-396, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS
1053 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2001).
164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
No. 00-1151, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17578 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2001).
783 So. 2d 404 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
No. 07-00-0282-CR, 2001 Tex. App.
LEXIS 959 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2001).
274 F.3d 829 (4th Cir. 2001).
749 N.E.2d 1082 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
760 N.E.2d 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
743 N.E.2d 94 (Ill. 2000).
No. B149356, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 975 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2001).
No. M1999-02284-WC-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn.
LEXIS 496, (Tenn. June 11, 2001).
No. 00-2253, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5650 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2001).
No. G029690, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 668 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2001).
105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476 (Ct. App. 2001).
No. 0206-01-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS
703 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2001).
No. 1-325/99-1959, 2001 Iowa App.
LEXIS 474 (Iowa Ct. App. July 18,
2001).
746 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2001).
No. 00-6110, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15731 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2001).
No. 00 Cr. 398, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17522 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2001).
270 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 2001).
No. 01-1489, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
25931 (8th Cir. Dec. 3, 2001).
134 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2001).
255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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136. Vanisi v. State
137. Waldron v. State
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